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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’

Insight25.02.224.00 PM by Peter Apps

Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports

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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’ #UKhousing #Grenfell

Once more, the primary focus of this week’s evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was the failure by successive governments to tighten building regulations guidance sufficiently to clearly ban the cladding material later used on the tower.

Much of this surrounds the continuing use of ‘Class 0’ as the minimum standard for external wall surfaces, despite knowledge since the early 1990s that the standard was insufficient to prevent the use of dangerous materials.

This question was explored with former senior official Anthony Burd, who began his evidence yesterday, and Dr Dr Debbie Smith, former managing director of the BRE, who was in the witness box for three and a half days before him.

We begin our recap with Mr Burd.

‘Have you any inkling as to why those amendments, those excisions from the text, were made?’

The story begins in the 1990s when – as the inquiry has previously heard – two tower block fires, one in Knowsley Heights in Merseyside in 1991 and one in Garnock Court, Ivrine, Scotland in 1999, caused concern about the rising use of combustible materials on the outside of tall buildings.

The BRE’s report into the Knowsley fire identified that the building had been clad with a combustible plastic which met the standard of Class 0 and was therefore compliant with the rules.

We have also heard that the report drew no real attention to this, and even implied that the cladding system was actually non-combustible.

In 1999, the BRE was commissioned to prepare two reports into the Garnock Court fire: one for North Ayrshire Council, which owned the block, and one for the government.

Mysteriously, these two reports were different. The North Ayrshire Council report contained several references to Class 0, but these were purged from the copy sent to the government.

“Have you any inkling as to why those amendments, those excisions from the text, were made?” asked lead counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett QC.

“I do not,” replied Mr Burd (pictured above), a former head of technical policy in the department now known as the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities.

“Can we safely conclude that whoever made the decision to excise those passages… were either people in the BRE or people in government?” asked Mr Millett.

“Given that is who the documents went to, yes,” replied Mr Burd.

The issue of the danger from combustible cladding was then investigated by a select committee in 1999. This committee was presented with evidence of the danger of Class 0 by industry experts.

As a result, its report effectively recommended the end of reliance on the standard. Cladding systems should either be entirely non-combustible or justified through the evidence of a test on the entire system.

But this is not what the government did. Instead, it kept the Class 0 standard and introduced the testing as an alternative.

“Are you able to offer any insight as to why that advice was rejected?” asked Mr Millett.

“I am not, sir,” replied Mr Burd.

Mr Burd continues his evidence on Monday.

‘Members expressed concern that the UK would become a “dumping ground” for inferior products that could not be sold in other member states’

The select committee report was not the only opportunity the department had at this time to ditch its reliance on Class 0.

In the early 2000s, the European Union had developed new fire tests which graded materials alphabetically from A1 (the best) to E (the worst) and represented a more sophisticated testing method than the British standards that underpinned Class 0.

The UK was supposed to transition to these standards to harmonise with the rest of Europe.

“Members expressed concern that, if the UK were to continue [without harmonising standards], it would become a ‘dumping ground’ for inferior products that could not be sold in other member states,” minutes of one meeting between officials and industry representatives records.

But not all the industry representatives wanted the standards raised. It was noted, for example, that combustible insulation products which could obtain a Class 0 rating by virtue of their foil facing would not be able to achieve Euroclass B, which was set to be introduced as the equivalent.

An email from the industry's lobbying group warned that such products could be “prevented from continuing” and said the move to European standards therefore “should not happen”.

Nonetheless, the government appears to have resolved to go ahead with the change. Minutes showed it intended to enter a transition phase where both Euroclass B and Class 0 were acceptable. It would then require Euroclass B for all new products entering the market, before ultimately making the European standard the only relevant requirement and withdrawing the British standard.

This was due to take around three years – but it never happened.

Instead, the transition period, with both Class 0 and Euroclass B applicable, continued until 2018 – a year after the Grenfell fire.

“Do you know why [the transition plan] was abandoned?” asked Mr Millett.

