Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire.
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard from Steve Evans, head of technical operations at the NHBC.
We got crucial new insight into how combustible materials ended up being signed off on so many buildings, as well as startling new evidence about the extent and clarity of warnings issued to central government before Grenfell.
We will begin our recap with a brief overview of the NHBC.
The NHBC
The NHBC plays a crucial role in the UK construction sector.
One of the company’s jobs is the provision of warranties for new-build homes. It covers somewhere between 70% and 80% of the market. In 2019, 160,000 new homes around the UK were sold with an NHBC warranty assuring their quality.
It is also the largest building-control inspector in the country. This means it is engaged by builders to sign projects off as compliant with regulations. Traditionally, this was a function of local councils, but private companies have been allowed to do it since the 1980s.
The NHBC is comfortably the largest of these, with an estimated 60% of the residential properties built in England and Wales signed off by the company.
All of this is lucrative. The inquiry saw documents showing that, in 2017 (the year of the Grenfell Tower fire), the firm made £65.2m in profit and held £1.595bn in invested assets.
While it does not have shareholders (profits are reinvested into the business), its senior staff are well paid. The inquiry heard that its four executive directors earned between £466,000 and £334,000 in 2018.
What role does it play in the Grenfell Tower story? It did not sign off on the tower. As the inquiry saw previously, this work was done by the local council.
However, it did influence the use of combustible cladding materials, particularly through the development of industry guidance which greenlit their use and its involvement in debates about their suitability in the 2010s. This is what the inquiry explored this week.
‘Really, in effect, you had been captured by Kingspan and were being used by them as their poodles’
As the inquiry heard previously (at length), manufacturer Kingspan began marketing its combustible K15 insulation boards for high-rise buildings from 2005.
It justified this on the basis of a large-scale test it had passed, but this test should only have permitted the use of the boards in the exact system tested. Instead, it was selling the insulation for use in a huge range of tall buildings.
The NHBC was involved in this, because its inspectors were approving K15 for use. Mr Evans (pictured above) explained that this was seen as acceptable because of a certificate from the British Board of Agrément (BBA) which said it could be used on high-rises “subject to advice being sought from the certificate holder” (Kingspan).
Therefore, he said, if a builder got confirmation from Kingspan that the product was safe for use on a high-rise, the NHBC would sign it off.
Asked if he agreed that putting such trust in Kingspan was a “glaringly obviously dangerous approach”, Mr Evans replied: “I can see… how you can arrive at that conclusion, but at that point, there was still nothing to say that those buildings were dangerous.”
The picture changed in 2013. In October, the NHBC was approached by Wintech, a consultancy, and specifically warned that the product did not meet the required standard of “limited combustibility” and despite being “widely used”, it “should not be without the supporting… test data to confirm its acceptability”.
In December, the BBA amended its certificate to remove the line saying the material could be used if approved by Kingspan.
NHBC discussed internally whether it should reject the use of the insulation board on high-rises, with one person cautioning that doing so would “cause a major issue with our customers [house builders]”, as they would “be forced to use Rockwool [a non-combustible alternative]”.
Asked about this, Mr Evans accepted that changing its position on K15 would have had “a massive effect on our builder customers”.
Instead of stopping to accept the insulation, the NHBC met Kingspan and asked it to provide further test evidence to support the use of its insulation on high-rises.
While it was waiting for this, it continued to sign off on projects using the insulation.
Mr Evans said that those started before December 2013 were still covered by the previous BBA certificate and for those started afterwards, the NHBC had time to “work with industry” to find a solution.
“If we’d taken a knee-jerk reaction to say we’re not accepting it on any building… that would have meant, at that point, a great deal of upheaval for those designers, builders for the industry as a whole, which could in three months’ time have actually been demonstrated was the wrong action,” he said.
“Did it not occur to you at the time that, really, this was a very soft and lax approach to fire safety and that really, in effect, you had been captured by Kingspan and were being used by them as their poodles?” asked Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry.
