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The former chief executive of the organisation managing Grenfell Tower failed repeatedly to pass information to firefighters on the night of the fire, the inquiry heard today.
Robert Black, at the time in charge of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), was sent documents firefighters needed but took more than two hours to pass them on.
Firefighters wanted a list of residents and plans of the building, and were unhappy with how long KCTMO took to provide them with this information.
Emails shown to the inquiry reveal Mr Black, who was at the tower on the night, was first sent a list of tenants at 5.24am on 14 June 2017 and an updated version at 5.38am from David Noble, another KCTMO employee.
Shortly after this, at 6am, Mr Black emailed other KCTMO employees asking them to pull together information about the refurbishment of the tower, saying: “RBKC [Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea] will put out a holding state[ment] but already asking these questions.”
Mr Black, however, did not forward the list of residents on to the London Fire Brigade (LFB) until 7.56am even though, the inquiry heard, firefighters had been seeking it since 4.30am.
In his witness statement, he said he had told firefighters that KCTMO would be able to provide a list of registered tenants and leaseholders, but not an up-to-date roster of occupants and visitors.
Nick Layton, a liaison officer for RBKC, told the Grenfell Tower Inquiry he first asked Mr Black for the list at 4.50am and then hourly until he eventually sent it.
Asked about these requests, Mr Black said that he didn’t remember any of them.
Asked why he didn’t forward the list on immediately, he told the inquiry: “I didn’t realise they wanted it.”
The inquiry also heard that firefighters repeatedly asked for up-to-date plans of Grenfell Tower.
In footage from one police officer’s body camera, Andy Roe, incident commander of LFB, can be seen telling the council’s liaison officer at 7.13am that he had been asking for plans for “a very long time”.
Mr Roe added: “The fact that you’ve not been able to get me a set of plans is a major deficiency and will be highlighted.”
Emails submitted as evidence to the inquiry showed that Mr Black did eventually send plans to the LFB, but the time signatures on the emails were inconsistent.
An email sent from Mr Noble at 7.14am had the plans attached. Mr Black forwarded this to the LFB, in an email recorded as having been sent at 5.16am.
Richard Millett, counsel to the inquiry, pointed out that one of these times must be incorrect.
Mr Black was at the tower for around six hours. Describing what he did while he was there, he told the inquiry he was “standing there, responding to phone calls, speaking to people on the phone. Not very much, as I said because I wasn’t part of the structure. Speaking to my team generally”.
During Mr Layton’s evidence, he was also asked about the length of time the council took to send a dangerous structures engineer (DSE) to the tower to judge whether it was at risk of collapse.
According to the LFB’s incident log, firefighters first sought an engineer at 2.17am. At 3.15am, the request was made again by the same radio operator, who wrote: “Stress this is matter of urgency and priority.”
A body-worn camera shows footage from 3.27am in which Mr Roe says he thinks an entire corner of the building is ready to collapse.
Mr Layton noted this down. He admitted to the inquiry that this “should have” prompted him to realise a DSE was necessary, but it didn’t.
According to Mr Layton, he was only directly asked for such an engineer by the LFB at 4.15am, when he arranged this.
Body-worn footage from 4.39 shows Dany Cotton saying that she had been asking for a DSE for two hours.
At one stage in his evidence, Mr Black was asked if his involvement on the night was “essentially passive”. He said it was.
Closing statements
Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade
Further expert evidence
Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives
Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives
Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted
Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat
Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire
Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested
Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat
Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard
Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower
Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors
Other witness evidence
Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence
Day 75: call room operators give evidence
Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers
Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters
Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off
Day 71: further questions over stay put advice
Day 70: the police evidence
The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence
Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door
Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it
Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape
Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'
Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety
Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'
Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor
Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death
Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics
Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say
Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows
Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life
Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor
Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’
Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice
Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association
Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'
Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call
The firefighters’ evidence
Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump
Day 50: the LFB commissioner
Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans
Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding
Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears
Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits
Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy
Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties
Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put
Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back
Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'
Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy
Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children
Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families
Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'
Day 36: QC defends inquiry process
Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations
Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames
Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'
Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure
Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined
Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described
Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls
Day 28: 'the building beat us'
Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'
Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts
Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'
Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored
Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort
Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre
Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'
Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents
Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'
Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'
Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues
Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11
Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls
Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze
Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties
Day 12: "it was like a war zone"
Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios
Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning
Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'
The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry
Day eight: where the fire started
Day seven: what was in the cladding?
Day six: the cause and spread of the fire
Day five: expert highlights key issues
Day four: firefighters defend response to fire
Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time
Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case
Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put
The commemoration hearings
30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'
29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry
25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'
24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor
23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings
22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning
21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens