Grenfell Inquiry day 33: ‘Oh my God, we've been telling people to stay put’

Control room officer Sharon Darby was grilled at the inquiry today, primarily about the way information was passed from 999 callers in the west London tower to firefighters trying to help them – via control room staff in Stratford, to the east of the capital.

She also commented on an issue discussed in length in previous sessions – that a decision not to turn on the TV in the control centre meant those directing the operation had not seen images of how the fire spread.

She said in a written statement released by the inquiry today: “There were no TVs on [at] Stratford and I did not see anything relating to the fire until about 5am when it started to get much quieter in the control room.

“We had purely been reliant on the crews to update us on what was happening. I remember Googling the fire and [thought] to myself, ‘oh my God, we’ve been telling people to stay put...’”

She also explained that information stopped being passed to firefighters on the ground via radio, and was communicated by phone instead. “Initially it was all done through the radio,” she said. “It got to a point where we were taking a lot of fire survival guidance calls – and the radio is not just for passing these it is also... taking other messages.

“Due to the amount of calls being taken, the decision was made to start passing messages to [then-station manager on development Jason Oliff] as he was on the phone to the ground, because it was quicker that way.”

Ms Darby conceded there could possibly have been an overlap where messages were being passed both by radio and phone.

A senior member of the fire team that tackled the Grenfell Tower blaze also admitted today that he couldn’t account for a 45-minute gap between firefighters taking breathing apparatus off a fire engine and deploying it within the burning building.

Michael Mulholland – who was manager of Wimbledon Fire Station on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June last year – today gave evidence to the inquiry into the tragedy.

He was at home when he received a message about the blaze in his capacity as part of the operational review team. As he travelled to the incident, the scale of the fire and the escalating response to it became apparent.

Mr Mulholland was shown a spreadsheet compiled by the London Fire Brigade from electronic data collected from breathing apparatus sets used at Grenfell Tower on the night of the fire.

One set was disconnected from a vehicle attributed to Euston Fire Station at 2.18am but was only switched on at 3.03am. Mr Mulholland was asked whether he could explain why that gap existed before deployment of the apparatus.

“No I can’t,” he said.

“I wouldn’t know what time Euston booked in at the incident, where they parked their vehicle. I can’t explain the time… It could be that they were held for a while before being called to the bridgehead.”

Equipment was again discussed at the inquiry.

Mr Mulholland said positive pressure ventilation fans (PPV) were requested amid fears the bridgehead – a frontline operational hub established by fire chiefs towards the base of the tower – could be overwhelmed by smoke.

Asked if he knew why the PPV took an hour to arrive, he said: “No I don’t.”

In the end the PPV proved ineffective and fire chiefs were forced to solve the problem using a less high-tech method. “There was a conversation… to smash the windows in the ground floor lobby to try to alleviate the smoke conditions we were experiencing.”