“No, I don’t believe that’s the case at all,” replied Mr Evans. “We had one test which had demonstrated the material could be used [on buildings] over 18 metres. There was no evidence at this point that Kingspan would not be able to provide further testing to demonstrate that.”
‘The use of highly combustible materials in residential buildings is now simply an accident waiting to happen’
As 2014 wore on, the testing promised by Kingspan did not materialise and the warnings about its use grew louder.
In fact, in July, senior government official Brian Martin wrote to the NHBC to express concern about the use of combustible insulation on high-rises. He described the email as “a friendly warning”.
In response, Mr Evans wrote back outlining the NHBC’s concerns about Kingspan, but assured him “there is no reason to suspect buildings built with Kingspan K15 are at risk at this time. It is just the fact that the testing carried out to date does not bear this out”.
“Is that the approach that NHBC routinely took to compliance: namely that if a manufacturer of a product says it’s safe, then it’s safe?” asked Mr Millett.
“We will not just accept their statement… that’s why we were asking them for additional testing,” replied Mr Evans.
Kingspan continued to try to find ways to reassure the NHBC. It engaged Arup, the fire engineering consultancy, in the hope that it would provide an assessment indicating the circumstances in which the insulation could be used safely.
But in October 2014, Dr Barbara Lane, a senior fire engineer at Arup and now an expert witness to the inquiry (pictured above), wrote to Mr Evans to say: “Arup are actually deeply concerned about the lack of understanding of assemblies and the ongoing incorrect use of test reports…
“The use of highly combustible materials in residential buildings is now simply an accident waiting to happen.”
This echoed the view of John Lewis, the NHBC’s own fire engineer, in an email two weeks later.
In response to a query from another building-control firm about another certificate (discussed last week) suggesting Kingspan’s insulation could be used on high-rises, he wrote: “It’s all garbage. Hereford LABC [Local Authority Building Control, which wrote the certificate] didn’t know what they were talking about.”
He added: “It’s all an accident waiting to happen and we’re meeting with all the [combustible insulation] manufacturers to try and get something sorted. But, in the meantime, they continue to state that it’s fine and most [building-control bodies] accept that at face value without sifting through the details.”
“Did you take it seriously that this was an accident waiting to happen or did you dismiss it as an exaggeration?” asked Mr Millett.
“I took this whole issue seriously, that’s why I’d spent most of the previous 10 months trying to work with industry to find a solution,” said Mr Evans.
But he did not go back to civil servant Mr Martin to correct his view that there was “no reason to suspect” buildings with K15 didn’t pose a risk. Why not?
“At this point, we were then looking to change our policy internally… It wouldn’t have been appropriate at this point to go back and tell him that until we’d changed our policy,” said Mr Evans.
Ultimately – as the inquiry has already seen – the NHBC wrote to Kingspan in February 2015, cc-ing Gene Murtagh, the insulation company’s chief executive, saying it would issue a warning to clients that the material was non-compliant and it would not accept its use without justification on high-rises.
The insulation manufacturer responded with the threat of a legal injunction for defamation.
The NHBC did change its position in April 2015, but it did not stop accepting the use of Kingspan’s material. Instead, it said the use of the material would need to be justified through a desktop study.
‘Did it ever occur to you that it might not actually be very feasible to produce a desktop study… based on tests conducted on completely different systems?’
Building regulations guidance in Approved Document B said insulation on high-rises had to meet the standard of limited combustibility. This was a standard that plastics such as Kingspan K15 could never achieve.
The alternative, from 2005 onwards, was to run a large-scale test and use the exact system tested. As we have seen, this was not happening.
In 2014, a group called the Building Control Alliance (BCA) came together to try and find a solution. Mr Evans chaired the group.
Minutes from a December 2014 meeting say its purpose was “identifying possible solutions to allowing [sic] polyurethane type insulation materials to be used in cladding systems over 18m”.
