Grenfell Inquiry report elects not to make specific recommendations for social housing providers

These recommendations include:

• The establishment of a single construction regulator to take control of overall regulation of the construction industry, including issuing construction products certificates
• An ‘urgent’ review of the definition of a higher-risk building, which takes into account factors such as vulnerability of residents, and not just the 18-metre height threshold that exists currently
• Fire safety functions currently delivered by the Home Office, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) and the Department for Business and Trade to be brought into one department and under one secretary of state
• A chief construction advisor with sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on matters affecting the construction industry
• A review of Approved Document B – the building regulations guidance covering fire safety – and a revised version as soon as possible. This should include a reconsideration of the total reliance on ‘stay put’ advice
• That product manufacturers provide all relevant test results that support fire safety claims, and a full history of tests – including failures – is included in product certificates
• The fire engineering profession be recognised and protected by law, with an independent body set up to regulate it
• A licensing scheme for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings
• A review of building control functions, which considers whether it is appropriate for private sector firms to operate in this space, and whether all building control work should be carried out by a national authority rather than local government
• Government should maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by public inquiries with a description of the steps taken in response, and report annually to parliament. If the government does not accept a recommendation, it should record its reasons for doing so
• Councils should find ways to gather information about displaced and missing people and draw up contingency plans to place people in temporary accommodation at short notice, taking account of their personal, religious and cultural requirements and immediate financial assistance

However, inquiry chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick and his panel members mostly refrained from commenting on the wider state of the social housing sector, instead choosing to scrutinise the way Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) carried out its responsibilities in the run-up to the fire that killed 72 people.

Part 4 and Part 5 of the report made “a number of criticisms” of the TMO, including in relation to handling complaints, remedying defects identified in fire risk assessments, installing and maintaining fire protection systems and routine inspection and maintenance of fire doors.

“In other circumstances, shortcomings of those kinds would probably have led us to make a number of recommendations directed to ensuring that they were rectified and not repeated,” the report read.

“However, since the fire, parliament has enacted the Social Housing (Regulation) Act 2023, which enables the Regulator of Social Housing to play a more active role in setting appropriate standards and ensuring that they are met.”

The report noted that under the new legislation, the regulator has the power to set standards on the competence and conduct of social housing management professionals and to require providers to make information available both to tenants and the regulator.

According to the inquiry, the act also “makes safety a priority” and “imposes a duty on landlords to investigate and remedy within a specified time of being reported defects that may adversely affect health”, the report added. The Labour government has said it will press on with the implementation of this duty, known as ‘Awaab’s Law’, and extend it to the private rented sector.

The report concluded: “In those circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to make any additional recommendations in relation to the matters that we have uncovered.”

KCTMO was criticised both for allowing its relationship with Grenfell residents to become “toxic” and for paying “insufficient attention” to fire safety during the renovation of the tower.

A fire safety strategy had still not been approved by the time of the fire, and the TMO “failed to take sufficient care” in its choice of architect and to examine the work of the fire engineer.

From 2011 to 2017, the report continued, “relations between the TMO and many of the residents were increasingly characterised by distrust, dislike, personal antagonism and anger”.

“Some, perhaps many, occupants of the tower regarded the TMO as an uncaring and bullying overlord that belittled and marginalised them, regarded them as a nuisance, or worse, and failed to take their concerns seriously,” it added.