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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 47: ‘an unedifying spectacle’

Insight17.09.211.00 PM by Lucie Heath

After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group

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This week the Grenfell inquiry heard closing statements for the first two modules of the inquiry from groups including Rydon, KCTMO and Kingspan @luciemheath reports #UKhousing

This week, the core participants from the first two modules of phase two of the inquiry gave their closing statements. These modules covered the fatal refurbishment of the tower and the testing and marketing of the cladding and insulation fixed to its walls.

In January 2020, when this part of the inquiry began, lead counsel Richard Millett QC accused the corporations involved in the refurbishment of engaging in a “merry-go-round of buck-passing”.

In the one-and-a-half years that followed, the inquiry sat through countless hours of evidence, which provided endless revelations about the industry that allowed an unsafe building like Grenfell to be built.

Despite this, as noted by a lawyer representing a group of the bereaved, survivors and residents yesterday, the buck-passing “continues” and the stated position of those involved in the building’s refurbishment remains largely the same.

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KCTMO sold Grenfell residents’ ‘interests and safety’ to ‘lowest bidder’, says mayor of London

“Donkeys led by donkeys”

Stephanie Barwise

This week’s evidence was bookended by closing statements from two groups of the bereaved, survivors and residents. They set out their main allegations against those involved.

Both groups were highly critical of the core team involved in the renovation of the tower, which roughly took place between 2012 and 2016. This team included Studio E Architects; Rydon, the lead contractor from 2014 onwards; Harley Facades, the cladding subcontractor; and Exova, the fire engineer.

Each organisation was criticised for failing to notice that non-compliant materials were being used on Grenfell Tower and continually assuming that other people on the project were responsible for fire safety.

Representing one group of residents, Stephanie Barwise QC said the refurbishment project was led by an “inept design team” and that the evidence from those involved demonstrates “the existence of a culture of non-compliance within certain sectors of the construction industry”.

A second group of residents was critical of the web of subcontractors involved in the project, which many believe facilitated a culture of buck-passing. They said Rydon should have ensured those it subcontracted were capable of carrying out the work they were hired to do, and described the process as “donkeys led by donkeys”.

Criticism was also directed at the refurbishment project’s client, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), which has been accused of putting cost-savings ahead of residents’ safety.

A lawyer representing the mayor of London said on Wednesday that KCTMO, which managed the estate on behalf of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), “sold the interests and safety of the bereaved, survivors and residents to the lowest bidder”.

The second group of residents argued that the disaster at Grenfell would never have happened if “RBKC performed its building control functions competently”.

“An arsonist blaming the fire brigade for not putting out the fire he started”

Sam Stein

Both resident groups were equally scathing of the manufacturers of the cladding and insulation used on Grenfell Tower. They have been accused of manipulating fire test data and producing marketing literature that made misleading claims regarding their products’ safety.

This includes Arconic, the cladding firm, and Kingspan and Celotex, the insulation manufacturers.

Representing one group of residents, Sam Stein QC said: “Evidence from all three companies showed no regard was given to the danger that their products posed to the public. Nothing was allowed to stand in the way of market share. If there was a bad test, it was ignored, and the next one rigged until the desired result was achieved.”

He said it was “remarkable” that Arconic attempted to distribute some of the blame for Grenfell to the fire brigade in its closing statement. “This is analogous to an arsonist blaming the fire brigade for not putting out the fire he started,” he said.

The organisations that tested and certified these products, including the Building Research Establishment (BRE), the British Board of Agrément (BBA) and Local Authority Building Control (LABC) were accused of “helping” the manufacturers with their “large-scale conspiracies to defraud”.

Mr Stein said: “These organisations, with varying degrees of consciousness, allowed themselves to be used. At best, they demonstrated such laziness and lack of rigour in their procedures that they were practically inviting the abuse perpetrated by the manufacturers.”

Overall, both residents’ groups were highly critical of all the corporate bodies for largely failing to accept blame and pointing the finger at others during the closing statements. One group called the week’s statements “an unedifying spectacle”.

“Operating in an orthodox manner and following standard industry practice”

Marcus Taverner

The team involved in the Grenfell refurbishment put forward three main arguments when defending themselves in their closing statements.

First, Grenfell was the result of poor building regulations that led to confusion within the construction industry. Second, this confusion was exploited by the product manufacturers that promoted their products as safe. Third, someone else on the refurbishment team was responsible for compliance.

