Grenfell Inquiry day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described

Firefighter Andrew Peckham was questioned extensively on the technical capacities of the command unit on the ground at Grenfell Tower.

He revealed that firefighters had several pieces of equipment that had “never worked” and he was never trained in how to use them.

Mr Peckham was challenged on a conversation his colleague Norman Harrison had previously described. According to Mr Harrison, he told another firefighter, Dan Egan, within Mr Peckham’s hearing, that the stay put advice being given to residents was wrong.

According to Mr Peckham, the stay put advice was in “constant discussion” and “certainly on people’s minds”, but he was unable to remember specifically what was said.

When asked what his own, unexpressed opinion had been at the time, Mr Peckham replied after some hesitation: “A lot of internal conflict going on with that, but yes, I would have said if you can get out, get out.”

Mr Peckham, who has been a firefighter since 2002, said he became “frustrated” after receiving limited information from the bridgehead – where the firefighting operation was based – about the progress being made to save people trapped in flats.

In his written evidence, he said: “I was frustrated at the lack of information coming through regarding rescues it felt we had no idea of the progress of the rescue and at times from within the command unit and it made me wish I could ‘throw on’ a suit and get in there to help.”

The day’s evidence had begun with watch manager Louisa De Silvo discussing the attempts of a crew attempting to reach people trapped on the 23rd floor.

It emerged the crew likely never reached this family – instead stopping to rescue casualties they encountered on the way up.

“This was a common thing for quite a lot of the crews” said Ms De Silvo. “We were briefing them to go to certain flats, on their way there they were coming across casualties in stairwells, people asking for help… so often weren’t able to get where they were briefed to go because you rescue the casualties in front of you.”

However, she told the inquiry she could not say for certain whether crews were making it to the flats they were being sent to. “They [often] had no idea what flats they were in or floors because they had zero visibility,” she said.

The inquiry also saw images of notes scrawled by firefighters on the wall on the stairwell on the ground floor of the tower, as they desperately tried to keep track of the vastly complex rescue mission.

She also recalled telling a crew they would have to attempt a rescue without any water to fight the fires they encountered on the way: “Any firefighter going near or into a fire will take water. That’s our baseline for our own safety.

“I remember having to say to him that it was unlikely there would be water and that he was to try to affect rescues… That’s significant to me because it was putting them at so much risk.”

Ms De Silvo was also grilled on a gap in deployments of around 18 minutes when the bridgehead moved from the third floor to the ground floor.

“I think what you need to understand the physical move, walking from the third floor to the ground floor is quick, but the things that happen around that takes time... so that could account for the delay,” she said.

Explaining why debriefing firefighters as they came out of the tower became difficult, she said: “A lot of the firefighters returning from their efforts were extremely exhausted, passing out, we were trying to get them water, take off their tunics, get them oxygen. They were passing out, certainly suffering from heat stress.

“Questioning them at that time when they are confused and overheating just wasn’t something we were able to achieve.”

The hearing continues.