ao link
Twitter
Linked In
Bluesky
Threads
Twitter
Linked In
Bluesky
Threads

You are viewing 1 of your 1 free articles

Grenfell Inquiry day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters

The former chief executive of the organisation managing Grenfell Tower failed repeatedly to pass information to firefighters on the night of the fire, the inquiry heard today. 

Linked InTwitterFacebookeCard
Robert Black, former chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation
Robert Black, former chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation
Sharelines

The former chief executive of the organisation managing Grenfell Tower failed repeatedly to pass information to firefighters on the night of the fire #ukhousing

Robert Black, at the time in charge of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), was sent documents firefighters needed but took more than two hours to pass them on.

Firefighters wanted a list of residents and plans of the building, and were unhappy with how long KCTMO took to provide them with this information.

Emails shown to the inquiry reveal Mr Black, who was at the tower on the night, was first sent a list of tenants at 5.24am on 14 June 2017 and an updated version at 5.38am from David Noble, another KCTMO employee.


READ MORE

Chief executive of Grenfell management company resignsChief executive of Grenfell management company resigns
Chief executive of Grenfell management company will 'step aside'Chief executive of Grenfell management company will 'step aside'
Grenfell Inquiry day 76: ‘stay put’ should be dropped when blaze moves across floors, says expertGrenfell Inquiry day 76: ‘stay put’ should be dropped when blaze moves across floors, says expert
Once upon a time in the west: the history of KCTMOOnce upon a time in the west: the history of KCTMO

Shortly after this, at 6am, Mr Black emailed other KCTMO employees asking them to pull together information about the refurbishment of the tower, saying: “RBKC [Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea] will put out a holding state[ment] but already asking these questions.”

Mr Black, however, did not forward the list of residents on to the London Fire Brigade (LFB) until 7.56am even though, the inquiry heard, firefighters had been seeking it since 4.30am.

In his witness statement, he said he had told firefighters that KCTMO would be able to provide a list of registered tenants and leaseholders, but not an up-to-date roster of occupants and visitors.

Nick Layton, a liaison officer for RBKC, told the Grenfell Tower Inquiry he first asked Mr Black for the list at 4.50am and then hourly until he eventually sent it.

Asked about these requests, Mr Black said that he didn’t remember any of them.

Asked why he didn’t forward the list on immediately, he told the inquiry: “I didn’t realise they wanted it.”

The inquiry also heard that firefighters repeatedly asked for up-to-date plans of Grenfell Tower.

In footage from one police officer’s body camera, Andy Roe, incident commander of LFB, can be seen telling the council’s liaison officer at 7.13am that he had been asking for plans for “a very long time”.

Mr Roe added: “The fact that you’ve not been able to get me a set of plans is a major deficiency and will be highlighted.”

Emails submitted as evidence to the inquiry showed that Mr Black did eventually send plans to the LFB, but the time signatures on the emails were inconsistent.

An email sent from Mr Noble at 7.14am had the plans attached. Mr Black forwarded this to the LFB, in an email recorded as having been sent at 5.16am.

Richard Millett, counsel to the inquiry, pointed out that one of these times must be incorrect.

Mr Black was at the tower for around six hours. Describing what he did while he was there, he told the inquiry he was “standing there, responding to phone calls, speaking to people on the phone. Not very much, as I said because I wasn’t part of the structure. Speaking to my team generally”.

During Mr Layton’s evidence, he was also asked about the length of time the council took to send a dangerous structures engineer (DSE) to the tower to judge whether it was at risk of collapse.

According to the LFB’s incident log, firefighters first sought an engineer at 2.17am. At 3.15am, the request was made again by the same radio operator, who wrote: “Stress this is matter of urgency and priority.”

A body-worn camera shows footage from 3.27am in which Mr Roe says he thinks an entire corner of the building is ready to collapse.

Mr Layton noted this down. He admitted to the inquiry that this “should have” prompted him to realise a DSE was necessary, but it didn’t.

According to Mr Layton, he was only directly asked for such an engineer by the LFB at 4.15am, when he arranged this.

Body-worn footage from 4.39 shows Dany Cotton saying that she had been asking for a DSE for two hours.

At one stage in his evidence, Mr Black was asked if his involvement on the night was “essentially passive”. He said it was.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Closing statements

 

Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade

 

Further expert evidence

Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives

 

Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives

Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted

Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat

Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire

Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested

Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat

Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard

Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower

Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors

 

Other witness evidence

Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence

 

Day 75: call room operators give evidence

Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers

Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters

Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off

Day 71: further questions over stay put advice

Day 70: the police evidence

 

The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence

 

Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door

Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it

Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape

Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'

Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety

Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'

Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor

Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death

Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics

Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say

Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows

Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life

Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor

Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’

Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice

Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association

Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'

Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call

 

The firefighters’ evidence

 

Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump

Day 50: the LFB commissioner

Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans

Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding

Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears

Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits

Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy

Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties

Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put

Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back

Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'

Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy

Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children

Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families

Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'

Day 36: QC defends inquiry process

Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations

Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames

Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'

Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure

Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined

Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described

Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls

Day 28: 'the building beat us'

Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'

Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts

Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'

Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored

Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort

Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre

Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'

Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents

Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'

Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'

Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues

Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11

Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls

Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze

Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties

Day 12: "it was like a war zone"

Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios

Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning

Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'

 

The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry

 

Day eight: where the fire started

Day seven: what was in the cladding?

Day six: the cause and spread of the fire

Day five: expert highlights key issues

Day four: firefighters defend response to fire

Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time

Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case

Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put

 

The commemoration hearings

 

30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'

29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry

25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'

24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor

23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings

22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning

21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens

 

Linked InTwitterFacebookeCard
Add New Comment
You must be logged in to comment.