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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

Insight12.02.212.00 PM by Nathaniel Barker

This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports

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The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for the first time since early December, having been again delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Hearings took place over video call, a temporary measure that the inquiry has promised will stay in place only for “as long as is absolutely necessary”.

We heard more evidence from insulation giant Kingspan – about which shocking revelations had emerged before Christmas regarding its marketing and testing practices.

And for the first time, witnesses from Arconic, the multinational firm that manufactured the cladding panels used on Grenfell Tower, were subject to questioning. Remember, this cladding was identified as the “primary cause” of fire spread up the building in the inquiry’s phase one report.

The timing was fitting. As housing secretary Robert Jenrick was in parliament laying out the government’s grand plan to fix the gargantuan cladding scandal rocking the nation, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was uncovering how it all started in forensic detail.

Arconic told all French customers to use more fire-safe product a year before Grenfell

Fire brigade has only implemented four of 29 Grenfell Inquiry recommendations, says report

Grenfell cladding firm told ‘misleading half truth’ in concealing fire test failure, president admits

Kingspan manager celebrated ‘plainly misleading’ insulation certificate as ‘FANBLOODYTASTIC’

There was an unpleasant echo of history in Robert Jenrick’s comments on cladding

Absentees ‘unreasonable’

Before the first Arconic witness was called, Richard Millett QC (above), lead counsel to the inquiry, delivered a lengthy statement. He confirmed that three of the company’s former employees – Claude Wehrle, Gwenaelle Derrendinger and Peter Froehlich – are still refusing to give oral evidence.

The trio are arguing that the so-called French Blocking Statute means they could be prosecuted for doing so. That is despite France’s embassy in London confirming that this is not the case, and despite their former colleague Claude Schmidt now agreeing to attend.

“The inquiry’s position is that the refusal of these witnesses to come and give evidence is unreasonable,” Mr Millett said.

He also revealed that Arconic refused to disclose documents to the inquiry – and did so only after the Metropolitan Police requested a European Investigation Order.

The inquiry will ‘empty chair’ absent Arconic witnesses, presenting evidence it wanted to ask them about.

‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

The bulk of this week’s substantive evidence came from Deborah French (above), the former UK sales manager at Arconic who sold the cladding used on Grenfell Tower. She was under cross-examination for a little over two days – but for Ms French, it probably felt like much longer.

Grenfell United tweeted that on her second day of evidence alone she said either “I don’t remember” or “I don’t recall” more than 250 times. There were uncomfortable moments aplenty.

One particular moment occurred late on Wednesday. Ms French was shown an email sent by Mr Wehrle, then technical manager at Arconic, to several colleagues, including her, in February 2014.

Attached to this email was a recent test report for Reynobond PE – the product Ms French had been selling for years and was currently discussing with Grenfell refurbishment sub-contractors.

It showed that the polyethylene-cored panels achieved a fire safety rating of only Euroclass E, the second-lowest possible. This was significant because until that point, Arconic had been using a 2008 test report to claim that the product met the much higher Euroclass B standard, which was the basis on which the British Board of Agrément (BBA) had issued a certificate stating that Reynobond PE “may be regarded” as meeting UK national Class 0.

This Class 0 certification effectively cleared the product for use on high rises such as Grenfell Tower under English building guidance and was frequently sent to buyers by Ms French.

In his email, Mr Wehrle wrote: “The previous ‘B’ class reported done for Reynobond PE in riveted system can no more be used from now.”

But here’s the thing: it appears Ms French did nothing about this email from Mr Wehrle. She did not update her customers as other Arconic salespeople in Europe had done – and in fact sent the now-obsolete BBA certificate to the Grenfell sub-contractors just two months later.

Mr Millett then memorably told Ms French that “not a single person” who had given evidence to the inquiry before her – including architects, contractors, cladding designers, and building control officers – knew that Reynobond was ever identified as Class E. She agreed with him that she was in a position to make this known, and that she should have done so, but insisted: “I wouldn’t have deliberately withheld it for any reason.”

