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Grenfell Tower Inquiry recap: module one – the refurbishment

Insight31.10.227.00 AM by Peter Apps

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry prepares to return for closing statements, Peter Apps recaps some of the evidence relating to the parties involved in the refurbishment of the building

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As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry prepares to return for closing statements, Peter Apps recaps some of the evidence relating to the parties involved in the refurbishment of the building #UKhousing

Evidence covering the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower ran from January 2020 to October 2020, which also included a lengthy break caused by the first coronavirus lockdown.

As the various players involved prepare to return to give overarching closing statements, here is a recap of the evidence revealed.

Studio E

Its role: The architects that designed the refurbishment, including specifying the cladding system.

What we learned: Studio E had already been engaged to design a school and leisure centre project at the base of the tower and the refurbishment of the block was effectively an “add-on”.

The firm won the job without an open procurement process, after their fee was deliberately split in order to avoid breaching the threshold.

It had no major experience of high rises and its lead architect, Bruce Sounes (pictured above), was carrying out his first residential cladding project.

However, he did not familiarise himself with the specific rules for high-rise buildings, assuming those who joined the project later would check his plans. He said that architects were only responsible for “architectural intent” – the aesthetics – and that it was up to others to ensure the designs were compliant.

Mr Sounes selected Celotex insulation for the refurbishment, reasoning that he had seen it used on many other jobs and therefore assumed it was compliant. He chose zinc cladding for its aesthetics, but added aluminium composite material (ACM) as an alternative option in the specification after it was suggested to him by cladding subcontractor Harley Facades.

One key exchange: “Is it, as you understand it, the role of an architect to check that the drawings are compliant with the building regulations?” Kate Grange QC, counsel the inquiry, asked Mr Sounes.

“No, I don’t think it is,” he replied. He added: “Building control, as I understood at the time, were primarily responsible for confirming compliance.”

Key week: Week Three. Read our summary here.

Rydon

Its role: Main contractor for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. It was appointed in spring 2014.

What we learned: After submitting the lowest bid of the three contractors that sought the refurbishment project (£9.2m against the next closest of £9.9m), Rydon agreed to a secret “offline” meeting with the client, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), to discuss further reductions to the costs in March 2014.

A spreadsheet for this meeting showed the firm discussed switching the previously specified (and non-combustible) zinc cladding for ACM to save around £300,000.

It later emerged that Rydon understated the amount that could be saved through this switch and intended to “pocket the difference” to make up for an error one of its estimators made when pricing the job.

Rydon was responsible for overseeing the work of cladding specialist Harley Facades and architect Studio E, which designed the cladding system. But their project manager, Simon Lawrence (pictured above), insisted he did nothing more than check that designs were being produced, relying on the specialists and building control to do it correctly.

Residents complained about Rydon’s work and accused staff of being aggressive and bullying when seeking access to flats.

In one email, Mr Lawrence said the firm was “under massive pressure and criticism from the rebel residents about our quality of work”.

One key exchange: Mr Lawrence was asked to explain the gap between the savings from the cladding switch presented to Rydon and the numbers it showed to KCTMO.

“I would suggest by that, although not my area of expertise, that Rydon took some of the saving for themselves,” he replied.

“Did you know that at the time?” asked Richard Millett QC (now KC), counsel to the inquiry.

“I think I probably did, yes,” replied Mr Lawrence, noting that the money “probably went into, effectively, additional profit”.

“Was the plan in Rydon to keep the TMO in the dark about the real extent of the savings on the ACM panels and then pocket the difference?” asked Mr Millett.

“That could be the reason for it,” said Mr Lawrence.

Key week: Week seven. Read our summary here.

Exova

Its role: Consultants employed to prepare a fire safety strategy.

What we learned: Exova was asked to prepare two strategies: one for the building as it stood and one for the refurbished tower.

Emails showed that in summer 2012, the firm described Studio E’s plans as making “a crap condition worse”, but said they would “massage the proposal to something acceptable”.

This was in reference to changes, such as switching the use of the bottom floors of the tower from commercial to residential, not the cladding work.

In fact, Exova’s fire strategy – produced by its consultant Terry Ashton (pictured above), a former building control officer – made no mention of cladding whatsoever.

In a report prepared in October 2012 and updated in October 2013, Mr Ashton wrote that the designs “would have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread, but this will be confirmed by an analysis in a future issue of this report”.

By this time he had been sent details of the cladding work at a stage when the external panels had not been switched to ACM, but the combustible insulation was proposed.

He did not consider these proposals in detail, saying he did not think he was being asked to and that “had we had a specific meeting to discuss those proposals” then he may have included them in his strategy.

After Rydon was appointed in spring 2014, Exova was no longer paid to advise on the project, meaning the “future version” of the report was never issued.

But Mr Ashton continued to advise the design team via email on several occasions.

He was asked about some of these emails in depth, including one which appeared to imply the use of combustible insulation was acceptable providing cavity barriers were included. This was not the case.

One key exchange: “Do you accept each time you were copied into an email represented a missed opportunity to give comprehensive guidance on the relevant building guidance [for cladding] and what it required?” asked Ms Grange.

“I think it could be interpreted that way, but as I’ve said on many occasions, the general gist of the inquiries were details rather than, ‘This is a system we are thinking of using, what do you think?’” replied Mr Ashton.

Key week: Week five. Read our summary here.

Harley Facades

Its role: Subcontractor responsible for the external cladding.

What we learned: Harley Facades’ involvement in the project began in September 2013, when two senior members of the firm met Mr Sounes for a coffee near London Bridge.

At this meeting, they showed him images of other buildings they had clad and emphasised that the job could be done more cheaply using ACM instead of the zinc he was proposing.

