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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’

Home26.02.21by Peter Apps

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment – the testing house that carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports

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‘Was it the goal to use the test to BRE’s commercial advantage?’

It is necessary to begin with some explanations – and a little history.

For 80 years, the BRE was the country’s national centre for research into building science, but in 1997 it was privatised. Since then it has been required to win work from commercial clients and bid for government research contracts to secure its income.

In 1999, amid a parliamentary investigation into two cladding fires in the 1990s, it proposed the use of large-scale fire tests that mimicked real-world building facades as a means of deciding whether a certain construction build-up was safe.

But the BRE would be paid to run these tests (a before/after image from one is shown above).

Richard Millett QC, lead counsel to the Grenfell Inquiry, asked Phil Clark, the week’s first witness: “Was it the goal to use the test to BRE’s commercial advantage?”

Mr Clark replied that it was not, emphasising that the tests could have been carried out by “anyone in the world”.

The testing methodology was then written into a formal British Standard (BS 8414) in the 2000s and official guidance was amended so that passing one of these tests was recognised as a means to use systems with combustible materials on high-rise buildings.

Brian Martin, a BRE employee, was seconded to government to work three days a week developing this.

“Would it be fair, from your own knowledge, to describe BS 8414 and BR 135… as a joint project as between the BRE on the one hand and government on the other, with Brian Martin on both sides?” asked Mr Millett.

Mr Clark agreed that it was. Mr Martin was eventually employed full-time by the government, where he remains a key civil servant.

Both Celotex and Kingspan went on to undertake multiple tests at the BRE’s facilities. It is the Celotex tests to which we will turn first.

‘It’s the benefit of your experience that you’re imparting to the client, isn’t it?’

Celotex carried out the first test on a system containing its RS5000 insulation in February 2014, resulting in a failure.

The inquiry was played footage from the helmet camera that Mr Clark (pictured above) wore during this test, and it showed him giving a running commentary of what was happening to the Celotex representatives present.

He explained that the cladding panels falling away had left the cavity barriers with “nothing to push against” and told them that he had “seen worse” failures. The problem is, he should not have been offering any advice.

“Just looking at all of that, that’s advice, isn’t it?” Mr Millett said. “It’s the benefit of your experience that you’re imparting to the client, isn’t it?”

Mr Clark denied this, saying that it was merely “passing on information as to what was seen and how things behave”.

Jonathan Roper, one of the Celotex witnesses, has claimed that Mr Clark advised him that thickening the external cladding panels may help achieve a pass on the second attempt. Mr Clark said he could not recall such a conversation taking place.

‘If you’ve got somebody who’s going out of their way to deceive, then there was a possibility they could do that’

Celotex passed its test at the second attempt in May 2014. But this test used secret additional magnesium oxide boards to strengthen the cladding panels – a feature declared neither in Mr Clark’s test report nor in Celotex’s later marketing of its product.

Much of the cross-examination focused on whether or not Mr Clark knew that these panels were present. Two Celotex witnesses – Mr Roper and his colleague Jamie Hayes – have said they have “no doubt” that he knew. But Mr Clark vociferously denied this.

The magnesium oxide boards were hidden behind cladding panels of a different thickness – 8mm rather than 12mm. They were also a different colour (the orange strips on the picture below).

Mr Clark claimed that he thought all the panels were 12mm thick and the colour change was simply a result of “supply shortages”. But he did sign a delivery note specifically indicating that they were 8mm thick, a detail he claimed not to have noticed.

However, there was no delivery note found for the magnesium oxide board. Mr Clark said it “may have got lost” as security guards sometimes delivered materials directly to the burn hall.

“Does that mean that when you conducted a test, you weren’t always absolutely sure what the precise make-up and composition of the rig you were testing was?” Mr Millett asked.

“I wouldn’t say necessarily, no, but if you’ve got somebody who’s going out of their way to deceive, then there was a possibility they could do that,” Mr Clark replied.

‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’

A number of things were not done according to procedure for the May 2014 test.

These included a lack of any revised drawings from the February test – despite the change in cladding panel.

And a requirement to photograph every component before it was placed on the rig was not met.

Mr Clark said that he was out of the office on a first aid course when the test rig was assembled and that it was overlooked by “whoever was deputising for me”.

Asked why he did not see the magnesium oxide boards being placed on the rig, he insisted that he “wasn’t in the office when it was being done”.

“Somebody at the BRE must have seen it being applied, though, mustn’t they?” asked Mr Millett (pictured above).

“I think they would have done, yeah, somebody should have done, but nobody had pointed it out to me,” Mr Clark answered.

The boards were visible in photos taken of the fully constructed rig (below). But Mr Clark claimed never to have seen these photos before giving evidence this week. He said they may have been taken by an apprentice who missed the significance.

“This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?” Mr Millett asked.

“Yes, I probably agree with you, yes,” Mr Clark replied.

“I mean, Mr Clark, isn’t the reality that you knew very well that there was a 6mm magnesium oxide layer behind it? You were in charge of this test, the photographs showed it was there, the deputy knew it was there… and it was covered over by a perfectly obvious ruby-coloured band in two places of a material of a different thickness. Surely you must have realised what was behind it?” Mr Millett said.

“No, I would have reported it. And had I known it, I would have stopped the test,” Mr Clark stated.

‘That’s not credible, is it, really?’

Helmet camera footage of the test compounded this line of questioning. Mr Clark was filmed making comments that referred to the boards, according to Celotex witnesses.

These included him saying “see how that flame seems to have ceased now that the board is there”, and “sometimes changing two things at a time doesn’t always give you an advantage”.

For the former comment, he said that the word “boards” was merely a reference to the external cladding panels and his use of the word “now” was no more than “misuse of a word” in “general conversation”.

For the latter, he was asked why he said “two things” had changed, when he was supposedly aware of only one change (the increased thickness of the panel).

He said he was simply explaining “the scientific principle that if you change two variables you don’t always know which has had the effect”.

Mr Millett said: “I’m going to put it to you squarely, Mr Clark. This was not just the imparting of a scientific principle, it was a reflection of the fact that you knew two things had been changed.”

“No, I refute that,” Mr Clark replied.

Finally, when writing up his test report, which made no reference to the boards, Mr Clark included an image – below – that plainly shows the magnesium oxide boards being removed from the rig. Celotex specifically asked him to remove this image – a request he denied.

Asked why he did not notice the boards in this photo, Mr Clark said: “In hindsight, probably, yes, I would − I should have picked up on it, but what you need to appreciate is at any one time I could have had seven or eight projects I was working on on my desk to write reports for.”

“That’s not credible, is it, really?” Mr Millett said.

Mr Clark denied this, saying he had “a very busy, high-pressured job”.

‘I’m putting it to you that you have given false evidence to the inquiry about this’

In the course of making these denials, Mr Clark claimed not to have had access to any documents other than those sent to him by the BRE.

However, this claim was subject to a denial by the BRE’s lawyers, who said he had been given three days’ unsupervised access at the BRE’s offices in order to access any documents he needed to prepare his statement.

“I’m putting it to you that you have given false evidence to the inquiry about this,” said Mr Millett.

“It’s not false evidence… I had forgot, when you were asking the question, that I had been there,” Mr Clark responded.

‘Can’t you just delete the whole sentence?’

With regard to Kingspan, Mr Clark was mainly asked about a test in March 2014 that paired the firm’s K15 insulation with high-pressure laminate cladding panels.

This test was a failure due to flames exceeding the top of the rig (pictured above), but serious questions were posed about the way both Mr Clark and Kingspan went about it.

First, it transpired that Mr Clark did not immediately terminate the test when the flames passed the top of the rig, despite an unambiguous requirement to do so in the testing rules.

Mr Clark explained this by saying it was common practice at the BRE to allow clients to get “as much learning as possible” from the test data.

Helmet camera footage from this test then showed Mr Clark writing notes recording that the flames had passed the top of the rig, and Kingspan’s Ivor Meredith saying: “Can’t you just delete the whole sentence?”