“No,” replied Dr Smith (pictured above).

“Was any consideration given to the risks to life presented by leaving Class 0 in the [guidance] in this way?” asked Mr Millett.

“Not at that time, I don’t believe so, no,” replied Dr Smith.

In May 2003, a pamphlet produced by insulation manufacturer Kingspan said: “Government has stated that it will not implement the new Euroclass system until industry is ready for it.”

Dr Smith said she was surprised by the document and could not explain it.

‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die. I mean, that’s clear isn’t it?’

As part of its contract to develop the large-scale test endorsed by the select committee, the BRE was required to carry out a “comprehensive survey” of cladding systems in use in the UK.

It did so with a questionnaire sent to local authorities. This produced only 13 responses. Dr Smith explained that it was “very difficult to get busy people to see the need to respond” to a survey of this nature.

But combining these responses with data from the trade press about materials on the market, the BRE designed 14 tests on various cladding systems to examine its proposed test methodology.

Among these systems was one including an aluminium composite material (ACM) panel, with a Class 0 rating.

When it was tested on 18 July 2001, this system performed catastrophically badly. Flames ripped through the nine-metre test rig in just five minutes, with flames extending 20 metres into the air. The test was halted to protect the safety of those present. While several other systems failed, none came close to the horrifying flame spread seen in this test.

The BRE then summarised the findings of the testing in a report for government in September 2002.

“Can we be clear about one thing: that your evidence to the inquiry is that from the middle of September 2002, the government was in no doubt at all that ACM panels with a [polyethylene] core should never ever be used [on buildings] above 18 metres?” asked Mr Millett (pictured above).

“Within that context of [the new testing methodology being developed], yes,” Dr Smith replied. “So the extent to which they were prepared to accept [that testing] as being representative.”

Surely now, in the knowledge of the risks that could be posed by Class 0 rated materials, the government needed to urgently amend its guidance to remove the standard immediately?

The BRE’s report did not spell this out. Instead, it simply said the material “proved to be one of the worst performing products” and added that “these issues require further consideration”.

“You see, Dr Smith, what you don’t do in this report is to spell out in big letters… that unless the government does something now about ACM panels over 18 metres, people will die. I mean, that’s clear isn’t it?” asked Mr Millett.

“Well it was not put in those terms. I haven’t seen any BRE report that ever speaks in those terms,” said Dr Smith. “Because our role is to present the technical evidence and the technical facts and the data and then to signal what we think needs to be considered.”

It was the ACM that would later be used on Grenfell Tower. The inquiry has already established it to have been the primary cause of the rapid fire spread.

Following the testing programme, the BRE received a letter in August 2002 from industry body the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology (CWCT) which warned that the new testing methodology was too tough on cladding systems.

The letter said that it was concerned the test could lead to “the abandonment” of the use of rainscreen cladding systems, adding that “if this occurs there could be economic consequences for the building industry and the UK as a whole”.

In the margins, a handwritten note from Dr Smith suggested amending the test methodology to make clear that fire barriers could “improve performance”.

“Was this suggestion a sop to industry?” asked Mr Millett. “It’s an encouragement isn’t it, that if you don’t pass, fire barriers might help?”

“Well, you should be incorporating fire barriers anyway,” said Dr Smith.

‘It was one of absolute shock and wondering how on earth that could have happened’

In 2006, the government did amend guidance in Approved Document B. The effect of this amendment is a critical and hotly contested issue.

It followed a fire in Salford at a building called The Edge in 2005. The blaze spread through sandwich panels on the external wall filled with an insulation material between two thin sheets of metal.

This caused some concern. The panels were Class 0, but plainly flammable.

As a result, Approved Document B was amended to extend a paragraph which required ‘limited combustibility’ insulation in certain circumstances to cover “any insulation product, filler material… etc”.

Limited combustibility is a far tougher standard than Class 0, and would have ruled out the kind of flammable products used on Garnock Court, Knowsley Heights, the Edge and later Grenfell Tower.

But the problem is that the other passage in the guidance including Class 0 was not removed.

So now, Approved Document B contained two standards: one for “insulation products, filler material… etc” and one for “external surfaces”.

The huge question is which of these standards should have applied to the external cladding panel.

Cladding is plainly not insulation. It keeps the building dry and improves its aesthetic, but does nothing to keep it warm. Government figures have argued since the fire that ‘filler material’ should have included the plastic in between the sheets in an ACM product. But was this true? And was it clear?

Dr Smith said she believed that following this change, every component of an external wall had to be ‘limited combustibility’. Although, under questioning, she revised this to say that it would not have applied to the external coating or face of a cladding product.

As a result of this, she claimed that her reaction after the Grenfell Tower fire to learning that combustible products were still in wide use on facades “was one of absolute shock and wondering how on earth that could have happened”.

But how does that claim stack up with the evidence of what happened in the years between 2006 and 2017?

‘What I’m really asking you to explain is whether you can provide a good reason for your complete inability to remember anything’

In March 2012, for example, Dr Smith suggested in an email that requirements for separation between buildings could be increased “due to highly insulated buildings and combustible facades”.

“Why were you even discussing combustible façades in circumstances where your understanding was that there couldn’t be any because of your reading of Approved Document B?” asked Mr Millett.

Dr Smith claimed she was mainly referring to the niche practice of growing plants on walls of buildings, which could sometimes go dry when not sufficiently watered.

On top of this, her colleagues at the BRE were repeatedly warned that the Class 0 rating meant ACM panels were in wide use in the UK.

In fact, Dr Sarah Colwell (pictured above) – who gave evidence last week – was invited to a meeting with the CWCT and other experts to discuss the issue in July 2014.

At the meeting, she was told that ACM was in wide use and the guidance was not sufficiently clear to ban it. She agreed to draft a frequently asked question (FAQ) to make clear that it should not be used.

But she decided not to produce this FAQ – and in her evidence last week said this decision was made in collaboration with Dr Smith.

Dr Smith said this surprised her. “I don’t recall that at all... I’m amazed that that’s her recollection of that.”

The BRE would be further warned by Nick Jenkins, who worked at cladding firm Booth Muirie, that the product was in wide use in the UK. This provoked an exchange of emails on the topic with the government. Dr Smith said she could recall none of this.

“What I’m really asking you to explain is whether you can provide a good reason for what appears to be your complete inability to remember anything about this exchange or this issue or these questions?” asked Mr Millett.

“I don’t think this was brought to my attention,” she said.

‘Did you reach an agreement with Brian Martin before this meeting that you would give away the barest minimum of information to the minister?’

All of this is particularly important because three days after the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, Dr Smith was invited to a meeting with new housing minister Alok Sharma (pictured above) to advise on the government’s response.

One of the critical issues he wanted advice on was whether Grenfell was likely to be an “isolated incident” or if many other buildings around the UK were impacted.

Had Dr Smith had known about the warnings issued to the BRE in the preceding years that the dangerous cladding on the tower was widely used, she surely should have told him. But she did not.

In fact, she did not even tell him her belief that until 2006 the material was entirely acceptable under official guidance.

“It would have been a direct answer to a direct question: is Grenfell a one-off? Why didn’t you say it can’t have been a one-off because the regulations were only tightened up in 2006 to ban all combustible materials from the external wall?” asked Mr Millett.

“It’s not something that occurred to me at the time, given the nature of the discussions that were going on in that meeting,” she replied.

Neither did she mention the 2001 test on ACM, despite the meeting directly seeking information on why the fire had spread so rapidly. She said this would have been “speculation”.

“No, it wouldn’t, Dr Smith. It wouldn’t have been speculation. It was a fact... Why not tell the minister that [test] had happened and that the government had the records of that?” asked Mr Millett.

Dr Smith said she did not believe it was relevant, as the test may have been on a different system to the one on Grenfell Tower.

Also at the meeting was Brian Martin, the senior official responsible for building guidance. Some of the warnings about ACM were issued directly to him and he too was aware of the 2001 test. But Dr Smith said he did not mention them at the meeting either.

He will surely be asked to explain why when he gives evidence in the coming weeks.

The email trail revealed that Dr Smith and Mr Martin had spoken the day before the meeting, as Dr Smith travelled back to the UK on a Eurostar to attend.

“Did you reach an agreement with Brian Martin before this meeting that you would speak only when spoken to and give away the barest minimum of information to the minister?” asked Mr Millett.

“Absolutely not,” replied Dr Smith.

‘What system was put in place to make sure that Phil Clark didn’t take things out of the hard copy files and destroy them?’

Throughout Dr Smith’s evidence, she was also asked about several issues relating to the BRE’s testing of cladding systems containing insulation on behalf of Kingspan and Celotex, the firms which sold their products for use on Grenfell Tower.

We do not have space here to recount all of those issues, although one new email was revealed which showed Dr Smith agreeing to sit down with Kingspan and “work with them to design a progressive programme of testing” on their products in 2008.

This appears to contradict the firm’s rules about strict impartiality and not providing advice to clients.

“Some people reading that email might think that here was the BRE cosying up to its clients for financial gain. Do you have a comment on that?” asked Mr Millett.

“No, I don’t believe that to be the case,” Dr Smith said.

She was also asked a startling series of questions about her colleague Phil Clark (pictured above), who was in charge of the laboratory where the tests were carried out. He was given access to the files relating to this period in preparing for his statement for the inquiry.

But there have been crucial documents the inquiry has been unable to find, such as the delivery note for fire resisting boards installed onto a Celotex test rig and never declared in the report.

“What system was put in place to make sure that Phil Clark didn’t take things out of the hard copy files and destroy them, to be blunt?” asked Mr Millett.

“I don’t know how he could possibly have done that, because he was in a room with nothing in there other than a desk and a chair,” she replied.

“I think the point Mr Millett is inviting you to consider is this: what was there to prevent Phil Clark from taking a piece of paper out of the file and slipping it into his pocket?” asked inquiry chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick.

“Well, insofar as nobody sat there and actually watched him 100% of the time, I can’t, you know, I can’t comment on that,” Dr Smith replied.

Asked at the end of her evidence if she would have done anything differently, Dr Smith asked to submit a written statement instead as her questioning had been “quite tiring”.

“I don’t think a submission will answer my question. I would like to have your reflections, even though they may be off the cuff, on oath in public now, please,” said Mr Millett.

“Well, I really − I’m not prepared − I haven’t prepared an answer to that. And I’m ... I just feel sort of exhausted by this process and I don’t feel that that’s − that I can really directly answer you right now,” she said.

The inquiry continues with further evidence from Mr Burd and other officials next week.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry – week 65 headlines

BRE manager did not tell government about failed cladding tests in aftermath of Grenfell fire

A former managing director at the Building Research Establishment did not tell an emergency meeting convened by government in the days after the Grenfell Tower fire that official tests had revealed the risk of the tower’s cladding material 16 years earlier.

Former BRE manager denies being more concerned about money than safety

A former Building Research Establishment manager denied being more concerned about money than safety, after an email showed her fretting about the loss of the company’s “fire safety mantle” to “a competitor” if it helped prepare joint industry guidance on dangerous cladding.

Government was warned UK faced becoming ‘dumping ground’ for combustible construction products

The government was warned in the early 2000s that the UK risked becoming a “dumping ground” for inferior construction products if tougher European fire standards were not implemented, but did not transition to them amid pressure from industry lobbyists.

Catastropic fire test in 2002 meant government should have had 'no doubt' that Grenfell cladding should not be used

The “catastrophic” result of an official cladding test meant the government was “in no doubt at all” that the violently combustible material later installed on Grenfell Tower “should never ever” be used on tall buildings from as early as 2002, the inquiry into the blaze heard.

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