Ms French’s inaction following this email contrasted sharply with the proactive approach she apparently took in May 2013 following a major fire in Dubai involving aluminium composite material cladding similar to Reynobond PE.

Then, she contacted her customers to tell them that “on all projects” Arconic was able “to offer the right Reynobond specification including the core” (in reference to the fact that the company also sold a fire-retardant (FR) version of the product).

This week Ms French backtracked on this email and said “it was too heavy on the sales side”. But later, under pressure from Mr Millett, she agreed that in the case of Grenfell she had been in a position to ensure that the Reynobond product with the appropriate core ended up on the tower. But she did not.

Things went from bad to worse for Ms French on Thursday morning. It emerged that in 2015, shortly after leaving Arconic for a new job in the industry and while Reynobond PE was being ferried to Grenfell Tower, she realised that the product did not have a test report confirming it met Class 0 standards.

Mr Millett put it to her that this news – which meant she had for years been selling a product for use on high-rise buildings under false claims about its safety – “would have come as an earthquake”.

“I cannot remember what my reaction was to that other than, you know, surprised at the time that it didn’t have the Class 0,” Ms French said.

But, Mr Millett demanded, surely if she had been truly shocked and surprised she would be able to remember her reaction? Was it not the case that in fact she was not surprised at all because she already knew that Reynobond PE had no Class 0-supporting test report?

“I’m not sure,” Ms French replied. She did, however, deny having been aware that Reynobond PE did not have a test report supporting it for use as Class 0 for “a long time”.

In any case, she did not take steps to tell Vince Meakins, her replacement at Arconic, about this realisation – or anyone else.

To Mr Millett’s visible exasperation, she claimed that it did not occur to her at this point that she had sold Reynobond PE for use on Grenfell on a false basis regarding its fire classification, saying: “I didn’t have the knowledge to put all those facts together.”

That answer spoke to a theme common throughout the inquiry so far, but particularly noticeable during Ms French’s evidence.

Repeatedly, she declared an acute lack of knowledge about the products and documents she was handling on a daily basis, and asserted that she trusted others in the Arconic hierarchy to be making the right decisions. “Working for an organisation like [Arconic] it didn’t even enter my head that it was or it wasn’t suitable,” she said of Reynobond PE early on. These claims were challenged on many occasions by Mr Millett.

As usual, at the end of her cross-examination, Ms French was asked if there was anything she would have done differently during her involvement in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment.

This is how she responded: “I’ve obviously had a good few years to be able to reflect on this. I mean, firstly, I want to say that it was a dreadful tragedy. One that I hope that we never have to witness again. I’ve learned significant amounts, and there is an awful lot that I’ve learned and taken on board fully. And I’m making sure that I improve on that knowledge every day. And that I pass that on to everybody that I’m currently working with and come into contact with.”

‘They are very secret over stuff like that’

The inquiry is clearly frustrated that it has been able to call only a limited number of witnesses from Arconic to give evidence. And no wonder – there are some enormous questions surrounding the firm that still need to be answered.

For one: why did it not inform the BBA that the Class 0 certificate for Reynobond PE needed to be withdrawn after it internally dropped the associated Euroclass B certificate? In fact, why did it continue to sell Reynobond PE at all when it was well aware that it was dangerous, and competitors were taking similar products off the market?

On Thursday the inquiry was shown the transcript of a phone conversation between Ms French and one of her former Arconic clients that took place in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. It revealed that Ms French told the client that Arconic chose “not to put it in the public domain” that it had internally withdrawn the Euroclass B report, adding that “they are very secret over stuff like that”.

Further, she said that “cost implications” had been behind the decision not to remove Reynobond PE from the market. The inquiry earlier heard that Arconic made a profit margin of around €7-8 on Reynobond PE, compared with €5-6 for the fire-resistant version.