Mr Clark replied: “I will put…” before trailing off.

“It looks from this that you were writing your notes in collaboration with Mr Meredith?” Mr Millett asked.

“There was no collaboration in any way, shape or form,” Mr Clark replied, adding that if he had anything to hide he would not have worn his helmet camera.

After the test was deemed a failure, Kingspan complained and asked for it to be regraded as a pass.

The BRE declined, but Mr Clark was asked to write a report for the test anyway. This was unusual – emails show him refusing to do so on other occasions.

“I don’t think I was very comfortable with issuing one,” he said, adding that he did not ask why he was being asked to provide the report.

Asked by Mr Millett if “very great care would need to be taken” in writing the test report to ensure it was not misconstrued as a pass, Mr Clark said yes.

But he added: “I think the test report doesn’t necessarily, unless you thoroughly read it, make it clear that the system has failed.”

In fact, the report made only a simple reference to the fact that flames passed the top of the rig after 43 minutes, in a timeline of events.

Subsequently, Kingspan used the report as evidence for reports written by fire consultancies to approve an untested system for use on a high rise (known as a desktop study).

On all 29 of these occasions, including three reports written by the BRE, the consultant missed the fact that the test was a failure. This meant Kingspan was able to use the failed test to bolster its case that its combustible product was suitable for high rises.

‘Data such as this has been misrepresented in the market in the past’

Finally, towards the end of the week Mr Clark's former boss, Stephen Howard (pictured), business group manager at the BRE, was asked why in 2015 he issued a classification report for a test Kingspan which had been carried out in 2005.

This test Kingspan had never been formally appraised against the pass fail criteria despite being widely cited by Kingspan as evidence that its product could be used on high rises.

The firm - by this point under pressure to prove its claims - belatedly sought the classification report in 2015. Mr Howard’s colleague, Tony Baker, cautioned against issuing it.

His worry was that the tested system - using a cement board - was unlike real-world cladding systems.

“I doubt this [the system tested in 2005] would be considered a complete system,” he wrote. “Data such as this has been misrepresented in the market in the past.”

But Mr Howard told a junior colleague to issue the classification report anyway. Grilled on why, he explained that he did not feel it was up to the BRE to make judgements about whether or not a system was realistic.

Finally, We also learned a little about Mr Clark’s career since the Grenfell Tower fire. He left the BRE in December 2017, having received “a very good offer to change” from rival test house Exova Warringtonfire.

But a year later, he left that job too - this time having been made “an even better offer” by Kingspan. His role at Kingspan was to set up the firm’s own in-house testing facility.

But in June 2020, he was very abruptly made redundant - a move he linked to the revelations which were soon to be made by the inquiry.

“It wasn’t long after that happened that the information came out of what Kingspan had been doing in terms of the falsification of tests. I think that may have played a little part,” he said.

He has since moved to certifier the British Board of Agrement where he is helping them “putting into practice lessons learnt as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire”.

The inquiry continues next week with further evidence from Mr Howard.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry: week 25 headlines

Kingspan used BRE report on failed test as basis for 29 desktop studies: Kingspan used a failed fire test to help secure 29 reports justifying the use of its combustible insulation on high-rise buildings, after the Building Research Establishment diverted from its usual practice to provide a written report despite the test failing.
BRE technician denies it is ‘not credible’ to say he was not aware of manipulated Grenfell insulation test: A senior Building Research Establishment technician has denied that it is “not credible” for him to claim he did not know that a critical fire test on the insulation later used on Grenfell Tower contained secret fire-resisting boards.
Senior BRE technician denies knowledge of secret fire-resisting boards in Grenfell insulation test: A senior technician at the Building Research Establishment has denied any knowledge of the presence of undeclared fire-resisting boards during a critical fire safety test on the insulation used on Grenfell Tower, despite accepting an “incredible list of omissions” when he may have had an opportunity to discover them.
Arconic allowed post-Grenfell fire certificate to repeat misleading claim: The company that made Grenfell’s cladding allowed a reissued version of the UK certificate for its product to repeat a false claim that it met European fire standards, even after the fire.

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