Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’
The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has entered a new phase, focusing on the actions of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) in the years before the fire: its planning, preparation, training and the specific inspections it carried out at Grenfell.
The exploration will peel the lid off one of the world’s largest fire services and one of Britain’s most treasured institutions.
This process began with a series of explosive revelations this week.
‘What they wanted was not heroes, but well-trained professionals working to a well-structured plan’
Monday saw opening statements, first from lawyers representing bereaved and survivors and then those acting for the mayor of London, the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) and the London Fire Commissioner (effectively representing the LFB).
There is not space here to recount everything said. Our reports from the day cover the community’s lawyers here and the others here. For those who want the full story, you can read the whole day’s action here.
The case against the LFB laid out by the lawyers for the community – Daniel Friedman QC, Professor Leslie Thomas QC and Imran Khan QC – rested on several themes.
Chief among them was that the fire did not, or should not, have caught the LFB by surprise. In fact, they said, the risk of a large cladding fire was well known within the brigade and had been for years. The problem was that it did not prepare for it.
“It is not a situation in which it can be said that, had we known then what we know now, lives could have been saved,” said Mr Khan. “The simple fact is that the LFB did know. They knew, and lives could and should have been saved.”
Mr Friedman said that the risks of cladding fires were raised at a senior level, and were even crystallised into a PowerPoint presentation, but never disseminated to the frontline or allowed to influence policy.
This was justified, he said, on the basis of the idea that fires overseas had little relevance to the UK.
“If these explanations are genuine, they amount to an admission of unacceptable closed-mindedness,” he said. “The LFB repeatedly presents itself as a world leader, but on this, the largest brigade in a significant global capital city, it is incongruously isolationist and parochial.”
This knowledge – and the more general knowledge of the potential for fires in high-rise buildings to spread out of control – should have resulted in a move away from the complete reliance on the ‘stay put’ policy long before Grenfell, they said.
On this, Mr Khan pointed to a different theory developed in Kent and cited an expert view that this would have made a difference at Grenfell, “even taking into account the practical difficulties”.
More broadly, the lawyers also pointed to a culture of not learning lessons and management difficulties within the brigade. Mr Khan in particular singled out allegations of “racism and misogyny”, which have been acknowledged as a problem at a station level by the current commissioner Andy Roe.
Describing a management system that was “highly resistant to change”, Mr Friedman said that most LFB managers were promoted from the grassroots and had then promoted “those coming up behind them without what would now be regarded as transparent and fair procedures”.
He also spoke of a culture that saw a “heroic need” to get in and fight fires rather than pursue other tactics, such as evacuation.
“What [bereaved and survivors] wanted was not heroes, but well-trained professionals working to a well-structured plan,” he said.
Mr Thomas said that the LFB had displayed a “fear of the new” in the years before Grenfell, adding that: “Cultural inertia within a public organisation such as the LFB is short-sighted and dangerous.”
Mr Friedman rounded off with a call for a “multidisciplinary national transformation process” of the fire services. “The panel will have to decide how much it will prompt these endeavours, but as with other aspects of this once-in-a-generation inquiry: if not now, when?”
‘This is an extraordinary possibility for the [bereaved and survivors] to have to contemplate four years after the fire’
One shocking revelation in the opening statements surrounded water, and the view of one of the inquiry’s experts, Dr Ivan Stoianov, that had the equipment available on the night been correctly used, it would have been “capable of launching water to the top of the building”.
This was said not to have happened “because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the technical features of water supply, and a consequential failure to alter incident strategies to secure greater water flow”.
There is no suggestion that this may have put the fire out: hoses directed lower at the building were unable to prevent the cladding from burning. But what it may have done, according to Mr Friedman, was reduce the speed of the downward spread of fire and given those trapped in the building precious time in which to escape.
Potential evidence of this is found in the late escape from the building of some of those trapped on floors where water was being directed externally. Antonio Roncolato, for example, escaped from floor 10 at 6.05am. Elpidio Bonifacio made it out of the building from floor 11 at 8.07am.
Had water been sprayed higher up, would others have potentially lived long enough to escape? “This is an extraordinary possibility for the [bereaved and survivors] to have to contemplate four years after the fire,” said Mr Friedman.
We will not hear much more about this issue for a while, though, as Dr Stoianov’s report has been pushed back to Module 7 of the inquiry, which will not take place until well into 2022.
‘We simply make the point that the question of foreseeability of the whole incident cannot be answered in simple binary terms, yes or no’
Responding to these statements, the FBU pushed back against some of the criticism directed at firefighters in the inquiry’s phase one report.
