Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’

In June 2016, the Brexit referendum resulted in a vote to leave the European Union, David Cameron resigned and Theresa May’s new government appointed new ministers. 

Mr Harral put forward some documents for new housing minister Gavin Barwell (pictured above) to review in July 2016, including the crucial discussion document. 

But Mr Harral was told by a senior colleague that “we certainly shouldn’t be rushing to put things to new ministers”. 

Asked how this made him feel, Mr Harral said: “I imagine that I was furious at the time, but the department was in post−referendum shock… It was really difficult to cut through that at that point in time.”

Mr Barwell then began work on a housing white paper, which should have been published in autumn 2016 but dragged on to spring 2017. Until this was completed, his team told civil servants that he would not review anything but “the highest priority” issues. 

By February 2017, an email chain showed officials discussing a redrafted discussion document which they wanted to “be on Gavin [Barwell’s] desk when he gets back from recess”. 

Mr Harral wanted to add a line to the covering document saying “we have already made significant progress”, but Mr Martin replied saying “significant” was “pushing it a bit” and suggested instead saying they had “started work”.

“Fine. The point is that we haven’t been sitting on our hands,” replied Mr Harral.

“I hear what you are saying but I’m pretty sure the department’s upper echelons have sat on my hands for the last 18 months!” replied Mr Martin. 

“They are not even aware your hands exist to sit on. Let’s just agree to gild lilies where necessary,” replied Mr Harral. 

“You can roll a turd in glitter if it gets us moving,” said Mr Martin. 

Mr Harral told the inquiry that his “gild lilies” remark referred to a desire to make sure the document “fitted in with broader government policy” 

“Are you sure that you didn’t really mean, ‘let’s mask the truth about how much progress we’ve made and make out we’ve made more progress than we have’?” asked Kate Grange QC, counsel to the inquiry. 

“No,” Mr Harral replied.

“You’re certain about that?” asked Ms Grange.

“I’m absolutely certain about that,” he replied. 

On Mr Martin’s “turd” comment, Ms Grange asked if what he meant was “what you had achieved so far was akin to a turd” and that officials were seeking to “dress it up in order to… persuade [ministers] that you’d done some more work than you actually had”. Mr Harral said he did not accept this. 

The discussion document was ultimately sent to Mr Barwell’s office on 23 March 2017. But it contained, in Ms Grange’s words, “no hint which tells him that this document has been years in the making, is now delayed to the point of embarrassment and that he needs to get on top of this urgently”. 

Mr Harral said he did not want to “get into an argument about delay”. “What I’m trying to say is that at least probably five months of the delay is down to decisions made in Mr Barwell’s private office,” he said.  

At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, the document still had not been published, the industry group to support the review had not been established, the research had not been signed off, and the fire safety rules remained the same as they were in 2013 when the coroner issued her warning. The four years to make a difference had been lost.

What makes this failure particularly egregious is the evidence the inquiry has heard about the warnings officials heard in this period. 

As the inquiry has repeatedly heard, a series of huge aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding fires mainly in the Middle East in the 2010 represented a terrible warning of what was set to happen in west London in 2017. 

We saw this week that these fires were specifically discussed by officials in the department. 

In February 2015, following a fire in the Torch Tower in Dubai, Mr Martin wrote to his colleagues: “There are provisions in the building regulations designed to prevent this kind of problem. So this shouldn’t be a problem in the UK. There are, of course, no guarantees.”

What he did not say is that eight months earlier, he had attended a meeting of cladding and fire industry experts who warned that passages in Approved Document B appeared to permit the use of ACM because of the ongoing inclusion of the ‘Class 0’ standard as the minimum requirement for the external surfaces of walls. 

The meeting had been told by an expert from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) that the actual required standard should be the higher ‘limited combustibility’. But the industry figures warned that the guidance was “not clear” on this point and called for the publication of a frequently asked question (FAQ) to clarify the point. This was never done. 

