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Survivors of the Grenfell disaster and their allies protest outside the inquiry (picture: Getty)

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: a recap of the evidence so far

Insight25.03.207.00 AM by Inside Housing

Like much of the world, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry is now on hold indefinitely due to the coronavirus outbreak. So, as we pause, Inside Housing recaps the key points from the evidence it has explored so far

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Like much of the world, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry is now on hold indefinitely due to the coronavirus outbreak. So, as we pause, @InsideHousing recaps the key points from the evidence it has explored so far #ukhousing

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: a recap of the evidence so far #ukhousing

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two has been running for nine weeks, but has only heard evidence for four of them.

A lengthy delay to allow the attorney general to consider an application for immunity derailed proceedings after the first week of opening statements, and resulted in a month-long hiatus before the application was granted.

And now, the lockdown of the country due to coronavirus has caused what is likely to be a substantially longer break in proceedings. But in the interim, the inquiry did hear some enlightening evidence. Here are the key points:

Fire engineer signed off Grenfell assessment as ‘fine’ despite ‘omissions, assumptions and gaps’, inquiry hears

Grenfell Tower Inquiry: a recap ahead of the resumption

Selection of the ACM

Grenfell after the refurbishment (picture: Studio E)

The phase one report identified the polyethylene-cored aluminium composite material (ACM) as the “principle reason” for the devastating external fire spread, and so deciphering how and why this material was selected will be one of the key tasks over the course of phase two.

We have learned a lot already. In 2011, Studio E began to hunt for an attractive “cladding product” for the building. As was known before the inquiry, this hunt eventually led to zinc panels, which were approved in a resident consultation and placed into the specification when the work was tendered in 2013. They were then switched out for ACM. Why did this happen?

As early as 2012, a company called CEP had approached the design team about switching the zinc for cheaper ACM. CEP is one of a small number of approved fabricators that worked closely with Arconic – the firm that sold the panels.

This nudging got stronger in September 2013 when Harley Facades was appointed specialist cladding contractor. Studio E reported to KCTMO that Harley “have been tracking the project for some time”. It added: “Their recurring experience is that budgets force clients to adopt the cheapest cladding option: aluminium composite material (ACM).”

“Their experience is that budgets force clients to adopt the cheapest option”

Tomas Rek, a junior member of the project team at Studio E, sourced options in 2013. He did not ask about fire performance or their fire rating, focusing primarily on cost, aesthetics and the speed with which the material could be delivered. He said there was pressure from KCTMO to specify ACM.

“We are under pressure from the client (KCTMO) regarding the costs with the suggestion flagged of using aluminium,” Studio E wrote in an email to one supplier.

In November 2013, Harley priced the project on the basis of zinc. But it added in an email that from a “selfish point of view” it would prefer to use ACM. When the work was tendered, it listed the zinc panels but included the option for bidders to price up the job using alternatives, including ACM. Mr Crawford then took over on the team and helped oversee the switch to ACM.

We will learn a good deal more about how the product was sold and selected when we hear evidence from KCTMO, Rydon, Harley and Arconic in due course.

Role of the architects

Senior architect Bruce Sounes, who has so far given only partial evidence at the inquiry (picture: Grenfell Tower Inquiry)

Witnesses from architect Studio E have now largely completed their evidence, with the exception of senior architect Bruce Sounes who has twice given partial evidence before being taken ill. The picture that has emerged from the questioning is of a firm that did not have the necessary experience and lacked the knowledge to avoid the terrible mistakes on fire safety.

Studio E appears to have been given the work simply because it was designing a school next door. It had no experience of high-rise refurbishment or overcladding work and its witnesses accepted that they would not have won the job if there had been open tendering. This did not happen because the fee for the work was kept below the £174,000 required to trigger an open competition. Studio E was instead paid an upfront fee of £99,000, with other fees deferred in a move that was designed to avoid a tendering process the firm knew it would lose.

The early work was carried out by Mr Sounes, who pulled together the original design drawings through to 2014. Mr Sounes showed an alarming lack of knowledge of the building regulations and associated guidance. Simply put, he did not think it was his job to ensure the materials being used were safe or compliant with the regulations, trusting specialist cladding sub-contractor Harley Facades to specify compliant materials and building control officers at the council to pull them up if it failed to. Neither happened – and his evidence is that he was not equipped to notice, despite his seniority at Studio E and his role designing the system.