Rydon, for example, attempted to push much of the responsibility for the cladding compliance onto Studio E Architects and Harley, the cladding subcontractor. Marcus Taverner QC, Rydon’s lawyer, said the company was “operating in an orthodox manner and following standard industry practice” by discharging this responsibility to specialist firms.

He said Rydon “did not profess to have the specialist knowledge to read all product literature relating to all of the many products used on the project and, in any event, did not have the skills to see through the misleading product marketing” from the manufacturers.

In its statement, Studio E said it “firmly believes that its staff were not incompetent”. Again, it pointed the finger at the regulatory system, which it described as “not fit for purpose”, and argued that any “reasonable architect” did not have “knowledge of the inadequacies in the system” at the time.

Harley Facades did not provide a closing statement this week, however employees from the firm previously said they believed Celotex and Arconic’s products were safe to use on Grenfell from reading their marketing literature.

Exova pushed the blame onto Rydon for failing to enter into a contract with it after taking over the Grenfell project.

The fire safety specialist wrote an early fire strategy for the refurbishment that said the design, which at that point did not include ACM cladding, would have “no adverse effect in relation to external fire spread”. The strategy said this finding would be confirmed by a later issue of the report, but no such report was ever written.

Exova said Rydon “are to blame for putting financial self-interest before all other considerations and never giving fire safety a second thought in the process”.

On the client side, KCTMO said it had an “obligation to secure value for money in procurement” and that this should be kept in mind when the inquiry considers “tender bids, cost savings and value engineering”.

A similar argument was put forward by RBKC. However, the council did admit fault within its building control department and said further admissions will be made in its closing statement to module three regarding the way the council oversaw KCTMO.

One of the main defences put forward by the designers, contractors and clients involved in the Grenfell refurbishment is the fact that there was nothing unique about this project, evidenced by the hundreds of buildings in the UK that have used ACM cladding and other unsafe materials.

Residents pointed out that the fact that the mistakes made by the refurbishment team were common should not serve to exonerate those who worked on Grenfell.

“Wrong and deeply unfair to try and pin the blame on the manufacturer of a particular material”

Geraint Webb

In their closing statements, each manufacturing firm largely denied accusations that they manipulated test data or knowingly misled the market, admitting to only a small number of failures. Kingspan was particularly bullish, criticising both the inquiry and the media for repeating “untrue” allegations against the companies.

Celotex and Kingspan did apologise for the “inappropriate and unacceptable conduct” of a number of individual employees.

Arconic’s lawyers claimed that the admission by the company’s president, Claude Schmidt, that the French cladding firm “misled” its customers over the safety of its product was due to a misunderstanding of the English word “misleading”.

Since Grenfell, a major argument put forward by all the manufacturing firms is that they were not responsible for how their product was used on Grenfell Tower and that they would never have recommended it be used in the way it was. This argument remained a constant theme throughout closing statements.

Arconic, for example, maintains that its ACM cladding was “capable of being used in a safe and compliant manner” on Grenfell and that it was the choice of combustible insulation that led to the system being non-compliant.

Kingspan and Celotex, on the other hand, said the cladding was to blame for the fire at Grenfell. Geraint Webb QC, representing Kingspan, argued that ACM “was unsafe for use with any type of insulation” and that the “nature and speed of the spread of the fire would not have been materially different if non-combustible mineral fibre insulation had been used”.

Regardless of what the inquiry makes of the firms’ conduct, the manufacturers also argued that they cannot be accused of misleading the refurbishment team involved with Grenfell, as there is little evidence the team bothered to read their literature in the first place.

For example, Craig Orr QC, speaking on behalf of Celotex, admitted the firm had described a 2014 fire test in an “innacurate” way, but said this had “no impact on and is completely irrelevant to the specifications, supply and use” of the insulation at Grenfell, because “it is clear beyond doubt” that no construction professional placed any reliance on Celotex’s literature.

He said the arguments by the construction team that they were misled by the manufacturers “should be rejected”.

“They have been devised after the event by the construction professionals to excuse their failure to have any proper regard to the compliance of the system they designed and constructed,” he said.

A similar argument was put forward by the BRE and LABC, which both admitted failings when it came to testing or certifying the products used on Grenfell, but said these failures did not cause the fire, as there is no evidence the refurbishment team relied on their certificates.

Both organisations also said they were not responsible for the way the manufacturers “abused” their systems. The BBA did not give a closing statement this week, but a senior BBA employee previously said the firm’s procedures were not designed to cope with a situation where manufacturers would deliberately withhold test data.

The inquiry continues.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points