“Were you ever made aware by Mr Martin that it was not clearly understood by at least some in industry that [Approved Document B] was apparently intended to prohibit the use of [...] ACM in buildings over 18 metres?” asked Ms Grange (pictured above). 

“I don’t recall being made aware, no,” said Mr Harral. He agreed that the minutes of the July 2014 meeting would lead a reader to “at least suspect” the product was in use in the UK.

“Wasn’t that vitally important information that Mr Martin ought to have made you aware of straight away?” asked Ms Grange

“I would want it to have been escalated, yes,” said Mr Harral. 

The officials also did nothing to check whether the product was actually in use in the UK.

“Wasn’t it just common sense to anybody looking at this information that it was screaming out for somebody to check whether we had this problem in the UK?” asked Ms Grange.

“In retrospect, you know, of course I wish that that’s where we’d got to, but we were so hidebound by the kind of structures that we sat within and the mentality that was shaped by our remit that I think…we’re not feeling confident or adventurous or forward−looking,” Mr Harral replied. 

Almost a year later, in January 2016 another fire in Dubai triggered another exchange of emails. This time, Mr Martin was even more explicit about the problem. 

“It relates to a cladding product which is a laminate of aluminium and polyethylene,” he wrote.

“This stuff [is] very rigid and makes nice shiny buildings. Sadly when it gets exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene core. Whoosh!”

Just days letter, on 16 February 2016 – as the inquiry has previously seen – Mr Martin was contacted by Nick Jenkins, who worked at cladding supplier Euroclad. 

Mr Jenkins was concerned about the widespread use of ACM in the UK and wanted guidance to be clarified to ensure its use was ruled out. 

He warned that the “vast majority” of projects he worked on involved combustible ACM cladding and many were “installed in combination with various [combustible] foam thermal insulation boards”. This is a description of precisely the system which was - at that time - being installed on Grenfell Tower. 

“There are many such buildings and their numbers are growing,” Mr Jenkins wrote: “I do think the situation is of grave concern.”

Mr Martin’s responses were ambiguous. He said he believed the guidance “could reasonably be considered” to ban the use of the panel, but added: “If the designer and building control body choose to do something else then that’s up to them.”  

Mr Harral said Mr Martin never passed on this warning about the widespread use of ACM. 

“It was plainly a life safety matter of the utmost seriousness which needed to be addressed urgently, a red alert situation, do you agree?” asked Ms Grange. 

“Yes, this should have been escalated,” he said. 

Asked what would have happened if the warning had been passed on, Mr Harral said it would have been sent up to ministers and “there would have been a series of decisions made as to what we might need to do to deal with that”.

Bob Ledsome, the former deputy director of building regulations, also told the inquiry this week that “he could not recollect” Mr Martin drawing the warnings to his attention. 

Mr Martin will give his side of the story when he appears in the coming weeks.  

What was the context behind such startling missed warnings? Both Mr Harral and Mr Ledsome (pictured above) told the inquiry of the difficulties of working in the department during this time.

This was partly due to resources. Mr Harral said his division had dropped from 14 construction professionals and three senior civil servants in 2006 to five technical specialists and one senior civil servant by 2015, and was also impacted by a consultancy ban which stopped them bringing in outside support. 

“We were really working on a less than bare-bones capacity in many respects,” he said. “I think that psychologically we were just beaten up, frankly. I just think we were not confident, we were stretched, and over time that must impact on your psychology.”

Mr Harral said he developed a stress-related illness, which led to him leaving the civil service in 2017. “The anxiety and frustration of not being able to actually move things forward was essentially… I remember very clearly realising it was going to kill me if I stayed,” he said.

He also said building regulations were “perennially marginalised” in the department, in favour of a focus on planning reform and a push to cut red tape. 

He said the appetite for deregulation was “very tangible” in the department. “The impact was absolutely evident, and discussions with ministers reinforced that,” he said.