He was replaced in day-to-day control of the refurbishment by Neil Crawford in 2014. Mr Crawford had not completed his ‘stage three’ training and therefore could not officially use the term ‘architect’. Nonetheless, he had come across external facade work and cladding in a previous job.

Studio E witnesses felt “held to ransom”, with Rydon withholding final payment

He too waved through the work. In 2015, he was given a series of drawings by Harley Facades, which he stamped and signed as “approved for construction”. He claimed that this approval related only to “architectural intent” and not safety or compliance with regulations. Studio E witnesses have explained “architectural intent” as little more than “the right aesthetic” and have argued that this was really the extent of their responsibility.

A complicating factor is its contractual position. No contract was ever signed with Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), and it was not until 2016 – with the project almost complete – that a contract was agreed to make Studio E a sub-contractor of Rydon. The witnesses from Studio E – in financial difficulty having undergone a liquidation and rebirth in 2014 from Studio E LLP to Studio E Ltd – felt “held to ransom”, with Rydon withholding final payment until agreement. The contract it eventually signed made it responsible for co-ordinating design work by other contractors and examining drawings for performance.

But by this time, the damage was done.

Government regulations

Picture: Peter Apps

Despite the lack of knowledge or concern for the regulations, they still appear to have been relevant.

First, the presence of a testing route to permit the use of combustible insulation is the door through which Celotex’s marketing material walked. That door was opened in 2006, following lobbying from the insulation industry. If it was not, Celotex would simply never have been able to advertise its product in this way. Second, the presence of a ‘Class 0’ requirement for the external surfaces (and hence cladding materials) appears to have been a big problem. The ACM cladding used on Grenfell had a certificate that at least appeared to confirm it met this rating.

Government had been repeatedly warned – since a select committee investigation into the Garnock Court fire in Irvine, in 1999 – about removing this standard as it was allowing dangerous products through. In his final comments to the hearing, Neil Crawford said: “Unfortunately, the industry only reacts to the regulations that are in place… there was an awareness, as far back as then. Why wasn’t it acted on?”

This remains one of the key questions for another day.

Advertising of the insulation

Picture: Alamy

Alongside the ACM, the cladding system on Grenfell Tower contained Celotex RS5000 insulation, made from a combustible plastic called polyisocyanurate.

We have learned that this material was suggested to KCTMO by engineering consultant Max Fordham as a suitable way to meet the requirements for insulation performance.

The regulatory position when Grenfell was refurbished was that combustible insulation could not be used on a high rise unless it was part of a system that had passed a large-scale test, or (arguably) been signed off by an expert via a desktop study.

Celotex RS5000 had been part of a system that passed a large-scale test in 2014, but this system used non-combustible cement fibre cladding, not solid-petrol ACM.

Celotex was accused of “masquerading horse meat as a beef lasagne”

Celotex’s advertising was unclear about this to say the least, describing the insulation instead as “acceptable for use on buildings above 18m”.

This appears to have been a significant factor in the architects resolving themselves that the product was nothing to worry about.

Neil Crawford, who oversaw the day-to-day refurbishment for Studio E in 2014, spoke particularly strongly – accusing Celotex of “masquerading horse meat as a beef lasagne”.

Some disturbing internal Celotex emails on this point were read out in the first week. In one, a supplier joked about the “smoke and mirrors” involved in the marketing of the insulation and said he would adopt a “caveat emptor [buyer beware]” approach. In others, Celotex’s team appeared to acknowledge that the product could not pass a test in combination with ACM. We will hear from Celotex when the inquiry resumes.

Role of the fire engineers

Cate Cooney gives evidence (picture: Grenfell Tower Inquiry)

Fire engineer Exova’s role was as follows: it was brought in by Studio E in 2012 to produce a fire safety strategy for the building as it stood, and a further one for the refurbishment.