It also queried whether evacuation of the tower was really a possibility, given the absence of fire alarms. It claimed that four years on from the fire, the government is yet to publish a proper strategy for evacuating a high-rise building during a fire.
“In light of this delay… how can watch manager [Michael] Dowden [the first firefighter to take command] possibly be criticised for not having devised an evacuation from Grenfell Tower on that terrible night?” said Martin Seaward QC, representing the FBU.
Speaking for the commissioner, Stephen Walsh QC (pictured above) said he would “resist the temptation to engage in counterarguments” until closing statements.
He did question how foreseeable the Grenfell Tower fire really was.
While he said it would be “crass” to argue that certain factors were not foreseeable, he added: “We simply make the point that the question of foreseeability of the whole incident cannot be answered in simple binary terms, yes or no.”
‘Would you accept that having waited four years… it’s difficult to see the word ‘priority’ having any meaning?’
With the opening statements out of the way, witness evidence began on Tuesday.
The first witness was Peter Groves, former head of training at the LFB. The primary line of questioning for him (as will be the case for several witnesses) was why the lessons from a fire at Lakanal House – a high rise in Camberwell, south London, where six residents died in 2009 – were apparently not learned before Grenfell.
In 2013, the coroner investigating that fire made seven recommendations for improvements to the training offered to incident commanders.
These included being “able to anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentation principle” and “aware of the risks to those above and adjacent to the fire flat”.
What happened to this is a big question, as Mr Dowden – by his own admission – was dumbfounded by the rapid spread of the fire at Grenfell and felt that his training had not prepared him for it.
From 2012 onwards training of LFB staff was provided by a private contractor, Babcock, with Mr Groves’ department effectively acting as a go-between.
The problem was that, especially in the early days of this arrangement, Babcock was quite heavily reliant on subject matter experts within the LFB to help design training. According to the witness statement of one senior officer, this amounted to “a significant and constant reliance” on LFB experts generating “demands on LFB resources… regularly reported to line managers up to director level”.
Mr Groves said this issue was particularly severe with incident commander training and as a result “it wasn’t always possible to fast-track urgently needed changes”.
Mr Groves claimed that existing courses for incident commanders were “adapted” to meet the requirements of the coroner at Lakanal House.
But the LFB had planned to introduce new training, by a deadline of April 2013. This did not happen.
In fact, in August 2017 – four years later and two months after the Grenfell Tower fire – this training was still being either piloted or “scoped out” for officers at levels two to four on the LFB’s grading system.
Mr Groves said the focus had been on the lowest level, which is what the majority of the workforce required. He added that alternative courses were available for the most senior level.
“There was the issue around subject matter expertise, signing off the content, but it was and still remains a priority training project,” he said.
“Would you accept that having waited four years and in relation to level two, it’s difficult to see the word ‘priority’ having any meaning?” asked counsel to the inquiry Andrew Kinnier QC.
“Yes, I can accept that,” Mr Groves replied.
This was not the only issue with training. A specific issue encountered at Lakanal was difficulties using radios during the incident.
But shown the slides for communications training, Mr Groves accepted that it did not in fact instruct crews about the difficulties that could be encountered in high-rise buildings.
“So the package itself doesn’t meet or address the communications issues that were experienced at Lakanal – is that a fair proposition?” asked Mr Kinnier.
“I think that’s fair, Mr Groves replied.
He was also shown evidence that the brigade had planned to introduce a training package for fighting fires in highly insulated buildings, at the request of a senior officer who believed there was an increasing risk in such blocks.
This training package was in fact developed, and a newsletter sent to stations encouraged use of it.
But it was not in fact made available. This was because when the LFB upgraded its version of Internet Explorer, it could no longer get the videos to play or the training log to function.
Mr Groves accepted that this could have been overcome by providing the videos on CD and logging the completion of the training on paper.
‘A sort of juggernaut-like grand structure of nomenclature and initials’
Mr Groves was followed into the witness box by Rita Dexter, former deputy commissioner at the LFB.
Ms Dexter, who joined the brigade in 2001, was never an operational firefighter. Instead, she had a senior career in local government before being headhunted for her managerial skill.
She was asked, in particular, about her time as chair of the LFB’s Operational Directorates Co-ordination Board (ODCB), a group that brought together senior managers from across the brigade.
Its primary purpose was to review the LFB’s operational performance and training. Where it noticed a problem, it would send articles out to stations through the ‘Operational News’ newsletter instructing crews to carry out online training packages.
