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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 29: ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’

Insight26.03.2112.15 PM by Peter Apps

The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby the government after the fire. Peter Apps reports

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The final week in this section of the inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby the government after the fire. @PeteApps reports #UKhousing #GrenfellTowerInquiry

This week the inquiry returned to hearing evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, which provided some of the insulation used on the walls of Grenfell Tower.

While the majority of the witnesses from the firm gave evidence in December last year, its very final witness, Richard Burnley, former managing director for UK & Ireland, was cut short when the inquiry paused due to the pandemic.

The reason he waited so long to return is that he was to be questioned about Kingspan’s lobbying efforts in the aftermath of the fire and while the inquiry was paused, Kingspan challenged this. They claimed questions about tests the firm carried out to bolster its case that combustible materials should not be banned were put in error.

This also necessitated the return of another witness, Adrian Pargeter, head of technical and marketing in Britain and Ireland, to clarify the evidence he had given about this period.

Here is what we learned.

‘We can confirm… [we] are happy that the build-up you propose is suitable to include K15’

As well as the post-Grenfell lobbying, there were a couple of important elements of the firm’s pre-fire actions which were examined.

One of these was a marketing pamphlet titled ‘Routes to Compliance’ (pictured above), which Kingspan published in August 2015 to outline to the market how its products could be used in compliance with the rules.

This document included two case studies – Brook House in Tottenham, north London and Spruce Court in Pendleton, Salford – which paired Kingspan’s combustible insulation with the polyethylene-cored cladding panels used on Grenfell Tower.

This is important, because in Mr Burnley’s witness statement he said checks carried out by the firm after the Grenfell fire did not reveal any instances where its insulation had been used with this cladding with Kingspan’s knowledge.

In fact it emerged that the firm had sent a letter to the developers of the Salford tower which specifically said “we can confirm… [we] are happy that the build-up you propose is suitable to include K15”.

The summary Kingspan had been sent included the detail that the cladding was to be ‘Reynobond 4mm’, the same brand of aluminium composite material (ACM) as used on Grenfell Tower. Mr Burnley said he was not sure Kingspan knew the exact core of the planned cladding when it provided the letter.

‘I am sure [this] is a direct result of our testing and campaigning on this issue’

The second area of important information this week concerned the UK’s largest private building inspector, the National House Building Council (NHBC).

We have previously heard that the organisation raised significant concerns about the use of Kingspan’s insulation on high-rise buildings throughout 2014, culminating in a letter in January 2015 which threatened to start rejecting it and reveal to the market that the NHBC did not believe it was compliant.

But what we also know is that in July 2016 the NHBC had entirely reversed this view and published guidance that endorsed the use of K15 and other combustible products even in untested systems with popular cladding panels. The big question has been, why the volte-face?

This week we saw new emails which showed Kingspan reacting to the publication of the guidance shortly after its publication.

Mr Pargeter wrote that the new guidance “effectively eased the passage of compliance for a selection of combustible insulation brands”.

“Overall I feel this is good news as it shows a shift in thinking and an acceptance of combustible insulation and I am sure is a direct result of our testing and campaigning on this issue,” he said.

“What is the campaigning that he is referring to there?” asked Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry.

“I assume by campaigning he means the meetings that we’ve had with various people, including the NHBC, to explain the test results,” said Mr Burnley.

“We want to remain ‘friends’ with DCLG”

Much of this week’s evidence related to Kingspan’s actions after the Grenfell Tower fire and its efforts to ensure regulations did not introduce a ban on combustible materials on high-rise buildings and instead continued to permit systems that had passed a large-scale test.

As the inquiry heard in December, the firm made contact with two large public relations firms – Grayling and Portland – and set about devising a plan to meet key MPs and persuade them of its argument.

“Some people will not want to meet you and they will not want to be lobbied,” said a strategy document produced by Portland in August 2017 entitled ‘Kingspan, political engagement plan’ (pictured above). “But there is still immeasurable value in getting Kingspan’s manifesto in front of these decision-makers. We want them to read it. We need them to read it.”

On 6 September 2017, an internal Kingspan email discussed the government’s latest advice to building owners following recent cladding tests. It suggested “a friendly tap on the shoulder” to raise its views with the then Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). “We want to remain ’friends’ with DCLG,” the email said.