The guidance it drafted (Technical Guidance Note 18) was published in July 2014 and included a third option for compliance: “If no actual fire test data exists for a particular system, the client may instead submit a desktop study report from a suitable independent UKAS accredited testing body… stating whether, in their opinion, BR135 criteria would be met with the proposed system.”
Mr Evans insisted under questioning that this approach was justified by Approved Document B and was consistent with industry practice surrounding, for example, fire doors.
But wasn’t this very different from assessing the compliance of a combustible cladding system?
“Did it ever occur to you that it might not actually be very feasible to produce a desktop study telling you how a system would react if it was set alight based on tests conducted on completely different systems?” asked Sir Martin Moore-Bick (pictured above), the chair of the inquiry.
“Not at that time, no. No, it didn’t, no,” replied Mr Evans.
A year later, the guidance note was updated. The requirement for a UKAS-accredited testing house was removed and replaced with a requirement for the assessment to be done by “a suitably qualified fire specialist”.
He said this was necessary, because of a lack of “capacity” at the large test houses.
While Mr Evans said this was based on wording in Approved Document B, it was actually a weakening of the document, which referred to “a suitably qualified fire engineer”.
“Were you not concerned that some of them [desktop studies] could now come from unqualified or uncertified bodies and had irrelevant fire qualifications or minimal qualifications?” asked Mr Millett.
“That would be for the building-control body to pick up as part of their review,” replied Mr Evans.
‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’
With desktop studies in place, combustible cladding systems now had a clear route through the building-control system, provided an expert could be found to agree to their use.
The widespread use of these combustible systems was causing increasing alarm in the industry at the start of 2016.
The inquiry saw extraordinary evidence of this as it played video footage of a conference held in January 2016 on the issue of tall-building facades.
Mr Evans had just completed a presentation on the risks of cladding systems, which referenced large fires in the Middle East and contained a slide warning the industry that it could face manslaughter charges if it got it wrong. He and the panel then took questions from the audience.
One of these questions came from Nick Jenkins (pictured above), who worked for Booth Muirie, the cladding supplier that was part of the Euroclad Group. Mr Jenkins was adamant that the UK had a problem with aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding with a polyethylene core – the same type as that used in Dubai.
ACM was the cladding used on Grenfell Tower and has been identified as “the primary cause” of the rapid fire spread.
He told the panel that these systems could obtain a ‘Class 0’ rating, permitting their use under Approved Document B. He said that, of the systems he sold, only two had a higher fire rating.
Warning that the material “burns very aggressively”, he said, “you could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings that we supply product to in London”.
The chair of the panel directed this question to Mr Evans, asking him if the UK was “ sitting on a time bomb” regarding dangerous cladding.
Mr Evans responded by saying “you will have to ask our builder customers” to scattered laughs. He added that “an anomaly” in the building guidance (the Class 0 standard) did apparently permit the highly dangerous ACM.
“There could be instances where you have this polyethylene-filled panel on buildings over 18 metres,” he said.
Strangely, this contrasted with evidence he had given to the inquiry moments before the video was played, where he said he believed the guidance required cladding panels to meet the higher standard of limited combustibility.
“Why didn’t you just tell the audience straight up that… ACM panels with a PE core were dangerous and non-compliant and should not be used and should never have been used?” asked Mr Millett.
“It is probably a badly worded answer,” Mr Evans said. “I thought I was trying to explain where that misunderstanding came from although… on reviewing the video it’s a badly worded answer.”
The inquiry then saw that Mr Jenkins contacted Mr Evans after the session to follow up, ultimately directing his concerns to Mr Martin with an email in February 2016.
In it he warned he had “grave concerns” about the use of ACM and said he felt new guidance was necessary to outlaw its use.
Mr Martin disagreed, responding that he was “not sure the text [of Approved Document B] is really that ambiguous” and “it’s for the designer and building control body to consider if [the regulation] has been met”.
