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A Grenfell Tower Fire survivor has demanded that the “broken system” which was exposed by the tragedy is not fixed with a “sticking plaster”.
Key points
Speaking today at the Grenfell Inquiry, Nicholas Burton, who lost his wife following the fire, urged politicians to take swifter action than in previous inquiries to ensure people across the country feel safe in their homes.
Mr Burton said: “We meet up with the prime minister downwards, with housing ministers, and they talk the talk but this has to be the one where it stops, and justice for me is that this never happens again and we have a fairer system, it can’t go on, it must stop here.
“We as survivors are dealing with billion-pound corporations, we are fighting against a system that is broken and they know its broken but they just use a sticking plaster over it and move on.
Mr Burton was living on the 19th floor with his wife Maria del Pilar Burton when the fire broke out on 14 June.
Both escaped the tower on the night but Mrs Burton was taken to hospital after falling unconscious during the rescue. Mrs Burton died of a stroke in January this year.
Mr Burton said: “No disrespect to inquiry, but it is a system from the government of the day to save embarrassment, we will have an inquiry to get to the truth and time lapses and we hopefully get to the bottom of it and find truth, but this over a long period of time.
“We have sat with the Hillsborough families, we have spent time with Doreen Lawrence and time with people around the country talking to them and they are scared of living in tower blocks with that cladding; the system is not working.”
Mr and Mrs Burton’s flat on the 11th floor was one of the 14 flats in the building not to have their doors replaced in 2011.
Mr Burton had turned down the offer from the TMO to replace his door, due to the £1,000 cost of having the work done.
In his witness statement, Mr Burton said that he had a “solid fire door” which let very little smoke into the flat during the fire.
He added that the door was in “good condition”, “was sturdy”, “had a good frame” and “performed well” during the fire.
According to Dr Barbara Lane’s report published in June as part of the inquiry, 106 fire doors were replaced in the Grenfell Tower in 2011, while 14 were left unchanged.
In the report, Dr Lane found that the replacement fire doors were non-compliant with building regulations and there were discrepancies between evidence of the doors fire performance and the way they were constructed and installed.
She also found that new fire doors were different to those tested by their manufacturer, Manse Masterdor, with different ironmongery and some including glazing.
Dr Lane concluded that the original construction properties of the original fire doors like the one at Mr Burton’s flat was unknown, so she could not determine if they were compliant at the time or their fire performance.
The inquiry also heard evidence from Helen Gebremaskel, who lived with her daughter in flat 186 on the 22nd floor. Both Ms Gebremaskel’s and her daughter survived, but six members of the Choucair family, which lived in flats 191 and 193, died as a result of the fire.
Ms Gebremaskel’s described the Choucairs as “like an extended family”.
In evidence submitted to the inquiry, Ms Gebraskel said that the numbering of floors, which was put out of sequence following renovations in 2015, could have led to confusion in the fire services rescue operation.
Ms Gebremaskel’s evidence said: “After the renovations this became incorrect and out of sequence, due to the Tower having additional floors added at a later date. This meant that the flat we lived in had originally been on floor 18 but now it became floor 21.
“It almost certainly would have caused confusion to fire fighters, however, because people calling from floors were likely referring to the floor number according to the lift, but not the floor number according to the stairs. The fire fighters would have been using the stairs to locate which floor they were coming to.”
Closing statements
Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade
Further expert evidence
Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives
Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives
Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted
Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat
Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire
Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested
Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat
Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard
Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower
Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors
Other witness evidence
Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence
Day 75: call room operators give evidence
Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers
Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters
Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off
Day 71: further questions over stay put advice
Day 70: the police evidence
The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence
Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door
Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it
Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape
Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'
Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety
Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'
Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor
Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death
Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics
Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say
Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows
Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life
Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor
Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’
Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice
Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association
Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'
Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call
The firefighters’ evidence
Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump
Day 50: the LFB commissioner
Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans
Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding
Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears
Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits
Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy
Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties
Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put
Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back
Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'
Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy
Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children
Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families
Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'
Day 36: QC defends inquiry process
Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations
Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames
Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'
Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure
Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined
Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described
Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls
Day 28: 'the building beat us'
Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'
Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts
Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'
Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored
Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort
Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre
Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'
Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents
Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'
Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'
Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues
Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11
Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls
Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze
Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties
Day 12: "it was like a war zone"
Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios
Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning
Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'
The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry
Day eight: where the fire started
Day seven: what was in the cladding?
Day six: the cause and spread of the fire
Day five: expert highlights key issues
Day four: firefighters defend response to fire
Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time
Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case
Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put
The commemoration hearings
30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'
29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry
25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'
24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor
23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings
22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning
21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens
In the days following the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017, Inside Housing launched the Never Again campaign to call for immediate action to implement the learning from the Lakanal House fire, and a commitment to act – without delay – on learning from the Grenfell Tower tragedy as it becomes available.
One year on, we have extended the campaign asks in the light of information that has emerged since.
Here are our updated asks:
GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LANDLORDS