ao link

My Account

You are viewing 1 of your 1 free articles

Grenfell building control inspector ‘fell below the standards of a competent surveyor’

News01.10.206.30 PM by Dominic Brady

The building control surveyor working on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment did not read in full the specifications for the dangerous cladding and insulation that were put on the block before approving the products, the inquiry has heard.

John Hoban was a building control surveyor working on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment (picture: Grenfell Inquiry)

Sharelines

Appearing for a second day before the inquiry, John Hoban, a building control surveyor at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), admitted that he may have “just looked at the first page” of the certificate for the Reynobond aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding that was to be attached to the building.

But in his witness statement he did not mention looking at the certificate at all. “Mr Hoban, why didn’t you mention that fact in either of your witness statements to the inquiry?” asked counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett QC.

“I just… I didn’t… all I can do is apologise,” Mr Hoban replied.

He said the building control teams would accept these certificates – published by independent third party certified the British Board of Agrément – “without question”.

The certificate said the panels “may be regarded as having a Class 0 surface” but contained a number of cavaets, including the need to “ensure that the installation of the cladding is in accordance with the certificate holders’ instructions”.

Asked what steps he took to ensure this had been done, Mr Hoban said: “I don’t think I had taken any steps. I would have, as I say, the first page perhaps as, you know, it said Class 0, and maybe I didn’t read the other pages… maybe I just looked at the first page.”

Austerity measures left council inspector who approved Grenfell ‘reviewing 130 projects at once’

Grenfell cladding installers paid to ‘look busy’, invoice reveals

Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’

KCTMO ‘strong-armed’ consultant into removing criticism of its management of Grenfell refurbishment

KCTMO rejected design advisor for Grenfell refurbishment ‘to save money on fees’

He said he was not aware that the products came with a ‘fire-rated’ core in addition to the standard polyethylene – despite this being specifically stated in the certificate.

Mr Hoban said he had no understanding of what polyethylene was or even the fact that it was a plastic.

“Does that tell us that you knew nothing of the fire performance of the polyethylene core of these ACM panels being proposed for the building?” asked Mr Millett.

“At the time, no,” Mr Hoban said.

He then admitted that despite being sent drawings specifying materials to be used on the tower, such as the infill panels between windows, he did not notice the materials. They were made from styrofoam, a highly combustible polystyrene product.

He said that due to the “considerable number of projects” he was dealing with, he did not “spend as much time as I should have looking at the documents”. He added that his belief that fire consultants Exova were advising on the project encouraged him that it would be compliant.

“In the discharge of your responsibilities and functions in that role [building control surveyor], are you telling us that you thought it was appropriate to rely on the presence of a fire engineer in the project?” asked Mr Millett.

“No. As I say, I just didn’t pick it up. It doesn’t register,” Mr Hoban replied.

He was not aware Exova had in fact left the project in summer 2014 and continued to provide advice only on an informal basis.

He said he looked up the insulation being used on the tower after seeing Celotex boards being delivered to site for insulation on the tower.

Yesterday, Mr Hoban made reference to a page on the Local Authority Building Control (LABC) website which, he said, listed the product as “suitable” for use on a high-rise building.

The product was widely advertised as “suitable” or “acceptable” for high-rise buildings, but was in fact only permitted in the exact combination in which it had passed a large-scale fire test. This contained non-combustible cement fibre external panels, a far less combustible product than the material used on Grenfell Tower.

Today, Mr Hoban said he could not remember whether he had found the information on Celotex’s own website or the LABC.

He accepted it was clear on a full reading of the Celotex certification that it was only acceptable if used with non-combustible cladding panels.

Mr Millet said: “You look up RS5000 on the Celotex website but you don’t get any further than seeing that it’s suitable for buildings above 18m and you don’t examine why precisely that is so. Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?”

“At the time I felt it was acceptable, but I see now that it is not,” Mr Hoban said.

Mr Hoban repeated his claim from Wednesday that he was overworked and explained there was a “culture within the department” that meant he could not escalate his concerns.

Another major issue with the tower’s cladding system was the missing cavity barriers around windows, which experts believe helped allow the fire spread quickly out of the kitchen on the fourth floor to ignite the combustible materials on the walls.

Mr Hoban did not identify this failure in his inspections of the tower. He said he could see other cavity barriers being installed “to an adequate standard”, and as the windows were already on the tower, he did not check behind them to see if there were barriers.

“Do you accept that your failure to identify the missing cavity barriers generically around the windows on this building was a fundamental failing on your part?” asked Mr Millett.

“I should have checked. As I say, I saw the other ones and I didn’t feel it was necessary to have a window exposed [to check whether there were barriers in place],” Mr Hoban said.

“I’m bound to put it to you, Mr Hoban, that that failure to check the window openings for the presence of cavity barriers fell below the standards of a reasonably competent building control inspector. Do you accept that?” asked Mr Millett.

“As I say, in hindsight, yes, but I didn’t see it as an issue at the time,” he replied.

Asked what he would have done differently at the end of his evidence, an emotional Mr Hoban said that building regulations at the time were “ambiguous and confusing” and he lamented RBKC’s decision to replace several retired surveyors with one graduate, adding “I don’t believe that’s the correct way to run a department”.

He suggested that had there been regulations in place like the ones he saw in his time at the Greater London Council, he does not think the fire would have happened.

In emotional final comments, a weeping Mr Hoban said he was “heartbroken” by the deaths in the tower.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continues on Monday.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points

Grenfell building control inspector ‘fell below the standards of a competent surveyor’

READ MORE

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Sign up for our weekly Grenfell Inquiry newsletter