Grenfell Inquiry day 80: fire doors in tower differed from those tested by manufacturer

These new fire doors have already been the subject of serious scrutiny, with many residents having also reported to the inquiry that their ‘self-closers’ were either missing or broken, meaning many were left open on the night of the blaze causing toxic smoke to pour into the lobbies and stairwells.

The police also revealed in March that they did not meet the legal minimum standard of 30 minutes’ fire resistance – despite having been tested to this standard before being sold.

Dr Lane told the inquiry today that the doors installed in Grenfell Tower differed from the product tested by the manufacturer before sale in several key ways.

She said the ‘hardware’ (such as locks and letter boxes) was different from the tested door.

“If you want to use the phrase ‘getting the door through the test’ it [the hardware] is a sensitive business. Any piece of metal, locks, letter boxes may act as heat spread route, flame spread route, hot smoke route and cause the door to fail,” she said.

She also said the door was tested on one side only, in contravention of guidance for composite doors. The glazing tested was also a different specification from that installed.

The doors were also never tested to the relevant ‘smoke’ standard – which requires cold smoke testing to check the doors for leakage. This standard is known as FD30S (Fire Door 30 minutes, smoke) as opposed to FD30, which does not have a smoke pass. “I don’t understand why an FD30 door was installed when an FD30S door should have been. S was not ordered and S was not delivered,” she said.

She added that guidance has been clear on the importance of self-closers since the 1970s, and that most best practice guidance suggests they should be checked for performance every six months.

“The guidance since the ’70s has been very clear about why it is so important,” she said.

Inside Housing analysis of survivors’ statements suggests self-closers were missing or broken in 56% of the flats in the tower.

Dr Lane also discussed the installation of gas pipes in the tower, which she said may have breached ‘compartmentation’ between the lobbies. This is the design feature which contains smoke within a certain space in the tower. The newly installed gas pipes in the lobbies were due to be ‘boxed-in’ but had not been by the time the fire happened.

She said she did not know if there was any interim fire-stopping material in place until this work was carried out, but added: “What it does affect is that [it] acts as a link from lobby to lobby. If the next pipe run if the same hole is there, it could act as a smoke run from lobby to lobby.”

She also explained that the lifts in Grenfell Tower did not have a ‘firefighting’ function, which requires an alternative power source and additional fire protection to allow their use during a blaze. She said this may have made the building non-compliant with a functional requirement of building regulations that all residents – including those with mobility issues – are able to escape.

Asked if the lift should have been taken out of service on the night of the fire, Dr Lane said: “Frankly, if I may say so, it shouldn’t have been provided in that condition in the first place and that should have been known.”

The inquiry continues.