At the end of his evidence, Mr Harral said he “deeply regretted” his role in the saga. “I’m deeply ashamed of the part I have played in this absolute tragedy and I hope we can learn key lessons about the regulatory culture we have in this country,” he said.

“I hope we can learn about the need to temper our obsession with innovation and the predominance of economic theory over more pragmatic human concerns and I hope we end up with an industry that actually is serving the people it aims to deliver for in a way that keeps them safe.” 

Mr Ledsome, too, was contrite. He said: “It was my job to ensure that building regulations were not always at the back of the queue for resources, for priorities.

“It is bitterly regrettable for me because, who knows whether it ultimately impacted precisely what happened at Grenfell, but it will be forever on my conscience that I failed on that.”

This week also saw Sir Ken Knight (pictured above) give his evidence to the inquiry. Sir Ken, a former fire chief, is the current chair of the government’s independent expert panel, which has helped shape its post-Grenfell response.

But he was also a key advisor in the years before the fire, particularly between 2007 and 2013 when he held the role of chief fire and rescue advisor. 

He was asked about a report the government asked him to prepare just four weeks after the Lakanal House fire in July 2009, which was supposed to provide an “independent overview of the investigations into the fire”.

The inquiry has previously heard that a separate, nascent investigation into the blaze that was being carried out for government by the BRE was “shut down” by Mr Martin at around the same time.

Sir Ken’s report made little of what has since proved to be the crucial issue of external fire spread. 

“From the early findings, the issue of external fire spread is not seen as significant,” he wrote, adding that infill panels on the tower “did not appear to burn unduly”.

He said he based this on the fact that “whilst they [the panels] had disintegrated… it was actually the windows themselves, the window frames that had collapsed, causing some of that fire spread”. 

“It wasn’t seen as a significant external wall fire,” he said. “There was external fire, but it wasn’t caused by the external wall itself.”

Two days before he submitted his report to ministers, he was sent a separate report by an architect called Sam Webb, which was prepared at the request of residents. 

In contrary to Sir Ken, he did feel the panels and the external fire spread were significant, with his investigations showing they were made of combustible plastic. “I’m surprised that such a material was approved for use in such large quantities on the facade of the building,” he wrote. 

“Why was that analysis of the cause of the fire spread not included in your final report?” asked Andrew Kinnier QC, counsel to the inquiry. 

Sir Ken said Mr Webb’s report had been received “too late”, after his version had “gone to print”. 

“Is that the type of document which would have prompted you to have drafted a postscript, for example, to be submitted to the secretary of state?” asked Mr Kinnier.

“No, it wouldn’t have, because it didn’t materially change my report in any significant way,” said Sir Ken.

Months later, in December 2009, Sir Ken was contacted by Ron Dobson, the commissioner for the London Fire Brigade, who told him that tests on the panels had shown them to be combustible. 

He warned that similar panels may be in use on other buildings and suggested “a warning to be given to housing providers” about their use. 

On the same day, Sir Ken emailed officials in DCLG to notify them about the testing on the panels. 

But he added that he felt issuing a warning would be “premature” and warned that putting too much detail into the public domain might “prejudice” the ongoing police investigation. 

Senior civil servant Anthony Burd replied saying that the department needed to be “very careful” to avoid “setting the hares running”.

Another official said such a warning would be “critical information in housing terms” and “we would need to assess what is to be made public”. 

Ultimately, Sir Ken replied to Mr Dobson saying: “It was felt that there was insufficient information at this time to warrant alerting housing authorities and/or property owners as to the specific matters raised.”

Instead, a generic warning was issued, written by director of housing Terrie Alafat, which told providers to check their external walls “if there is any doubt over the compliance”.

Mr Kinnier (pictured above) asked: “Would you accept the better way to phrase this letter would have encouraged housing authorities actively to check the walls for compliance with the relevant regulation?” 

“Yes, I do,” said Sir Ken. 