The guidance was not amended. In fact, the NHBC would publish its own guidance that legitimised the use of combustible materials even further.
‘Was this a desperate attempt to give some validity retrospectively to the commonly used wall build-ups which NHBC had been approving?’
In July 2016, the NHBC published a guidance note titled Acceptability of common wall constructions containing combustible materials in high rise buildings.
Mr Evans said the note was based on the large volume of desktop studies the firm had reviewed and was designed to demonstrate those which would be considered acceptable without even a desktop study.
It listed ACM as an acceptable cladding material and Kingspan K15 and Celotex RS5000 as acceptable insulations. This was the exact combination of materials used on Grenfell Tower.
This was done despite NHBC emails showing it knew of no tests where ACM had passed, and had been told of a test featuring solid aluminium and K15 which “failed within 15 minutes with ‘flames coming off the top of the test rig’”.
“We had seen at this point [desktop] assessments which, when assessed, were deemed to satisfy [the regulations] via their desktop assessment route,” Mr Evans said. “We then put a specification in place which we felt from that evidence we would be willing to accept as demonstrating compliance with [the regulations].”
“You see, by this time the use of combustible materials had been referred to variously as a ‘ticking time bomb’… ‘an accident waiting to happen’… and of grave concern. Why was NHBC now easing the passage of compliance for combustible materials rather than making things tighter?” asked Mr Millett (pictured above).
“I wouldn’t consider it at that point that we’d eased the passage. We had carried out a great deal of work in satisfying ourselves and gaining information from experts in this area that we could justify issuing that note and accepting those constructions,” said Mr Evans.
Asked if it was a “desperate attempt to give some validity retrospectively” to the projects the NHBC had signed off, Mr Evans said no.
Mr Evans was then shown spreadsheets pulled together after the Grenfell Tower fire, containing dozens of blocks where the NHBC had signed off on dangerous cladding systems. Inside Housing research has suggested there are at least 50, based on a relatively small sample size of completion certificates for affected buildings.
“Are you able to explain how it was that NHBC, with the high standards that you told us about… managed to sign off a number of very large projects made up of thousands of people’s homes when they didn’t comply with the building regulations?” asked Mr Millett.
“NHBC don’t build buildings. We were on site for a limited amount of time. It’s the builders’ responsibility to build in accordance with the building regulations,” replied Mr Evans.
Asked at the end of his evidence what he would have done differently, Mr Evans said he would have “been more assertive” with Kingspan.
“Evidence for the inquiry has revealed that they weren’t just delaying things, they were, in some cases, lying,” he said.
What’s next?
This week also saw the final evidence from witnesses from Local Authority Building Control, which we covered here. We covered their role in more detail last week here.
The inquiry will now break for Christmas, with oral evidence resuming on 24 January. When it does, we will hear from more witnesses involved in the testing and certification of cladding products, with former government officials and ministers taking the stand in the spring.
Grenfell Tower Inquiry week 60: headlines
Senior government official was warned of ‘grave concerns’ about Grenfell-style cladding in 2016
A senior government official was warned of “grave concerns” over the widespread use of the cladding material used on Grenfell Tower by a senior industry figure 15 months before the deadly fire, new emails released by the inquiry have revealed.
The National House Building Council (NHBC) continued to permit the use of combustible Kingspan insulation on high-rises despite its own fire engineer warning that the product was “an accident waiting to happen”.
NHBC denies being ‘poodle’ for Kingspan in accepting combustible insulation on high-rises
A senior staff member at the National House Building Council (NHBC) has denied the organisation was “captured by Kingspan” and “used by them as their poodles” in continuing to sign off the use of its combustible insulation on high-rises after learning it was not supported by testing.
The company that issued a certificate which said Kingspan’s combustible insulation could be used on high-rise buildings was “gamed”, “played” and “sweetened up” by the manufacturer, a senior staff member has said.