(As a rather depressing aside, the inquiry heard this week that using Reynobond FR on Grenfell Tower would have likely cost about €28,000 to €30,000 more than the PE core that was used – just 0.3% of the refurbishment budget.)

Monday will see the return of Ms French’s replacement at Arconic, Mr Meakins. His evidence on Thursday established that he was pushed, unlike Ms French, to sell the fire-resistant version of Reynobond. He was also unaware that there was no valid Class 0 test certificate for Reynobond PE.

Expect the inquiry to delve further into the decisions Arconic was making about its products in the run-up to the Grenfell Tower fire.

‘FANBLOODYTASTIC’

By Peter Apps

Before Ms French took the stand (or Zoom call, at least), there was one witness from insulation manufacturer Kingspan for the inquiry to cross-examine.

Andrew Pack (above) was asked about two primary matters: his role as leader of the technical advice team in the 2000s and the work he did in relation to obtaining a certificate from the Local Authority Building Control (LABC), which proved important in persuading the industry that Kingspan’s insulation was suitable for use on high rises.

On both, Mr Pack sought to minimise his involvement, claiming that his was largely an “admin” role and that questions about K15 (the combustible insulation that formed part of Grenfell Tower’s cladding system) were a minor part of his overall job.

But there were plenty of difficult questions to answer. His job was to lead the team that answered queries from architects and consultants about the appropriate use of Kingspan products. While he claimed that most queries relating to the use of K15 on high rises were passed to another, more specialist team, this was not always the case.

Why, for example, did he email a client in September 2011 suggesting that the product had passed a test clearing it for use on steel-frame buildings?

He claimed his understanding was that its solitary test pass (which related to masonry construction) was acceptable so long as the steel frame had a non-combustible board attached. But this is not what his email said.

“In plain and simple terms what you have written here, that tests in plural have been carried out, and include tests to BS 8414 part 2 [the test for steel frame, which Kingspan had not passed] is not true, is it?” counsel Rachel Troup asked.

“Correct,” Mr Pack replied.

With regard to the LABC certificate, Mr Pack arranged the initial meetings with LABC and checked a draft of the document. At no point did he query or correct a critical error: the statement that K15 could be considered a product of limited combustibility (the standard required for use on high rises, which it did not meet).

His argument was that he felt the certificate merely cleared the product for use behind non-combustible cladding (which, incidentally, even itself would have been more than was actually permitted by the rules).

But he found it tougher to explain the jubilation of his boss, Philip Heath, about the certificate’s wording, with the inquiry revealing emails that showed him describing it as “GOLD” and “FANBLOODYTASTIC”.

Mr Pack said that Mr Heath would have to explain his excitement himself. Sadly, Mr Heath has already been questioned and the inquiry did not have these emails at that time.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry: week 23 headlines

Grenfell cladding firm did not withdraw ACM for ‘commercial reasons’, inquiry hears: Arconic continued to sell the cladding product used on Grenfell Tower despite concerns about its safety because of “cost implications”, its UK salesperson said on a phone call shortly after the fire.
Grenfell cladding sales manager sat on report showing panels failed safety tests, inquiry hears: The former Arconic employee who sold the cladding used on Grenfell Tower failed to tell her customers about a report that showed the product was unsafe for use on high rises, the inquiry into the fire heard.
Former Arconic employee who sold ACM used on Grenfell agrees certificate was misleading: A certificate that supported the decision to use the deadly cladding material installed on Grenfell Tower was “misleading”, an ex-employee of the product’s manufacturer has told the inquiry into the fire.
Kingspan manager celebrated ‘plainly misleading’ certificate as ‘FANBLOODYTASTIC’: A senior Kingspan manager celebrated a “plainly misleading” certificate that suggested the company’s combustible insulation could be used on high rises by writing “FANBLOODYTASTIC” in an email to colleagues, the inquiry heard.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points