“And if nothing was done, then it certainly raised the risk of another fire like Lakanal or substantially similar to Lakanal happening. Do you accept that?” asked Mr Kinnier.

“Yes, it could,” said Sir Ken.

Finally, Sir Ken was also asked about the government’s decision not to impose minimum standards on fire risk assessors. 

Since it was introduced 2005, legislation has set no basic competency standards for the assessors of high-rise buildings meaning anyone could legally call themselves an assessor and carry out checks on buildings – even high-risk premises. 

In his Lakanal report, Sir Ken noted the potential need to strengthen the requirements for risk assessments, explaining to the inquiry that it was plain the assessment of risks at the building had been “inadequate” and had failed to identify “major failings” in the building.

But Louise Upton, then head of the fire safety policy team at the DCLG, was said to have felt “any review of the legislation would be unwelcome” as it would “question the whole rationale of the self-compliance regime”.

Further recommendations to introduce minimum standards were also rejected, with Ms Upton writing in July 2010: “Businesses are unlikely to welcome the burden of further regulation in this area.”

The inquiry also saw the coroner investigating the Lakanal House deaths recommended in March 2013 that the Fire Sector Federation (FSF) “consider whether it has a role in clarifying the scope of fire risk assessments and in offering further guidance as to training of fire risk assessors”. 

But when Dennis Davis (pictured above), executive officer at the FSF, presented a proposal for accreditation of assessors in April 2013, Ms Upton wrote: “Oh Lordy! Let’s have a meeting sooner rather than later to see what we can do to steer the FSF away from its worst excesses in respect to control freakery.”

Mr Martin added: “Looks to me like the FSF is in danger of trying to do more than is necessary, desirable or within its ability.”

Sir Ken, who had by this time retired from his role as chief fire and rescue advisor, replied: “I agree.”

He told the inquiry that this was “not meant to be negative about the FSF”, but that he was merely concerned that the organisation was “over-engineering” the proposals and “doing more than what was necessary”. 

“The panel will make of that what they will,” said Mr Kinnier.

Mr Davis, who also gave evidence this week, told the inquiry he “wasn’t aware of this attitude” when he saw the emails.

Mr Davis and the FSF did ultimately produce competency criteria and proposals for certification in October 2015. But the document said it was “very unlikely” the proposals would become mandatory.  

Mr Davis was asked why it was considered unlikely. “I think… there was a reluctance for any form of additional mandatory controls on business, red tape, those sorts of arguments,” he said.

Mr Kinnier replied: “There was that reluctance to regulate.”

Mr Davis said: “I mean, fire safety is perceived as a burden, an addition, and therefore trying to promote it would naturally run you into those sorts of arguments.”

The inquiry continues, with evidence from Ms Upton starting next week.

Government rejected competency standards for fire risk assessors to avoid ‘burdens on business’, emails show

Government officials rejected calls to impose minimum standards of competency on fire risk assessors because “businesses are unlikely to welcome the burden of further regulation”, emails released by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry show.

Senior government advisor wrote report saying external fire spread 'not significant' at Lakanal House

The government’s senior fire advisor wrote a report weeks after a fatal flat fire in 2009 which said external fire spread was “not seen as significant” and that combustible panels on the buildings walls “did not appear to burn unduly”.

Senior civil servant ignored ‘red alert’ warning about ‘widespread use’ of Grenfell-style cladding

A senior civil servant “ignored” a “red alert” warning about the “widespread, historic and ongoing” use of a highly combustible cladding product on UK high rises, despite explaining to colleagues only days previously how it would go “whoosh” if exposed to fire.

Deregulation rules left officials ‘between a rock and a hard place’ on fire safety, says former civil servant

A former civil servant has said that his team was trapped “between a rock and a hard place” because of direct conflict between the government’s rules on deregulation and its commitment to review fire safety rules following a deadly tower block fire.

Each week we send out a newsletter rounding up the key news from the Grenfell Inquiry, along with the headlines from the week

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Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points

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Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?

Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means

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Week three: Architects of misfortune

This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points

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Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’

The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment

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Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’

Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon

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Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’

Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence

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Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’

Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks

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Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’

This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points

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Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor

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Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’

With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points

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Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’

With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report

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Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’

With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports

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Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’

This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’

Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps

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Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’

This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps

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Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment

Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block

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Module two: the cladding products

Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’

The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports

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Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’

As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings

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Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story

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Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’

This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’

The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’

In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’

The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.

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Week 26: 'You were taking an enormous risk, weren't you?'

Week 26 at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was a key moment in understanding how dangerous products used on the tower came to be accepted by industry professionals. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’

The most explosive evidence this week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry came from those who did not attend, as the evidence which would have been presented to Arconic witnesses was displayed in their absence. Peter Apps reports

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Week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry zeroed in on the British Board of Agrément, the body that produced “misleading” certificates which inspired trust in both the cladding and insulation used on the tower. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 29:  ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’

The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby government after the fire. Peter Apps reports

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How the products used in Grenfell Tower's cladding system were tested and sold

As the section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining how the products used in the cladding system were tested, marketed and sold comes to a close, Peter Apps summarises what we have learned about each of the products included in the system

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Module Three: the management of the tower

Week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of a fire the whole building can become an inferno’

The focus of the inquiry shifted this week to the actions of the social housing providers responsible for maintaining Grenfell Tower. Pete Apps recaps what we learned

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Week 31: ‘If we cannot get out people will die’

This week saw the former residents of Grenfell Tower enter the witness box to tell of their experiences attempting to raise complaints with the council and its managing agent. Pete Apps reports

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Week 32: ‘Let's hope our luck holds and there isn't a fire’

This week saw the return of the landlord of Grenfell Tower, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), as senior staff members attempted to explain how vital fire safety protections at the block were allowed to fall into disrepair. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 33: ‘Isn't that a serious gap in the scope of a policy meant to safeguard vulnerable people?’

A slightly disjointed week at the Grenfell Tower inquiry saw further evidence from staff at building manager Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) interspersed with the views of a cladding expert. Peter Apps reports

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Week 34: ‘Some members of the community are doing their best to spread false information’

Jack Simpson covers all the major revelations from the past week of evidence at the Grenfell Inquiry, including evidence from Laura Johnson, director of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

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Week 35: ‘I really didn’t like the champagne’ 

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw council witnesses, including former deputy leader Rock Feilding-Mellen and leader Nicholas Paget-Brown, questioned about their role in the story for the first time. Peter Apps reports

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Week 36: ‘Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry scrutinised the work of Carl Stokes, the man hired to carry out fire risk assessments for the block. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 37: ‘In giving that advice, weren’t you acting beyond your knowledge and expertise?’

A curtailed week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw fire risk assessor Carl Stokes grilled over advice he gave regarding the tower’s cladding. Peter Apps reports

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Week 38: ‘Well it’s a bit more than that, isn’t it. He’s suggesting that you tell the LFB a lie’

The inquiry heard the mammoth cross-examination of KCTMO’s health and safety manager Janice Wray this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 39: ‘What you said there was a grotesque understatement’

This week the inquiry continued to hear from former employees of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, as well as two employees from the London Fire Brigade. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 40: ‘An exercise in concealment and half-truth’

Former KCTMO chief executive Robert Black gave his evidence to the inquiry this week and was asked to account for the various failures described over the previous six weeks. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report.

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Week 41: ‘We should do nothing. This is not the sort of website we should be responding to’

This week saw the return of Robert Black, chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), before the inquiry turned its attention to the defective smoke control system in the tower. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 42:‘They would leak as much as they leaked. They were what they were’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued its in-depth investigation of the tower’s non-compliant smoke control system this week, with evidence from the various contractors involved in delivering it. Pete Apps reports 

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Week 43:‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’

This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports

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Week 44:‘I've never seen a fully compliant firefighting lift in any local authority building, to this day actually’

This week the inquiry turn the focus onto the building’s defective lifts, with evidence from an expert, contractors who worked on them and a former engineer at KCTMO. Pete Apps reports. 

