You are viewing 1 of your 1 free articles
The inquiry hears contradicting information about the control centre’s television, which was not used to inform commanders of the devastating spread of the blaze.
Key points
Television images – and lack of them – were at the heart of the latest Grenfell Tower Inquiry hearing today.
Jason Oliff, who was a station manager on development at the London Fire Brigade at the time of last summer’s tragic blaze, gave evidence to the Martin Moore-Bick chaired probe.
Mr Oliff, who was undertaking an on-the-job training period after being promoted in 2016, was nearing the end of his first ever shift as ‘officer of the day’ when the fire was reported in the early hours of 14 June 2017.
After receiving a message to his pager shortly before 1:30am, he attended the back-up control room in Stratford, east London, which was acting as the nerve centre of the frantic firefighting operation.
Mr Oliff’s colleague, Joanne Smith, last week told the inquiry that while the usual control room in Merton had a television that showed 24-hour news, a decision was taken not to turn on a TV set in Stratford as the news channel pictures could be distressing for staff communicating with people inside the burning building.
But Mr Oliff’s evidence today left the issue shrouded in mystery after he declared that he had been told the TV set was broken.
“As you walk into the Stratford control room the head desk is in front of you and the screen is behind it, and it was switched off,” he said. “I noticed the TV was off and when I said this to, I think, the officer of the watch, I was told it was broken, it wasn’t working.”
News footage could have helped control room staff make better decisions on the night, said Oliff.
“When you are monitoring calls and listening for information from the main scheme radio, you are trying to formulate a picture of what actions crews are taking and how the incident is developing. Having a screen up in the control room would give everyone in that room an overview of what the emergency services were dealing with.”
He added: “I would not have had authority to change decisions in the control room at that time but [TV screens] may have given the officer of the watch or [other key staff] an overview of the development of the incident and they may have been able to make an assessment to change the ‘stay put’ policy.
“A picture paints a thousand words.”
According to evidence from both Ms Smith and Mr Oliff, the decision to tell operators to start advising 999 callers to attempt escape from the burning building rather than awaiting rescue was taken at about 2.30am.
Mr Oliff also recounted how a news clip he’d seen on a colleague’s mobile phone of the extent of the blaze informed his thinking when he was called over to help a call operator with a very difficult situation during the night.
Mr Oliff advised the operator to tell the male caller to try to leave the building with his children without going back for his wife, who had become separated from them.
In a written statement, Mr Oliff described it as a “highly stressful situation”. But he said the news footage he’d seen “allowed me to see what we were up against and the conditions crews were dealing with”.
Meanwhile, Mr Oliff conceded that using a mobile phone to speak to the command unit set up to control operations on the ground was a departure from usual policy.
“This was not normal procedure. Normal procedure is that information is passed to the command vehicles by air waves radio. This is sufficient for a low number of fire safety guidance calls. The unprecedented nature of the incident we were dealing with meant… it was adapted.”
He added that he did not take his radio into the control room.
“I did not have access to an airwave radio… I had my own personal airwave radio which I left in my vehicle when I arrived because part of my role as officer of the day is not usually to communicate with the fire ground or incident commander directly.
“I was briefed to take over responsibility for fire safety guidance information and… it was my decision to use my mobile phone to contact the command unit.”
Mr Oliff was pressed on whether he sought information from the fire crews on the ground about specific rescue attempts. “No, I didn’t,” he said.
“This was an unprecedented incident. The amounts of information we were passing over – I would imagine the fire crews were extremely stretched and I imagined that any information they had about rescues they would pass back when they had the time.”
Closing statements
Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade
Further expert evidence
Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives
Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives
Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted
Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat
Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire
Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested
Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat
Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard
Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower
Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors
Other witness evidence
Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence
Day 75: call room operators give evidence
Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers
Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters
Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off
Day 71: further questions over stay put advice
Day 70: the police evidence
The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence
Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door
Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it
Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape
Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'
Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety
Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'
Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor
Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death
Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics
Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say
Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows
Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life
Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor
Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’
Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice
Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association
Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'
Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call
The firefighters’ evidence
Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump
Day 50: the LFB commissioner
Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans
Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding
Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears
Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits
Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy
Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties
Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put
Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back
Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'
Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy
Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children
Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families
Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'
Day 36: QC defends inquiry process
Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations
Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames
Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'
Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure
Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined
Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described
Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls
Day 28: 'the building beat us'
Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'
Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts
Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'
Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored
Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort
Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre
Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'
Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents
Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'
Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'
Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues
Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11
Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls
Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze
Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties
Day 12: "it was like a war zone"
Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios
Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning
Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'
The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry
Day eight: where the fire started
Day seven: what was in the cladding?
Day six: the cause and spread of the fire
Day five: expert highlights key issues
Day four: firefighters defend response to fire
Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time
Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case
Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put
The commemoration hearings
30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'
29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry
25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'
24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor
23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings
22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning
21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens
In the days following the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017, Inside Housing launched the Never Again campaign to call for immediate action to implement the learning from the Lakanal House fire, and a commitment to act – without delay – on learning from the Grenfell Tower tragedy as it becomes available.
One year on, we have extended the campaign asks in the light of information that has emerged since.
Here are our updated asks:
GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LANDLORDS