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Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries
Module one: the refurbishment
Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry
After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means
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Week three: Architects of misfortune
This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points
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Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’
The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment
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Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’
Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon
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Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’
Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence
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Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’
Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks
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Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’
This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor
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Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’
With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’
With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report
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Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’
With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports
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Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’
This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’
Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps
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Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’
This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps
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Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment
Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block
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Module two: the cladding products
Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’
The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports
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Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’
As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings
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Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story
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Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’
This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’
The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’
In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’
This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’
The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.
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Week 26: 'You were taking an enormous risk, weren't you?'
Week 26 at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was a key moment in understanding how dangerous products used on the tower came to be accepted by industry professionals. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’
The most explosive evidence this week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry came from those who did not attend, as the evidence which would have been presented to Arconic witnesses was displayed in their absence. Peter Apps reports
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Week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry zeroed in on the British Board of Agrément, the body that produced “misleading” certificates which inspired trust in both the cladding and insulation used on the tower. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 29: ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’
The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby government after the fire. Peter Apps reports
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How the products used in Grenfell Tower's cladding system were tested and sold
As the section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining how the products used in the cladding system were tested, marketed and sold comes to a close, Peter Apps summarises what we have learned about each of the products included in the system
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Module Three: the management of the tower
Week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of a fire the whole building can become an inferno’
The focus of the inquiry shifted this week to the actions of the social housing providers responsible for maintaining Grenfell Tower. Pete Apps recaps what we learned
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Week 31: ‘If we cannot get out people will die’
This week saw the former residents of Grenfell Tower enter the witness box to tell of their experiences attempting to raise complaints with the council and its managing agent. Pete Apps reports
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Week 32: ‘Let's hope our luck holds and there isn't a fire’
This week saw the return of the landlord of Grenfell Tower, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), as senior staff members attempted to explain how vital fire safety protections at the block were allowed to fall into disrepair. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 33: ‘Isn't that a serious gap in the scope of a policy meant to safeguard vulnerable people?’
A slightly disjointed week at the Grenfell Tower inquiry saw further evidence from staff at building manager Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) interspersed with the views of a cladding expert. Peter Apps reports
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Week 34: ‘Some members of the community are doing their best to spread false information’
Jack Simpson covers all the major revelations from the past week of evidence at the Grenfell Inquiry, including evidence from Laura Johnson, director of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.
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Week 35: ‘I really didn’t like the champagne’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw council witnesses, including former deputy leader Rock Feilding-Mellen and leader Nicholas Paget-Brown, questioned about their role in the story for the first time. Peter Apps reports
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Week 36: ‘Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry scrutinised the work of Carl Stokes, the man hired to carry out fire risk assessments for the block. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 37: ‘In giving that advice, weren’t you acting beyond your knowledge and expertise?’
A curtailed week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw fire risk assessor Carl Stokes grilled over advice he gave regarding the tower’s cladding. Peter Apps reports
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Week 38: ‘Well it’s a bit more than that, isn’t it. He’s suggesting that you tell the LFB a lie’
The inquiry heard the mammoth cross-examination of KCTMO’s health and safety manager Janice Wray this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 39: ‘What you said there was a grotesque understatement’
This week the inquiry continued to hear from former employees of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, as well as two employees from the London Fire Brigade. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 40: ‘An exercise in concealment and half-truth’
Former KCTMO chief executive Robert Black gave his evidence to the inquiry this week and was asked to account for the various failures described over the previous six weeks. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report.
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Week 41: ‘We should do nothing. This is not the sort of website we should be responding to’
This week saw the return of Robert Black, chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), before the inquiry turned its attention to the defective smoke control system in the tower. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 42:‘They would leak as much as they leaked. They were what they were’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued its in-depth investigation of the tower’s non-compliant smoke control system this week, with evidence from the various contractors involved in delivering it. Pete Apps reports
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Week 43:‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’
This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports
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Week 44:‘I've never seen a fully compliant firefighting lift in any local authority building, to this day actually’
This week the inquiry turn the focus onto the building’s defective lifts, with evidence from an expert, contractors who worked on them and a former engineer at KCTMO. Pete Apps reports.