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Week 45: ‘Don’t you find all this rather a surprising debate, given that the Equality Act was passed in 2010?’

The inquiry heard from expert witness Colin Todd this week, who gave his views about the work of risk assessor Carl Stokes as well as answered questions about his own guidance. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report

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Week 46: ‘I think I've been very, very clear that is completely wrong’

This week the inquiry heard further expert evidence about fire risk assessor Carl Stokes’ actions, as the section of its work covering the management and maintenance of the tower concluded. Peter Apps reports

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Six key failures in the way Grenfell Tower was managed before the fire

Peter Apps recaps some of what we have learned about the actions of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) in the years before the fire.

Module one and two closing statements

Week 47: ‘An unedifying spectacle’

After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group

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Module five: the fire brigade

Week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’

The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports

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Week 49: ‘I'm not sure we've always taken every opportunity to learn as an organisation’

How the London Fire Brigade acted upon lessons from incidents in the years before the Grenfell Tower disaster came under the microscope this week at the public inquiry. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 50: ‘There is a culture in LFB that is very conservative. I think there is great comfort in what is familiar’

This week the inquiry heard how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) elected not to issue warnings about dangerous cladding before Grenfell and a detailed examination of its policy for checking high risk buildings. Pete Apps reports. 

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Week 51:‘We teach firefighters to expect building failure’

An unusually brief week of evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry explored how a fire service neighbouring London was taking a different approach to tackling blazes in high rises. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 52: ‘I actually think that there is a measure of incompetence at all levels’

Expert evidence concluded the current section of the inquiry with some stinging criticism of the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report. 

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Module six: fire services

Week 53: ‘They make for chilling reading and harrowing listening’

The inquiry’s investigation into central government began this week with lawyers setting out their view on how and why firefighting policies failed. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 54: ‘Our consideration of evacuation at this time was something of a blind spot’

The development of policy on ‘stay put’, both nationally and for London, occupied the attention of the inquiry this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 55: ‘My review is pretty scathing!’

In a week that included the 200th day of evidence in phase two of the inquiry, attention turned to the London Fire Brigade’s control room. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 56: ‘Why didn't we thump the table harder’

This week, the control room at the London Fire Brigade was examined further – both before and after the fire. Pete Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 57: ‘It was worse than slow, it was sluggish’

Former London Fire Brigade (LFB) commissioner Dany Cotton was the star witness this week, as the inquiry continued to delve into the brigade’s knowledge and training before the Grenfell Tower fire. Jack Simpson, Grainne Cuffe and Pete Apps report

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Week 58: ‘I don't think we deserve to ask for trust until we demonstrate different outcomes’

A current and former commissioner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) wrapped up the inquiry’s investigation into the actions of the brigade before the fire. Grainne Cuffe and Peter Apps report.

Module six: testing and government 

One of the major scandals of our time: key revelations as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turns to government

The government was accused of “covering up” the risks of dangerous cladding as its “unbridled passion for deregulation” left it a “junior party” to the construction industry as the latest phase of the public inquiry opened today. Peter Apps summarises some of the main points

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Week 59: ‘Recent tests have apparently shown it continued to burn for 20 minutes after the flame was taken away’

After shocking opening statements, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of Local Authority Building Control. Pete Apps reports

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Week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 61: ‘Mistakes are meant for learning, not repeating’

In the first hearings of the new year, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard closing statements from the firefighting section of phase two. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 62: Did it ever occur to you that this act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting?