So far we have heard only from Cate Cooney, a senior consultant who produced the report on the building as it stood. Her report – based largely on drawings from the tower’s construction in the 1970s – made a series of assumptions: that the building had been built to a good standard, maintained to the standard it was built and had good compartmentation and smoke detection.

But arguably more important is what was said about the refurbishment. While Exova’s witnesses have not yet been questioned about this, Studio E’s have.

So we know Exova produced two draft strategies for the refurbishment – in October 2012 and October 2013. Both documents said: “It is considered that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread, but this will be confirmed by an analysis in a future issue of this report.”

“Changes will have no adverse effect in relation to external fire spread”

The problem is that when it gave this opinion, Exova’s consultants had the information to be aware that a rainscreen cladding system with combustible insulation was planned.

Exova’s witnesses are likely to argue forcefully that they did not know that the originally planned zinc panels would be switched to the more combustible aluminium composite material. The “future issue of this report” was never commissioned. But Exova will still need to explain why it thought a rainscreen cladding system with combustible insulation did not need to be flagged as a fire risk, or why it did not raise that the insulation breached government guidance. Its failure to do so appears to have given the architects confidence with regard to fire safety.

“From our point of view, at this point… that sentence confirmed to us there was no concern [with regard to the cladding],” Mr Sounes said.

From April 2014, when Rydon was appointed design-and-build contractor, it opted against retaining Exova’s services. But Exova did remain involved – providing responses to queries via email. What it said will be looked at once the inquiry resumes.

The organisations involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower

Picture: Jon Enoch

KCTMO: Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the arm’s length management organisation responsible for providing housing management to Grenfell Tower. It was the end client which procured the refurbishment and oversaw it.

Rydon: Main contractor. It won a tender for the ‘design and build’ of the refurbishment project in March 2014, with a contract signed in October. It then held overall responsibility for the work, sub-contracting various elements to more specialist firms.

Celotex: The manufacturer of the RS5000 insulation which formed the majority of the insulation on the tower. The product is made from a combustible plastic called RS5000.

Arconic: A large multinational aluminium company, which manufactured and sold the Reynobond PE 55 cladding panels which were installed on the tower.

RBKC: As well as ultimately owning the tower, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea provided the ‘building control’ function for the refurbishment. This involved providing a completion certificate which effectively signed off the project as compliant with building regulations.

Studio E: Architect – first engaged by KCTMO as the principal designer for the wider refurbishment, it became a sub-contractor following Rydon’s appointment in 2014, working under the standard RIBA terms of business.

Harley: Specialist sub-contractor for the cladding. It was in contract with Studio E before Rydon was appointed, and then struck an agreement with Rydon for the design of the facade works.

Exova Warringtonfire: Fire engineer. Appointed by KCTMO in mid-2012 to provide a fire strategy for the building as it stood and for the refurbishment work. Three versions of the refurbishment version were produced, the last in November 2013. It provided ongoing advice after this point but was not directly engaged by Rydon.

CEP: The fabricator, responsible for cutting the panels into cassettes. CEP was one of a small number of ‘approved’ fabricators which worked closely with Arconic. Also supplied the window frames.

Max Fordham: The engineering consultant which worked for the TMO providing advice on energy strategy and sustainability. It was Max Fordham that identified Celotex insulation as a product which could meet the target insulation performance and was also thin enough to fit the design dimensions.

Kingspan: Produced and sold a smaller amount of combustible K15 insulation which was used on the tower.

Siderise: Produced and sold the cavity barriers.

Aluglaze: Produced and sold the window panels.

Artelia: The construction, design and management co-ordinator, employer’s agent and quantity surveyor, assisting KCTMO with its management of the contract.

Osborne Berry: The building contractor appointed by Harley to fit the cladding and window systems.

Kevin Lamb: An independently outsourced specialist cladding designer which provided Harley with detailed design drawings.

John Rowan and Partners: The clerk of works reporting to the TMO, responsible for site inspection and monitoring.

SD Plastering: A sub-contractor responsible for fitting the window surrounds.

JS Wright: A mechanical and electrical sub-contractor. It will have little involvement in module one.

Curtins Consulting: A structural engineer reporting first to KCTMO and then to Rydon. They will also have little involvement in module one.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points