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Week 45: ‘Don’t you find all this rather a surprising debate, given that the Equality Act was passed in 2010?’
The inquiry heard from expert witness Colin Todd this week, who gave his views about the work of risk assessor Carl Stokes as well as answered questions about his own guidance. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report
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Week 46: ‘I think I've been very, very clear that is completely wrong’
This week the inquiry heard further expert evidence about fire risk assessor Carl Stokes’ actions, as the section of its work covering the management and maintenance of the tower concluded. Peter Apps reports
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Six key failures in the way Grenfell Tower was managed before the fire
Peter Apps recaps some of what we have learned about the actions of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) in the years before the fire.
Module one and two closing statements
Week 47: ‘An unedifying spectacle’
After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group
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Module five: the fire brigade
Week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’
The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports
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Week 49: ‘I'm not sure we've always taken every opportunity to learn as an organisation’
How the London Fire Brigade acted upon lessons from incidents in the years before the Grenfell Tower disaster came under the microscope this week at the public inquiry. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 50: ‘There is a culture in LFB that is very conservative. I think there is great comfort in what is familiar’
This week the inquiry heard how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) elected not to issue warnings about dangerous cladding before Grenfell and a detailed examination of its policy for checking high risk buildings. Pete Apps reports.
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Week 51:‘We teach firefighters to expect building failure’
An unusually brief week of evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry explored how a fire service neighbouring London was taking a different approach to tackling blazes in high rises. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 52: ‘I actually think that there is a measure of incompetence at all levels’
Expert evidence concluded the current section of the inquiry with some stinging criticism of the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report.
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Module six: fire services
Week 53: ‘They make for chilling reading and harrowing listening’
The inquiry’s investigation into central government began this week with lawyers setting out their view on how and why firefighting policies failed. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 54: ‘Our consideration of evacuation at this time was something of a blind spot’
The development of policy on ‘stay put’, both nationally and for London, occupied the attention of the inquiry this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 55: ‘My review is pretty scathing!’
In a week that included the 200th day of evidence in phase two of the inquiry, attention turned to the London Fire Brigade’s control room. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 56: ‘Why didn't we thump the table harder’
This week, the control room at the London Fire Brigade was examined further – both before and after the fire. Pete Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 57: ‘It was worse than slow, it was sluggish’
Former London Fire Brigade (LFB) commissioner Dany Cotton was the star witness this week, as the inquiry continued to delve into the brigade’s knowledge and training before the Grenfell Tower fire. Jack Simpson, Grainne Cuffe and Pete Apps report
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Week 58: ‘I don't think we deserve to ask for trust until we demonstrate different outcomes’
A current and former commissioner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) wrapped up the inquiry’s investigation into the actions of the brigade before the fire. Grainne Cuffe and Peter Apps report.
Module six: testing and government
One of the major scandals of our time: key revelations as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turns to government
The government was accused of “covering up” the risks of dangerous cladding as its “unbridled passion for deregulation” left it a “junior party” to the construction industry as the latest phase of the public inquiry opened today. Peter Apps summarises some of the main points
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Week 59: ‘Recent tests have apparently shown it continued to burn for 20 minutes after the flame was taken away’
After shocking opening statements, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of Local Authority Building Control. Pete Apps reports
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Week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 61: ‘Mistakes are meant for learning, not repeating’
In the first hearings of the new year, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard closing statements from the firefighting section of phase two. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 62: Did it ever occur to you that this act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting?
