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Grenfell cladding panels were primary cause of external fire spread, inquiry hears

The cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower in the 2012-2016 refurbishment were the primary cause of the fire spreading up the outside of the building, the official inquiry has been told.

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Grenfell’s cladding panels were primary cause of fire spreading up outside of building, inquiry has heard #ukhousing #GrenfellInquiry

First expert witness report given at the #GrenfellInquiry #ukhousing

Professor Luke Bisby, an expert witness to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tasked with examining how the external facade of the tower caught fire and how the fire spread over the facade, made his first report today.

Professor Bisby wrote: “The primary cause of rapid and extensive external fire spread was the presence of polyethylene-filled ACM rainscreen cassettes in the building’s refurbishment cladding system.”

This conclusion was based largely on the results of the government’s post-Grenfell cladding tests, in which flames reached the top of a model wall with Grenfell-style cladding in less than seven minutes.


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While he considered the panels to be the primary cause, he added that the use of combustible insulation in the cladding system, the presence of “extensive cavities” in the cladding system and the use of combustible insulation in window frames “may also have contributed to the fire’s spread”.

In the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, vertical aluminium cladding rails were added to the outside of the building, resembling columns that extended from the face of the tower.

Cavity barriers, according to the report, were cut to make room for the rails, “and no cavity barriers were placed within these rails”, meaning fire could have spread up the cavities inside without being blocked.

Flames spread down, as well as up, the face of the tower, partly due to falling debris and molten polyethylene from the core of the cladding panels flowing downwards over the walls, the report said.

This video was compiled by Professor Luke Bisby to create a chronological representation of how the fire spread. It contains footage of Grenfell Tower on fire and may be distressing for some viewers.

Professor Bisby added that the “architectural crown detail” added to the top of the tower during the refurbishment “played an important role in increasing the rate and/or extent of lateral fire spread”.

This crown, at the top of the vertical rails, was – like the cladding panels – mostly made from ACM with a polyethylene core. Some of the edges were exposed, meaning flames could easily get to the combustible core, the report found.

Professor Bisby found that there was insufficient evidence as yet to determine the cause of the fire, or to say with certainty that it was a Hotpoint fridge-freezer in a kitchen.

This was also the conclusion of another report to the inquiry by Professor Niamh Nic Daeid, who looked into the cause and spread of the fire in the original flat and how it got out of that flat.

Update: at 16.23 on 4.6.18 This story was updated to include a video created by Professor Luke Bisby.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Closing statements

 

Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade

 

Further expert evidence

Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives

 

Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives

Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted

Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat

Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire

Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested

Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat

Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard

Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower

Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors

 

Other witness evidence

Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence

 

Day 75: call room operators give evidence

Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers

Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters

Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off

Day 71: further questions over stay put advice

Day 70: the police evidence

 

The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence

 

Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door

Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it

Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape

Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'

Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety

Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'

Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor

Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death

Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics

Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say

Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows

Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life

Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor

Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’

Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice

Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association

Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'

Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call

 

The firefighters’ evidence

 

Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump

Day 50: the LFB commissioner

Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans

Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding

Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears

Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits

Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy

Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties

Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put

Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back

Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'

Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy

Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children

Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families

Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'

Day 36: QC defends inquiry process

Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations

Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames

Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'

Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure

Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined

Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described

Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls

Day 28: 'the building beat us'

Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'

Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts

Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'

Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored

Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort

Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre

Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'

Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents

Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'

Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'

Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues

Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11

Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls

Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze

Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties

Day 12: "it was like a war zone"

Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios

Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning

Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'

 

The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry

 

Day eight: where the fire started

Day seven: what was in the cladding?

Day six: the cause and spread of the fire

Day five: expert highlights key issues

Day four: firefighters defend response to fire

Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time

Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case

Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put

 

The commemoration hearings

 

30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'

29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry

25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'

24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor

23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings

22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning

21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens

 

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