One of the problems, though, was the information it was working from in order to carry out these reviews. A database had been created to record “post-mortems” of incidents, in order to identify common issues and areas for training.
But it was rarely filled in. Data from September 2014 showed that of 47,105 incidents, just 1,679 – or 4% – had a report filed. Why so low?
Ms Dexter said this headline number risked “creating a deceiving picture” as many LFB incidents involved no action. However, she did accept that there was a reluctance within stations to report incidents, with the additions to the database seen as “punitive” by frontline staff.
“We did our best to reflect back that it was genuinely intended to be an improvement tool. But clearly, there was still some reluctance to engage with it,” she said.
At times, following Ms Dexter’s cross-examination was extremely complex, as the questions navigated a whirl of committees, structures and acronyms: ODCB, DIOT, TCAP, PCRs and PCOs. This was an issue that Richard Millett, lead counsel to the inquiry, addressed head-on.
“People watching might wonder why the LFB got itself into a position where it had a sort of juggernaut-like grand structure of nomenclature and initials, which is quite difficult to penetrate from the outside,” he said.
“Did it ever occur to you that the structure within which you were working was clunky and difficult to manage, where lines of communication didn’t work very well and you got enmeshed in it all?”
Ms Dexter said no. While she accepted that things were “possibly sometimes unnecessarily” complicated, she added: “Many people in the London Fire Brigade are doing difficult, intricate things… If I came across things that were ridiculously complicated I would have changed them.”
‘It was openly recognised that the government had a deregulating agenda’
Another aspect of Ms Dexter’s work discussed in detail was the period after the Lakanal House fire in 2009 – and the interactions between the LFB and central government. This led to a couple of new revelations about the failure to prevent the Grenfell Tower fire at the highest level.
These began in December 2009, just five months after the fire, when the LFB received testing showing that the panels that had ignited at Lakanal House did not meet required standards – and that the material used on the building (high-pressure laminate) was in wider use.
Ron Dobson, then-commissioner of the LFB, wrote to Sir Ken Knight, the government’s chief fire and rescue advisor, suggesting that it “may be appropriate for a warning to be given to housing providers that it would be advisable to check the specification for external wall panels in their high-rise housing stock”.
But Sir Ken responded saying the government would not do this, explaining that “it was felt at this time there was insufficient information to warrant alerting housing authorities”.
This is important not just because of the evidence about central government, but because it begs the important question as to why the LFB did not alert its own frontline about the known risk from cladding.
“Does it follow that it remained the case, and the LFB knew that it remained the case, that any number of high-rise buildings in London could well have non-compliant panels that promoted fire spread?” asked Mr Millett.
“Yes,” replied Ms Dexter.
“Do you remember a time when you or anybody in the fire safety department considered telling station staff that this risk existed?” asked Mr Millett.
“My answer is: no, we didn’t, but… I ’m not sure about the depth of the information we had, and I think the whole topic of cladding is more complicated than: cladding is bad and is a risk,” she replied.
The warnings to central government continued. In December 2012, three years later, Mr Dobson wrote to Brandon Lewis, then a junior minister within the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).
He listed seven recommendations the brigade had following its investigations into Lakanal, including the publication of additional guidance about the risk of external fire spread.
This warning too was rebuffed, with the department insisting that existing guidance already “explicitly states” that external walls should resist the spread of fire.
In October, following the conclusion of the coroner’s inquest, the brigade tried again, with Mr Dobson writing to “invite you to look at the issues raised previously” and consider “whether it would now be possible to take some more vigorous action in response to them”.
“Would it be fair to describe that last invitation as an extremely polite kick up the DCLG backside?” asked Mr Millett.
“Yes,” replied Ms Dexter.
Once more, there was no promise of action. Ms Dexter said she was not surprised by this, explaining that she felt she was “not pushing at an open door” with the government on these matters.
“The government had formally declared policies about reducing the burden on business,” she explained. “It was openly recognised that the government had a deregulating agenda.”
The LFB went on to commission a report into how well fire safety legislation was working in London, which was ultimately written by the Building Research Establishment (BRE).
This led to an interesting exchange that may set the ground for some further questions when the inquiry begins looking at the relationship between this private testing house and the government later this year.
“Did anybody ever conduct an investigation into how independent the BRE was from government for this purpose?” asked Mr Millett.
“No,” replied Ms Dexter.
“Why is that?” asked Mr Millett.
“I think I understood that they were independent from government,” she replied.
The BRE report was finalised in autumn 2015, after Ms Dexter was made redundant, so this thread will likely be picked up with other witnesses.
Throughout these exchanges about Lakanal, Ms Dexter was repeatedly asked why she did not do more to alert the frontline that there might be more dangerous buildings out there.
For example, she explained how she had watched a presentation on the multiple failures at Lakanal House that had a big impression on her.
“When you got this presentation… was your reaction to say ‘gosh, this building was horrendously non-compliant, we’d better tell all frontline responders so that they don’t assume that the building in front of them is compliant’? Did that occur to you at the time?” asked Mr Millett.
“No, it didn’t occur to me at the time, but a learning point that embraces that was there in the action plan for incident commanders and, to that extent, had been taken forward,” she replied.
The inquiry continues, with more from Ms Dexter and other LFB witnesses next week.
Grenfell Tower Inquiry: week 48 headlines
The London Fire Brigade (LFB) was “unacceptably closed-minded”, “isolationist” and “parochial” in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire and was beset by a culture that left it unable to cope with an emergency “beyond the normal or standard fire”, lawyers acting for bereaved and survivors said today.
Firefighters would have been “improvising in the face of a risk to life” if they had sought to evacuate Grenfell when flames spread up the tower, a lawyer acting for the Fire Brigades Union has told the inquiry.
New training packages for London Fire Brigade (LFB) incident commanders covering the danger of rapid fire spread were still under development at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire, despite having been recommended four years earlier by the coroner investigating six deaths at another major high-rise fire.
LFB logged 4% of incidents on improvement database amid fear system was punitive
London Fire Brigade (LFB) teams logged only 4% of the incidents they attended on a database used for learning from mistakes, amid fears from firefighters that the reports were considered “punitive”, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard today.
The government did not act on advice from the London Fire Brigade (LFB) to issue “a warning to housing providers” about the danger of combustible materials used in external cladding systems eight years before the Grenfell Tower fire.
Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries
Module one: the refurbishment
Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry
After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means
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Week three: Architects of misfortune
This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points
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Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’
The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment
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Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’
Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon
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Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’
Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence
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Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’
Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks
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Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’
This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor
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Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’
With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’
With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report
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Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’
With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports
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Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’
This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’
Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps
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Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’
This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps
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Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment
Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block
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Module two: the cladding products
Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’
The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports
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Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’
As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings
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Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story
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Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’
This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’
The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’
In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’
This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’
The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.
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Week 26: 'You were taking an enormous risk, weren't you?'
Week 26 at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was a key moment in understanding how dangerous products used on the tower came to be accepted by industry professionals. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’
The most explosive evidence this week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry came from those who did not attend, as the evidence which would have been presented to Arconic witnesses was displayed in their absence. Peter Apps reports
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Week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry zeroed in on the British Board of Agrément, the body that produced “misleading” certificates which inspired trust in both the cladding and insulation used on the tower. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 29: ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’
The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby government after the fire. Peter Apps reports
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How the products used in Grenfell Tower's cladding system were tested and sold
As the section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining how the products used in the cladding system were tested, marketed and sold comes to a close, Peter Apps summarises what we have learned about each of the products included in the system
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Module Three: the management of the tower
Week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of a fire the whole building can become an inferno’
The focus of the inquiry shifted this week to the actions of the social housing providers responsible for maintaining Grenfell Tower. Pete Apps recaps what we learned
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Week 31: ‘If we cannot get out people will die’
This week saw the former residents of Grenfell Tower enter the witness box to tell of their experiences attempting to raise complaints with the council and its managing agent. Pete Apps reports
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Week 32: ‘Let's hope our luck holds and there isn't a fire’
This week saw the return of the landlord of Grenfell Tower, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), as senior staff members attempted to explain how vital fire safety protections at the block were allowed to fall into disrepair. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 33: ‘Isn't that a serious gap in the scope of a policy meant to safeguard vulnerable people?’
A slightly disjointed week at the Grenfell Tower inquiry saw further evidence from staff at building manager Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) interspersed with the views of a cladding expert. Peter Apps reports
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Week 34: ‘Some members of the community are doing their best to spread false information’
Jack Simpson covers all the major revelations from the past week of evidence at the Grenfell Inquiry, including evidence from Laura Johnson, director of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.
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Week 35: ‘I really didn’t like the champagne’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw council witnesses, including former deputy leader Rock Feilding-Mellen and leader Nicholas Paget-Brown, questioned about their role in the story for the first time. Peter Apps reports
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Week 36: ‘Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry scrutinised the work of Carl Stokes, the man hired to carry out fire risk assessments for the block. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 37: ‘In giving that advice, weren’t you acting beyond your knowledge and expertise?’
A curtailed week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw fire risk assessor Carl Stokes grilled over advice he gave regarding the tower’s cladding. Peter Apps reports
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Week 38: ‘Well it’s a bit more than that, isn’t it. He’s suggesting that you tell the LFB a lie’
The inquiry heard the mammoth cross-examination of KCTMO’s health and safety manager Janice Wray this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 39: ‘What you said there was a grotesque understatement’
This week the inquiry continued to hear from former employees of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, as well as two employees from the London Fire Brigade. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 40: ‘An exercise in concealment and half-truth’
Former KCTMO chief executive Robert Black gave his evidence to the inquiry this week and was asked to account for the various failures described over the previous six weeks. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report.
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Week 41: ‘We should do nothing. This is not the sort of website we should be responding to’
This week saw the return of Robert Black, chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), before the inquiry turned its attention to the defective smoke control system in the tower. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 42:‘They would leak as much as they leaked. They were what they were’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued its in-depth investigation of the tower’s non-compliant smoke control system this week, with evidence from the various contractors involved in delivering it. Pete Apps reports
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Week 43:‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’
This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports
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Week 44:‘I've never seen a fully compliant firefighting lift in any local authority building, to this day actually’
This week the inquiry turn the focus onto the building’s defective lifts, with evidence from an expert, contractors who worked on them and a former engineer at KCTMO. Pete Apps reports.
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Week 45: ‘Don’t you find all this rather a surprising debate, given that the Equality Act was passed in 2010?’
The inquiry heard from expert witness Colin Todd this week, who gave his views about the work of risk assessor Carl Stokes as well as answered questions about his own guidance. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report
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Week 46: ‘I think I've been very, very clear that is completely wrong’
This week the inquiry heard further expert evidence about fire risk assessor Carl Stokes’ actions, as the section of its work covering the management and maintenance of the tower concluded. Peter Apps reports
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Six key failures in the way Grenfell Tower was managed before the fire
Peter Apps recaps some of what we have learned about the actions of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) in the years before the fire.
Module one and two closing statements
Week 47: ‘An unedifying spectacle’
After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group
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Module five: the fire brigade
Week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’
The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports
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Week 49: ‘I'm not sure we've always taken every opportunity to learn as an organisation’
How the London Fire Brigade acted upon lessons from incidents in the years before the Grenfell Tower disaster came under the microscope this week at the public inquiry. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 50: ‘There is a culture in LFB that is very conservative. I think there is great comfort in what is familiar’
This week the inquiry heard how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) elected not to issue warnings about dangerous cladding before Grenfell and a detailed examination of its policy for checking high risk buildings. Pete Apps reports.
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Week 51:‘We teach firefighters to expect building failure’
An unusually brief week of evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry explored how a fire service neighbouring London was taking a different approach to tackling blazes in high rises. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 52: ‘I actually think that there is a measure of incompetence at all levels’
Expert evidence concluded the current section of the inquiry with some stinging criticism of the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report.
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Module six: fire services
Week 53: ‘They make for chilling reading and harrowing listening’
The inquiry’s investigation into central government began this week with lawyers setting out their view on how and why firefighting policies failed. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 54: ‘Our consideration of evacuation at this time was something of a blind spot’
The development of policy on ‘stay put’, both nationally and for London, occupied the attention of the inquiry this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 55: ‘My review is pretty scathing!’
In a week that included the 200th day of evidence in phase two of the inquiry, attention turned to the London Fire Brigade’s control room. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 56: ‘Why didn't we thump the table harder’
This week, the control room at the London Fire Brigade was examined further – both before and after the fire. Pete Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 57: ‘It was worse than slow, it was sluggish’
Former London Fire Brigade (LFB) commissioner Dany Cotton was the star witness this week, as the inquiry continued to delve into the brigade’s knowledge and training before the Grenfell Tower fire. Jack Simpson, Grainne Cuffe and Pete Apps report
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Week 58: ‘I don't think we deserve to ask for trust until we demonstrate different outcomes’
A current and former commissioner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) wrapped up the inquiry’s investigation into the actions of the brigade before the fire. Grainne Cuffe and Peter Apps report.