“What kind of relationship did Kingspan have with the DCLG that would accommodate this friendly tap?” asked Mr Millett.

“My understanding is that we didn’t have a strong relationship with DCLG. I think people probably knew people, but I don’t think there was any strong relationships,” replied Mr Burnley.

Kingspan’s lobbying efforts continued, including a dinner with Conservative MP Kevin Hollinrake and others in January 2018, when Kingspan presented its views on the importance of testing. Mr Hollinrake was given a ‘double asterix’ in Kingspan’s original lobbying plan, because the firm was a large employer in his constituency and he sat on an influential select committee which was examining the post-Grenfell response of government.

This was a crucial period. The government had instructed Dame Judith Hackitt to undertake a post-fire review of building regulations and by spring 2018 her report was imminent. She had signalled that she would not call for a ban on combustible materials and would instead endorse the system of testing and desktop studies with some reforms. This would have represented a win for Kingspan.

But the select committee stood in its way. It was convinced a ban would be a safer route and was pushing for it. Kingspan needed something to change the debate.

‘Do you accept that your attempts… to set the record straight have simply been to create a further record of dissembling and mendacity?’

What Kingspan sought to do was use a large-scale test on a non-combustible system to show that these materials could also produce unsafe results.

This is where the alteration to Mr Pargeter’s (pictured above) evidence comes in. In December, he was grilled over evidence which showed Kingspan planning to test a system comprised of non-combustible elements, but deliberately designing in defects aimed to make it fail.

He had been questioned on the premise that this test failed in July 2018 and was used to support Kingspan’s case against the combustibles ban

Actually, it transpired that despite the deliberately induced weaknesses, the test passed in May 2018. He accepted, when questioned this week, that this was “a disappointment” to Kingspan.

But why had he not mentioned it when he first gave evidence? His claim was that under the pressure of cross-examination he “forgot”.

“I have to suggest to you that that’s not really credible, is it?” asked Mr Millett.

“Well, what other reason would I have for withholding that?” replied Mr Pargeter.

“One reason might be that you had never hitherto mentioned even the existence of the May test and the blow that it dealt to your case, let alone disclosed any documents about it. That would be a good reason for not mentioning it when you were giving evidence, wouldn’t it?” said Mr Millett.

“No, I wouldn’t have thought − I wouldn’t have thought that, no,” replied Mr Pargeter.

So what of the July test which did fail? It transpired this was carried out on a system which utilised a product called ‘Vitracore G2’. This material had an ‘A2’ rating, meaning it could be used in spite of the combustibles ban, but Kingspan was aware it actually had a much lower fire performance and had been involved in previous test failures with one internal email saying it would “go up like [polyethylene]”.

This test was carried out in Dubai and duly failed. Kingspan went on to present the findings to the select committee, but did not reveal that the Vitracore product had been picked because of its poor fire performance. Why not?

Mr Pargeter claimed that this was because the product had an A2 rating, so regardless of any suspected weakness, it could still be used following a ban. He denied that concealing this – and the May test – amounted to misleading the select committee.

“Do you accept that your attempts following your evidence on 9 December 2020 to set the record straight have simply been to create a further record of dissembling and mendacity, Mr Pargeter?” asked Mr Millett.

“No,” replied Mr Pargeter.

‘Would it be fair… to say that you were set up by others at Kingspan as Kingspan’s useful idiot?’

Asked about this same sequence of events, Mr Burnley (pictured above) – who actually presented the evidence to the select committee and whose signature appeared on the letter describing the tests – claimed he had not known about the failed attempts to set up the May test for failure.

He insisted Kingspan did not act for commercial reasons and was simply concerned about public safety, honestly believing testing to be the best way to achieve this.

“Are you really going to sit there and say that?” asked Mr Millett.

“That was my belief,” Mr Burnley replied.

He was then shown an email exchange between other Kingspan colleagues which said he had been chosen to give evidence because “he knows enough but not too much, which is helpful”.

“Would it be fair… to say that you were set up by others at Kingspan as Kingspan’s useful idiot, who knew the case message, could speak very articulately to it, but not the fact that it rested on flimsy evidence?” asked Mr Millett.

