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Lawyers for the victims and survivors of the Grenfell Tower disaster tore into the London Fire Brigade (LFB) yesterday, with one saying its leader is “not fit to run” the service.
Key points
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry is taking closing statements for phase one of the hearing this week, starting with legal representatives for the LFB and what the inquiry terms “the BSR” – the bereaved, survivors and local residents.
All of the BSR lawyers were highly critical of the LFB, as well as Kensington and Chelsea Council, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) and firms involved in the refurbishment of the tower.
Sam Stein QC said LFB commissioner Dany Cotton and her leadership team “are not fit to run” the service, having failed “to consider the unfolding evidence before this inquiry”.
He said Ms Cotton “should have been well aware of the dreadful failings” within the LFB before she gave evidence to the inquiry – when she said she would not change anything about the brigade’s response to the blaze.
But he said: “This condemnation of the leadership of the fire brigade of London should not be taken to be an insult to those on the front line.”
Danny Friedman QC, also representing the victims, said Ms Cotton’s comments were “woefully ill-judged and defensive”, “insulting” and “brought her and her organisation into disrepute”.
He also accused the LFB control room of “very significant failures”, listing cases of Grenfell residents being given conflicting advice by 999 call handlers.
And Pete Weatherby QC said Ms Cotton’s evidence “comes from an ingrained culture of denial”.
Stephanie Barwise QC argued that residents should have been evacuated as soon as the fire spread to the tower’s cladding, but that the fire service “failed to comprehend that immediate evacuation was the only option and that entire building failure was inevitable”.
She said that Grenfell “represented a health hazard so egregious that it should never have been occupied” and that it was “no exaggeration to describe the tower, as refurbished, as a death trap”.
Ms Barwise also accused Arconic (cladding manufacturer), Celotex (insulation manufacturer) and Rydon (contractor for the refurbishment) of “obfuscation” in its evidence to the inquiry.
Mr Friedman called for the inquiry to “declare” breaches of public law and regulations in its phase one findings.
And he pointed to an “operational gap” between KCTMO and the council on the night of the fire, “potentially facilitated by the current state of our social housing law”.
Earlier in the day, Stephen Walsh QC, representing the LFB, said the service accepted that on the night its “policies, procedures and training were strained to their limits and, in some respects, well beyond”.
And he said that “that the quality of the operational risk information recorded for Grenfell Tower at the time of the fire fell below the standards expected by the brigade”.
However, he maintained that Grenfell was a “unique and singular event”.
He added: “It is a stark fact that one of the largest fire services in the world was severely challenged, in some elements overwhelmed, in the performance of its functions.
“This was not by reason of an insufficiency or inadequacy of the greatest number of resources ever deployed to a fire in residential premises, but by a savage fire that rapidly progressed through a building which, on the evidence of the inquiry’s experts, was fundamentally non-compliant with fire safety requirements in multiple respects.
“This was a unique fire, not just because of its unprecedented scale and rapidity, but also because of the way it behaved.”
Mr Walsh also defended the decision not to alter the ‘stay put’ advice to residents sooner and outlined measures introduced by the LFB since the fire.
Closing statements
Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade
Further expert evidence
Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives
Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives
Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted
Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat
Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire
Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested
Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat
Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard
Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower
Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors
Other witness evidence
Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence
Day 75: call room operators give evidence
Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers
Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters
Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off
Day 71: further questions over stay put advice
Day 70: the police evidence
The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence
Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door
Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it
Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape
Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'
Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety
Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'
Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor
Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death
Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics
Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say
Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows
Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life
Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor
Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’
Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice
Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association
Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'
Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call
The firefighters’ evidence
Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump
Day 50: the LFB commissioner
Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans
Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding
Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears
Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits
Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy
Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties
Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put
Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back
Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'
Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy
Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children
Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families
Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'
Day 36: QC defends inquiry process
Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations
Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames
Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'
Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure
Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined
Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described
Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls
Day 28: 'the building beat us'
Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'
Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts
Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'
Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored
Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort
Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre
Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'
Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents
Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'
Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'
Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues
Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11
Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls
Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze
Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties
Day 12: "it was like a war zone"
Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios
Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning
Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'
The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry
Day eight: where the fire started
Day seven: what was in the cladding?
Day six: the cause and spread of the fire
Day five: expert highlights key issues
Day four: firefighters defend response to fire
Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time
Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case
Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put
The commemoration hearings
30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'
29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry
25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'
24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor
23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings
22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning
21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens