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Four things we learned from the Grenfell survivors’ inquiry evidence

Insight23.11.187.00 AM by Peter Apps

The evidence of survivors to the Grenfell Inquiry concluded at the start of this month. Peter Apps assesses what we’ve learned from their testimonies. Pictures by Alamy, Press Association and Rex Features

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Four things we learned from the Grenfell survivors’ inquiry evidence #ukhousing

Windows

A key question since the fire has been how it broke out of Flat 16 and ignited the cladding, and how it then broke back in to the building and killed residents sheltering in their flats.

The evidence of survivors has pointed towards issues with the windows, installed during the same refurbishment which fitted the cladding, as contributing. Many statements describe flames coming in through windows – others describe seeing it move across window panels on the outside of the building.

Fire doors

The fire door problems at Grenfell Tower were terrifyingly widespread. We already knew that 106 wooden doors in Grenfell were replaced in 2011 with a new composite ‘Suredor’ model made by Manse Masterdor, which has since failed safety tests.

What we have learned from the residents’ evidence is the shocking prevalence of faults with these doors – 46 of 81 residents to give evidence (56%) have referred to problems with their fire doors. The vast majority of these complaints have been about missing self-closers.

Expert evidence released by the inquiry this week suggests this may have been a major contributing factor in the early spread of smoke within the communal areas of the tower – which resulted in residents being trapped in flats and hampered the efforts of firefighters to reach them.

Professor Jose Torero said in his report: “Given the information available, it is most likely that this occurred because doors were open. This highlights the importance of self-closing mechanisms for doors.”

This line of evidence raises difficult questions for building manager the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) – which appears not to have responded to some specific resident complaints on this point, and in others to have actively removed the self-closers when they broke without replacing them.

A major warning to other housing providers then: ensure self-closers in your tower blocks are in good working order.

Relationship with KCTMO and Rydon

Residents have lined up to describe how difficult their relationship with KCTMO and contractor Rydon had become during the refurbishment and in the years before the disaster.

Samuel Daniels, who lived on the 16th floor, said: “The relationship with Rydon was toxic. Residents resented them being there and the disruption to their lives. The builders were rude to residents and we were rude back.”

Edward Daffarn in his evidence recalls that “around 40” households put up signs on their front doors reading “no entry to Rydon”. Mr Daffarn, who ran the now-famous Grenfell Action Group blog, also accused KCTMO of effectively overseeing “managed decline” of the Lancaster West Estate.

Rydon was responsible for the refurbishment which included the fitting of cladding and new windows. KCTMO was responsible for the internal features of the building – including fire doors.

The extent to which missed warnings (particularly on fire doors and windows, with residents unaware of the dangerous combination of materials used in the cladding) resulted from the broken relationship will be explored further in the second half of the inquiry. But for now, it is enough to serve and underscore the importance of social landlords listening to and engaging with angry residents.

Stay put

Unsurprisingly, there is a substantial amount of anger from residents over the stay put advice they were given by the fire service.

For example Farhad Neda, who escaped from the 23rd floor, said he felt residents were “fatally let down”. “Having been in contact with the firefighters outside the tower, I was told on several occasions that they were on the way to get us. I feel that it is the false hope which prevented a number of people from escaping the tower that night,” he said.

Indeed, many felt this anger – including Paulos Tekle, the father of five-year-old Isaac who got lost while evacuating the tower and died. Mr Tekle told the inquiry that he was visited by a firefighter at close to 2am and told to remain in his flat and await rescue. When the family eventually made their bid to escape at 2.54am, conditions were barely survivable on the stairs.

While the advice given by the fire service was clearly offered in good faith and based reasonably on the evidence of previous fires, it seems clear that some residents were let down.

The official position on stay put from the National Fire Chiefs Council says that it is “usually safer to stay in your flat unless the heat or smoke from the fire is affecting you”.

But Natasha Elcock told the emergency call handler at 1.43am that there was smoke coming into her flat. She continued to be told to stay put until almost 3am, by which point she was lying on the floor to keep away from the smoke. She’d phoned 999 five times during this period and at every stage was told to stay in the flat. This evidence is not uncommon and raises difficult questions over the strategy and the advice.

Never Again campaign

In the days following the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017, Inside Housing launched the Never Again campaign to call for immediate action to implement the learning from the Lakanal House fire, and a commitment to act – without delay – on learning from the Grenfell Tower tragedy as it becomes available.

One year on, we have extended the campaign asks in the light of information that has emerged since.

Here are our updated asks:

GOVERNMENT

Act on the recommendations from Dame Judith Hackitt’s review of building regulations to tower blocks of 18m and higher. Commit to producing a timetable for implementation by autumn 2018, setting out how recommendations that don’t require legislative change can be taken forward without delay
Follow through on commitments to fully ban combustible materials on high-rise buildings
Unequivocally ban desktop studies
Review recommendations and advice given to ministers after the Lakanal House fire and implement necessary changes
Publish details of all tower blocks with dangerous cladding, insulation and/or external panels and commit to a timeline for remedial works. Provide necessary guidance to landlords to ensure that removal work can begin on all affected private and social residential blocks by the end of 2018. Complete quarterly follow-up checks to ensure that remedial work is completed to the required standard. Checks should not cease until all work is completed.
Stand by the prime minister’s commitment to fully fund the removal of dangerous cladding
Fund the retrofitting of sprinkler systems in all tower blocks across the UK (except where there are specific structural reasons not to do so)
Explore options for requiring remedial works on affected private sector residential tower blocks

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Take immediate action to identify privately owned residential tower blocks so that cladding and external panels can be checked

LANDLORDS

Publish details of the combinations of insulations and cladding materials for all high rise blocks
Commit to ensuring that removal work begins on all blocks with dangerous materials by the end of 2018 upon receipt of guidance from government
Publish current fire risk assessments for all high rise blocks (the Information Commissioner has required councils to publish and recommended that housing associations should do the same). Work with peers to share learning from assessments and improve and clarify the risk assessment model.
Commit to renewing assessments annually and after major repair or cladding work is carried out. Ensure assessments consider the external features of blocks. Always use an appropriate, qualified expert to conduct assessments.
Review and update evacuation policies and ‘stay put’ advice in the light of risk assessments, and communicate clearly to residents
Adopt Dame Judith Hackitt’s recommended approach for listening to and addressing tenants’ concerns, with immediate effect