Module six: testing and government
One of the major scandals of our time: key revelations as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turns to government
The government was accused of “covering up” the risks of dangerous cladding as its “unbridled passion for deregulation” left it a “junior party” to the construction industry as the latest phase of the public inquiry opened today. Peter Apps summarises some of the main points
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Week 59: ‘Recent tests have apparently shown it continued to burn for 20 minutes after the flame was taken away’
After shocking opening statements, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of Local Authority Building Control. Pete Apps reports
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Week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 61: ‘Mistakes are meant for learning, not repeating’
In the first hearings of the new year, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard closing statements from the firefighting section of phase two. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 62: Did it ever occur to you that this act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting?
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with a new shocking revelation about the government’s actions in the immediate aftermath of the fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 63: ‘It came after the general move to deregulation. So more regulation was not welcome’
The government’s focus on deregulation before the Grenfell Tower fire was placed in the spotlight this week with a series of shocking revelations about its failure to amend fire safety guidance. Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 64: ‘I didn’t think ACM would be suitable for use in any high-rise buildings. I don’t think anyone did’
This week, the Building Research Establishment’s Dr Sarah Colwell gave more than three days of evidence, with some huge revelations about what was known about the dangers of aluminium composite material years before the fire and the mass confusion over the government’s building regulations. Peter Apps and Jack Simpson report
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Week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’
Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 66: ‘Was there a cover-up?’
The latest evidence from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tracked the government’s failure to act on fire safety warnings right up until the months before the fire. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’
This week the inquiry heard disturbing new evidence about the failure of senior government officials to act on warnings about dangerous cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 68: ‘Can we agree that was a pretty dangerous thing to have, all this falling on one man’s shoulders?’
Three senior civil servants gave evidence this week, including the official who had responsibility for building regulations guidance on fire safety in the years before Grenfell. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 69: ‘It was just unthinkable. You had the makings here of a crisis you could not comprehend’
This week, civil servant Brian Martin gave his long-awaited evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps reports
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Week 70: ‘Show me the bodies’
An important week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw a dramatic conclusion to the mammoth cross-examination of civil servant Brian Martin, as well as the first politicians. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 71: ‘I have changed my schedule to fit this in. I do have an extremely busy day meeting people’
Three politicians who were responsible for building regulations before Grenfell appeared before the inquiry this week, including the former communities secretary Eric Pickles, who responded to the coroner’s letter following the Lakanal House fire. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Module Four: aftermath
Week 72: 'The system isn't broken. It was built this way'
This week the inquiry turned to the shocking story of the lack of support for bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Grainne Cuffe and Jack Simpson report
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Week 73: ‘Most people would regard that as hopeless’
This week, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard about the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s chaotic response in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, from the staff responsible for it. Pete Apps, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 74: ‘Do you agree that RBKC was ill-prepared and incapable to meet its duties’
This week, Nicholas Holgate, former chief executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, was grilled on his failure to hand over control of the aftermath of the fire, despite the borough’s lack of capacity. Peter Apps reports
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Week 75: ‘It still shocks me to the core that that’s how we treat our citizens in this country’
This week the inquiry heard witnesses from the housing management body discuss their role in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, followed by a range of witnesses from other organisations which supported the response. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’
This week the inquiry heard from central government figures and members of the London-wide emergency response arrangements. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 77: ‘The planning wasn’t done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s examination of the aftermath of the fire concluded with witnesses from central government. Peter Apps reports
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Module seven: expert evidence and closing statements
Week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard a range of expert witnesses discuss their reports. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 79: ‘You could argue the system was created to enable people to circumvent the rules’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued to hear expert evidence this week, with two senior figures in the world of fire safety academia criticising the government’s approach before and after the blaze. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’
As the inquiry moves into its final stages, lawyers for the key players gave statements about the evidence surrounding central government. Peter Apps reports
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Week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia. It’s racism. It is the elephant staring back at us in the room’
This week, closing statements covering the aftermath of the fire delivered a shocking new revelation and an expert toxicologist gave his views on the causes of the deaths. Peter Apps reports
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Module eight: further evidence relating to the deceased
Week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry moved into its final module this week, with evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims died. Peter Apps reports
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Week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’
A second week of evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims of the fire died delivered more heartbreaking stories about their final moments. Peter Apps recaps
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Week 84: ‘Every decision affects someone who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother’
The final week of oral evidence for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s second phase contained more heartbreaking evidence about the deaths in the tower. Peter Apps reports
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Closing statements
Week 85: ‘The merry-go-round turns still, the notes of its melody clearly audible in the last few days’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for closing statements from lawyers representing the bereaved and survivors and the various parties under scrutiny for the fire. Pete Apps reports.
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