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with a new shocking revelation about the government’s actions in the immediate aftermath of the fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 63: ‘It came after the general move to deregulation. So more regulation was not welcome’
The government’s focus on deregulation before the Grenfell Tower fire was placed in the spotlight this week with a series of shocking revelations about its failure to amend fire safety guidance. Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 64: ‘I didn’t think ACM would be suitable for use in any high-rise buildings. I don’t think anyone did’
This week, the Building Research Establishment’s Dr Sarah Colwell gave more than three days of evidence, with some huge revelations about what was known about the dangers of aluminium composite material years before the fire and the mass confusion over the government’s building regulations. Peter Apps and Jack Simpson report
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Week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’
Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 66: ‘Was there a cover-up?’
The latest evidence from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tracked the government’s failure to act on fire safety warnings right up until the months before the fire. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’
This week the inquiry heard disturbing new evidence about the failure of senior government officials to act on warnings about dangerous cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 68: ‘Can we agree that was a pretty dangerous thing to have, all this falling on one man’s shoulders?’
Three senior civil servants gave evidence this week, including the official who had responsibility for building regulations guidance on fire safety in the years before Grenfell. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 69: ‘It was just unthinkable. You had the makings here of a crisis you could not comprehend’
This week, civil servant Brian Martin gave his long-awaited evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps reports
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Week 70: ‘Show me the bodies’
An important week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw a dramatic conclusion to the mammoth cross-examination of civil servant Brian Martin, as well as the first politicians. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 71: ‘I have changed my schedule to fit this in. I do have an extremely busy day meeting people’
Three politicians who were responsible for building regulations before Grenfell appeared before the inquiry this week, including the former communities secretary Eric Pickles, who responded to the coroner’s letter following the Lakanal House fire. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Module Four: aftermath
Week 72: 'The system isn't broken. It was built this way'
This week the inquiry turned to the shocking story of the lack of support for bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Grainne Cuffe and Jack Simpson report
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Week 73: ‘Most people would regard that as hopeless’
This week, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard about the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s chaotic response in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, from the staff responsible for it. Pete Apps, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 74: ‘Do you agree that RBKC was ill-prepared and incapable to meet its duties’
This week, Nicholas Holgate, former chief executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, was grilled on his failure to hand over control of the aftermath of the fire, despite the borough’s lack of capacity. Peter Apps reports
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Week 75: ‘It still shocks me to the core that that’s how we treat our citizens in this country’
This week the inquiry heard witnesses from the housing management body discuss their role in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, followed by a range of witnesses from other organisations which supported the response. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’
This week the inquiry heard from central government figures and members of the London-wide emergency response arrangements. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 77: ‘The planning wasn’t done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s examination of the aftermath of the fire concluded with witnesses from central government. Peter Apps reports
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Module seven: expert evidence and closing statements
Week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard a range of expert witnesses discuss their reports. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 79: ‘You could argue the system was created to enable people to circumvent the rules’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued to hear expert evidence this week, with two senior figures in the world of fire safety academia criticising the government’s approach before and after the blaze. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’
As the inquiry moves into its final stages, lawyers for the key players gave statements about the evidence surrounding central government. Peter Apps reports
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Week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia. It’s racism. It is the elephant staring back at us in the room’
This week, closing statements covering the aftermath of the fire delivered a shocking new revelation and an expert toxicologist gave his views on the causes of the deaths. Peter Apps reports
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Module eight: further evidence relating to the deceased
Week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry moved into its final module this week, with evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims died. Peter Apps reports
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Week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’
A second week of evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims of the fire died delivered more heartbreaking stories about their final moments. Peter Apps recaps
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Week 84: ‘Every decision affects someone who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother’
The final week of oral evidence for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s second phase contained more heartbreaking evidence about the deaths in the tower. Peter Apps reports
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Closing statements
Week 85: ‘The merry-go-round turns still, the notes of its melody clearly audible in the last few days’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for closing statements from lawyers representing the bereaved and survivors and the various parties under scrutiny for the fire. Pete Apps reports.