“I don’t believe that’s the case, no. If that had been the case then I wouldn’t have accepted the invitation to go,” replied Mr Burnley.

Mr Millett then repeated to him a question he asked Mr Pargeter in December: “Is it true that Kingspan’s position, even in 2018, in the face of a government investigation into 14 fire safety following the Grenfell Tower fire, was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?”

Mr Burnley said he “did not accept that at all”.

‘Do you accept that the BBA has shown itself to be toothless and weak?’

Almost two weeks of evidence from witnesses at the British Board of Agrément (BBA) also concluded this week, with chief scientific officer John Albon (pictured above) grilled about certificates the organisation issued covering the Kingspan K15 insulation and Reynobond PE 55 cladding panels used on Grenfell Tower.

Much of this cross-examination retraced evidence from previous weeks, but towards the end of his evidence, counsel Kate Grange QC turned to a broader theme.

She read from descriptions of the BBA on its website, which said it “set the standard for excellence” based on “independence” and an “unrivalled track record”. It called itself “the leading authority on building product certification; a position we’ve held for more than 50 years”.

Ms Grange then ran through the various failures the inquiry has identified in the BBA’s work:

A failure to obtain tests on a ‘cassette’ version of the cladding, which showed its devastating fire performance before issuing a certificate which appeared to condone its use on high rises in 2007. Mr Albon said it “was the responsibility of the manufacturer to supply them” and “our procedures are not designed to cope with that scenario”. He did accept that there was a “failure” not to identify that the testing it did have only covered a different means of fixing the panel to buildings.
A “serious failure” in its review of the certificate between 2013 and 2015 which saw the BBA publish an update without obtaining fresh testing from manufacturer Arconic after its requests were “stonewalled”. Mr Albon accepted the review had “failed to identify that there were additional fire test reports available”.
On the Kingspan certificate, he accepted the firm had included statements about fire performance that were “inaccurate and misleading and which had no proper evidential basis”, namely that it had a Class 0 fire rating and “would not contribute to the development stages of a fire”. He also agreed the firm had been “extremely slow to implement” changes it asked for in 2008 but did not make until 2013.
He rejected, however, that including a statement which said the insulation could be used “in accordance” with a passage of official guidance that demanded a higher fire standard was a “particularly serious error”.

“In the light of all of that, do you accept that the work of the BBA fell a long way short of the standards of excellence advertised by the BBA on its website?” asked Ms Grange.

Mr Albon said he accepted “mistakes were made”, but said that he hoped “suitably experienced and knowledgeable professionals” could still have made use of the certificate.

“Do you also accept that the BBA has shown itself to be toothless and weak in its dealings with product manufacturers?” Ms Grange asked.

“No, I don’t agree with that,” said Mr Albon. He said this was because the organisation had withdrawn its certificate covering Arconic’s cladding panels after a BBC journalist alerted them to additional tests after the fire.

What’s next?

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has now concluded this module, which focused on the testing and marketing of the products used on the tower. You can read our summary of what we learned here.

We now move focus to the social housing management of the tower, which will include matters such as resident complaints, fire risk assessments and the maintenance of the tower.

Opening statements for that section of the inquiry will begin on Monday.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry headlines: week 29

Kingspan manager denies being ‘useful idiot’ in firm's post-Grenfell lobbying

A manager at insulation manufacturer Kingspan has denied being used as a “useful idiot” during the firm’s push against plans to ban combustible materials in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire.

NHBC accepted combustible insulation ‘as a direct result’ of Kingspan ‘campaigning’

The UK’s largest building inspector published guidance saying it would accept the use of untested combustible cladding systems “as a direct result” of “campaigning” by insulation manufacturer Kingspan, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard.

Kingspan direction denies attempt to ‘mislead’ MPs by concealing cladding tests

A senior Kingspan director denied attempts to “mislead” MPs investigating the dangers of cladding systems after Grenfell by “concealing” testing it carried out on non-combustible cladding systems.

BBA committed ‘very basic failure of due diligence’ over Kingspan certificate, inquiry hears

The chief scientific officer at the UK’s leading certification body for construction products has accepted “a very basic failure of due diligence” in producing a certificate covering the combustible Kingspan insulation later used on Grenfell Tower.

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