“Their recurring experience is that budgets force clients to adopt the cheapest cladding option: ACM,” Mr Sounes wrote in an email following the meeting.

Via email exchanges over the next couple of months, Harley Facades’ team continued to emphasise the cost advantages of ACM.

After Rydon won the tender in spring 2014, it was appointed and began to turn Studio E’s specifications into detailed design drawings that could be replicated on site.

Why, at this stage, did their designers not ask if the materials were fire-safe and compliant?

Ray Bailey, founder of Harley Facades, told the inquiry that insulation manufacturer Celotex’s claim that its insulation was suitable for high rises was effectively taken on trust.

For the ACM, he pointed to a certificate that suggested the product had a ‘Class 0’ rating (the minimum standard suggested by guidance), but accepted he did not read it in detail to discover that there were, in fact, important caveats to this claim.

Ultimately, like others, Mr Bailey said reliance was placed on building control to ensure the work was compliant.

As the work got underway, drawings passed between Daniel Anketell-Jones of Harley Facades (pictured above), freelancer Kevin Lamb, Studio E, Rydon and building control.

At one point, during a debate about whether fire-stopping or cavity barriers were required, Mr Anketell-Jones wrote that fire-stopping would be “ridiculous”.

“There is no point in ‘fire-stopping’, as we all know, the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!” he wrote.

He explained that he believed the ACM would fall off, rather than ignite and spread fire up the tower.

One key exchange: “Are you telling us that, even though Harley was a specialist cladding subcontractor with a lot of experience, particularly in relation to overcladding high-rise residential buildings, you nonetheless relied on building control to tell you whether or not the products and design complied with the statutory requirements?” asked Mr Millett.

“We are not statutory compliance experts, so when we have a doubt about how something is done, we seek guidance, and building control are the experts on compliance,” replied Mr Bailey.

Key week: Week nine. Read our summary here.

Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation

Its role: KCTMO was the arms-length organisation responsible for managing social housing in the west London borough and, as such, was the client during the refurbishment.

What we learned: KCTMO was focused throughout on delivering “value for money” from the project, having been set a budget of £8.5m by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC).

In 2013, it was warned that the project could not be completed within the constraints of that budget by management consultant Artelia.

“Unless the project, in its current guise, is stopped and a review embarked upon to redefine the scope, programme and cost, it will fail,” the firm wrote.

Artelia’s witness said it was then “strong-armed” into changing this report by Peter Maddison, then director of assets and regeneration at KCTMO. This is something he denied.

Instead, documents showed the focus of the project became “value for money”, with KCTMO planning to procure a new contractor.

After receiving the lowest bid from Rydon, of £9.2m, KCTMO then entered into the “offline” meeting described above to bring the cost down to their budget.

As the project progressed, project manager Claire Williams (pictured above) questioned the safety of the cladding. In an email, she described having a “Lacknall moment (sic)” – a reference to the 2009 fire at Lakanal House in south London.

She sent an email to Artelia to check the fire safety of the cladding material, which the firm advised her to pass on to Rydon.

There is no record of a reply, but she insisted that Rydon’s project manager, Mr Lawrence, said it was “inert” and “would not burn”. Mr Lawrence vehemently denied this and no record of the meeting has been found.

It also emerged during her evidence that Ms Williams had destroyed evidence relating to her time on the project – binning her work books and notes before leaving the organisation in May 2018.

One key exchange: “Have you ever informed the Metropolitan Police that you had destroyed documents which were relevant to their investigation?” asked Mr Millett.

“No, I didn’t,” Ms Williams replied. “Because it’s not occurred to me. Today’s the first time that I’ve ever really had a conversation about this.”

“They weren’t destroyed, I didn’t rip pages out of them,” she added. “So it wasn’t a conscious ‘I’m hiding anything’ decision, it was, ‘I am clearing my desk.’”

“Well, they were destroyed – you binned them,” said Mr Millett.

“I put them in the bin, yes,” she replied.

Key week: Week 14. Read our summary here.

Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (building control)

Its role: As well as being the tower’s landlord, RBKC’s building control department was required to sign off the project as in line with regulations.

What we learned: John Hoban (pictured above), the building control officer responsible for the project, is one of the few witnesses in the inquiry to have admitted fault.

Mr Hoban explained that the pressure he worked under had increased in the years before the fire. The size of the team was reduced due to funding reductions from 12 to four, with the remaining officers’ geographical patches expanding as a result.

A special projects team, which would likely have taken on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment, was disbanded.

Nonetheless, Mr Hoban accepted serious errors. He said he likely “just looked at the first page” of the certificate for the cladding, taking it at face value that it met the standard of Class 0. But this meant he missed important caveats and qualifications on the next pages, including that the product came in two forms: fire-rated and polyethylene-cored.

For the insulation, he looked either at the certificate for the product on the Local Authority Building Control’s website or manufacturer Celotex’s website. He could not remember clearly which. Both said the product was suitable for buildings taller than 18 metres and he did not interrogate this further.

In fact, it was below the minimum standard and could not be used except in one specific system that had passed a large-scale test – a system completely different from Grenfell’s cladding.

Mr Hoban also never checked behind windows to see if cavity barriers were present. They were not.

He said he drew comfort from the fact that he believed Exova was advising on the job and that the firm would ensure the work was compliant.

At the end of his evidence, an openly sobbing Mr Hoban apologised to the families of those killed for his failures.

One key exchange: “You look up RS5000 on the Celotex website but you don’t get any further than seeing that it’s suitable for buildings above 18 metres, and you don’t examine why precisely that is so. Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?” said Mr Millett.

“At the time I felt it was acceptable, but I see now that it is not,” Mr Hoban said.

Key week: Week 12. Read our summary here.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points