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with a new shocking revelation about the government’s actions in the immediate aftermath of the fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 63: ‘It came after the general move to deregulation. So more regulation was not welcome’

The government’s focus on deregulation before the Grenfell Tower fire was placed in the spotlight this week with a series of shocking revelations about its failure to amend fire safety guidance. Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 64: ‘I didn’t think ACM would be suitable for use in any high-rise buildings. I don’t think anyone did’

This week, the Building Research Establishment’s Dr Sarah Colwell gave more than three days of evidence, with some huge revelations about what was known about the dangers of aluminium composite material years before the fire and the mass confusion over the government’s building regulations. Peter Apps and Jack Simpson report

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Week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’

Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports 

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Week 66: ‘Was there a cover-up?’

The latest evidence from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tracked the government’s failure to act on fire safety warnings right up until the months before the fire. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’

This week the inquiry heard disturbing new evidence about the failure of senior government officials to act on warnings about dangerous cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 68: ‘Can we agree that was a pretty dangerous thing to have, all this falling on one man’s shoulders?’

Three senior civil servants gave evidence this week, including the official who had responsibility for building regulations guidance on fire safety in the years before Grenfell. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 69: ‘It was just unthinkable. You had the makings here of a crisis you could not comprehend’

This week, civil servant Brian Martin gave his long-awaited evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps reports

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Week 70: ‘Show me the bodies’

An important week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw a dramatic conclusion to the mammoth cross-examination of civil servant Brian Martin, as well as the first politicians. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 71: ‘I have changed my schedule to fit this in. I do have an extremely busy day meeting people’

Three politicians who were responsible for building regulations before Grenfell appeared before the inquiry this week, including the former communities secretary Eric Pickles, who responded to the coroner’s letter following the Lakanal House fire. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Module Four: aftermath

Week 72: 'The system isn't broken. It was built this way'

This week the inquiry turned to the shocking story of the lack of support for bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Grainne Cuffe and Jack Simpson report

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Week 73: ‘Most people would regard that as hopeless’

This week, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard about the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s chaotic response in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, from the staff responsible for it. Pete Apps, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 74: ‘Do you agree that RBKC was ill-prepared and incapable to meet its duties’

This week, Nicholas Holgate, former chief executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, was grilled on his failure to hand over control of the aftermath of the fire, despite the borough’s lack of capacity. Peter Apps reports

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Week 75: ‘It still shocks me to the core that that’s how we treat our citizens in this country’

This week the inquiry heard witnesses from the housing management body discuss their role in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, followed by a range of witnesses from other organisations which supported the response. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’

This week the inquiry heard from central government figures and members of the London-wide emergency response arrangements. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 77: ‘The planning wasn’t done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s examination of the aftermath of the fire concluded with witnesses from central government. Peter Apps reports

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Module seven: expert evidence and closing statements

Week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard a range of expert witnesses discuss their reports. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 79: ‘You could argue the system was created to enable people to circumvent the rules’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued to hear expert evidence this week, with two senior figures in the world of fire safety academia criticising the government’s approach before and after the blaze. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report 

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Week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’

As the inquiry moves into its final stages, lawyers for the key players gave statements about the evidence surrounding central government. Peter Apps reports

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Week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia. It’s racism. It is the elephant staring back at us in the room’

This week, closing statements covering the aftermath of the fire delivered a shocking new revelation and an expert toxicologist gave his views on the causes of the deaths. Peter Apps reports

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Module eight: further evidence relating to the deceased

Week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry moved into its final module this week, with evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims died. Peter Apps reports

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Week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’

A second week of evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims of the fire died delivered more heartbreaking stories about their final moments. Peter Apps recaps

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Week 84: ‘Every decision affects someone who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother’

The final week of oral evidence for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s second phase contained more heartbreaking evidence about the deaths in the tower. Peter Apps reports

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Closing statements

Week 85: ‘The merry-go-round turns still, the notes of its melody clearly audible in the last few days’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for closing statements from lawyers representing the bereaved and survivors and the various parties under scrutiny for the fire. Pete Apps reports.  

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